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Terrorist groups from around the globe rely on a range of communication 
tactics to rally support to their political movement, including publicly directed 
discourse ranging from public talks to online publications. Thus far, the 
criminological literature has focused primarily on efforts embodied in law and policy 
to make terrorism harder to commit. Based on the zero-sum assumption that any 
losses for a terrorist group result in gains for a government, this perspective suggests 
that terrorism may only be reduced through deterrence or by diminishing the relative 
capacity of terrorist organizations. In contrast, this dissertation argues that public 
communications are a relatively inexpensive, readily available, and less oppressive 
means to potentially reduce terrorism.  
Seeking to identify the role that government public communications have 
played in existing counter-terrorism strategies, this dissertation examines US public 
communications regarding terrorism delivered by US Presidents and their Press 
  
Secretaries between 1970 and 2014. Drawing upon the 6,001 transcripts of 
presidential communications concerning terrorism during this period, a series of 
structural equation models are employed to estimate the impact of the quantity and 
sentiment of presidential communications concerning terrorism on subsequent 
terrorism aimed at US targets. Findings from these models suggest that the frequency 
of presidential communications regarding terrorism is consistently related to 
reductions in terrorism targeting the US in the following month. The frequency of 
terrorism communications is related to decreases in both domestic and international 
terrorism, but is also related to increases terrorist casualties between 1970 and 2014. 
After accounting for the sentiment in these models, support primarily emerged that 
communicating negative sentiment reduces terrorism in line with restrictive 
deterrence theory. Key differences in the impact of both the frequency and sentiment 
of terrorism communications between presidential administrations are also identified, 
suggesting that influences were more prominent for Presidents such as Carter and 
George W. Bush. Finally evidence that public approval moderates the impact of 
presidential communications on domestic terrorism is provided, with presidents with 
approval ratings in the lowest 25% netting the largest decreases in terrorism but 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The impacts of terrorism extend well beyond the loss of life and damage to 
infrastructure (Verger et al., 2004). Acts of terrorism also carry political and symbolic 
messages that are often more directly connected to terrorist organizations’ goals than to 
the attacks themselves (Badey, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 2005). Through their 
political and physical actions terrorist organizations attempt to directly and indirectly 
“expose a government’s inability to protect a country’s assets, thereby causing a loss in 
citizen confidence and government legitimacy” (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009: 359). 
Intended to generate public fear and anxiety (Gaibulloev and Sandler, 2009; Hoffman, 
2008), their accompanying rhetoric aims both to undermine governments and to 
strengthen support for the terrorist organizations. It is vital for governments to address 
these political consequences, as trying to prevent the expression of these political 
statements will likely increase the justification for further violence (Stepanova, 2011). 
Much of the previous counterterrorism research has focused on attempts to prevent and 
disincentivize terrorism through legal and policy changes (Clarke and Newman, 2006; 
Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero, 2005; Lynch, 2011; Morris, 2015). However, governments 
have additional policy levers they can use to engage the political domain surrounding 
terrorism. One such policy lever is public communication, which has the potential to 
address terrorism and reduce motivations to perpetrate acts of terror. 
Terrorist organizations have exploited public communication to gain media 
attention and political support, and as a catalyst for political change (Richards, 2004). 





control a public narrative, portraying governments as “reactive, impotent, [and] 
incompetent” (Jenkins, 1982: 17). As noted by Neumann (2007) and Toros (2008), this 
has led to the argument that governments should avoid engaging in discussions with 
terrorist groups in order to prevent benefitting terrorist organizations.1 From this 
perspective, any communication strategy could increase the legitimacy of terrorist 
organizations and grant greater exposure to their political views (Jenkins, 1982; 
Neumann, 2007); and accommodating grievances that are aligned with the terrorists’ 
pursuits could be interpreted as concessions toward terrorist organizations (Sederberg, 
1995). This added attention may also undermine those who have pursued political change 
through peaceful and legal means (Jenkins, 1982; Neumann, 2007).  
These strategies assume that terrorist conflicts are zero-sum in nature, whereby 
any gains for the terrorists are interpreted as losses for governments and the public more 
broadly (Turk, 1982). By strictly adhering to this perspective, governments are precluded 
from negotiating with terrorist organizations and engaging in open communication more 
generally, as any direct communication could destabilize political systems and undercut 
traditional efforts to combat terrorism (Neumann, 2007; Sederberg, 1995). Demonstrating 
this, governments often dismiss public communication strategies as an unsuitable tactic 
for responding to terrorism, as United States (US) President George W. Bush outlined in 
a 2003 speech. 
                                                 
1 It should also be noted that this stance has also been echoed by terrorist organizations such as Al-Qaeda: 
“Take note on the ground rule regarding this fight. There can be no dialogue with occupiers except through 





These terrorists will not be stopped by negotiations or by appeals to 
reason or by the least hint of conscience. We have only one option: we 
must and we will continue to take the fight to the enemy (Bush II, 2003). 
In practice, governments frequently use public communications to respond to 
terrorism in order to reassure the public following terrorist events, condemn the use of 
terrorism, and project the value of “anti-terrorism” (De Castella, McGarty, and 
Musgrove, 2009; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013: 382). The US government explicitly uses 
presidential speech to “discredit terrorist propaganda by promoting truthful and peaceful 
messages” (US Department of State, 2006: 4), thereby providing an alternative to the 
terrorist organizations’ draconian portrayal of the government (Carter, 2012; Kydd and 
Walter, 2006; Toros, 2008). These communications have attempted to frame the 
government as operating “under the banner of… domestic unity and international 
legitimacy” (Obama, 2009b), while portraying terrorist organizations’ methods as evil or 
wicked2 (Bartolucci, 2012; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013).  
Public communications are an essential component of both terrorism and 
government responses to terrorism, and both groups attempt to assert control over this 
domain rather than engaging in traditional dialogue (Domke et al., 2006; Jenkins, 1982: 
17). Despite this, government communications regarding terrorism do sometimes elicit 
responses from terrorist groups (O'Hair, Heath, Ayotte, and Ledlow, 2008; Payne, 2009; 
Toros, 2008). For instance, terrorist leaders including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al 
Zawahiri have publicly referred to presidential communications as “the American… 
enormous propaganda machine” and “the media siege” respectively (as cited in Payne, 
                                                 
2 “The terrorist attack on a bus today in Israel was an outrageous act of lawlessness and senseless brutality. 
Criminal acts such as this advance no cause or political belief. They inspire only revulsion at the lack of 





2009: 110). As terrorist groups regularly explicitly react to presidential communications, 
by publicly discussing and responding to terrorism, governments are also engaging 
terrorist groups. 
Presidential communications can be a powerful tool for influencing political 
landscapes, and Jenkins (1982) suggests that these communications are regularly the most 
prominent and visible government response to terrorism. Yet, the prevalence of this 
speech does present some risk for increased terrorism. In addition to bringing attention to 
terrorist organizations, it can also be used to recruit new members when it plays into the 
terrorist organizations’ narratives (Carter, 2012; Kydd and Walter, 2006). Despite these 
fears, this dissertation argues that when used strategically, public communications have 
the potential to effectively reduce the risk of terrorism. Previous analyses provide some 
evidence that public communication by government officials can reduce support for 
terrorist organizations and diminish the incidence of terrorism. Dugan, Huang, LaFree, 
and McCauley (2008) suggest that the Turkish Government’s public reactions to the 
terrorist attack at the Orly Airport in 1983 led in part to the rapid decline of the Armenian 
terrorist organization ASALA. Thus, with both the ability to mitigate harm in the wake of 
a crisis (Coombs, 2007; 2015) and the potential to escalate violence within conflicts 
(L’Etang, 2009; Rummel, 1991), communications can be an important policy instrument 
that governments can employ strategically to shape the outcomes of conflicts that involve 
terrorism. As presidential communications can arguably increase or decrease the terrorist 
risk, this research takes the first step to develop a systematic understanding of the impact 





In order to do this, this dissertation focuses explicitly on speech by the presidents 
of the United States and their press secretaries. Presidential press secretaries are a pivotal 
arm of presidential communications, being either the “mouthpiece” or “representative” of 
the president on important policy matters (Towle, 1997: 299). Particularly when acting as 
a representative, the press secretary “interprets the President and his activities” and their 
credibility and personality shape public perceptions of the president (McMillan and 
Ragan, 1983; Spragens and Terwoord, 1980: 1). Whether directly from the president or 
through their press secretaries, these presidential communications play a major 
international role in framing issues of terrorism and security more broadly (Bartolucci, 
2012). The international influence of US presidential discourse on perceptions of 
terrorism has been documented in places as remote as Serbia and Croatia, and the 
projected US stance on counterterrorism “dictates its employment everywhere in the 
world” (Erjavec and Volčič, 2006:298; Osuri and Banerjee, 2004). While the term 
terrorism is loaded with cultural biases and other assumptions, the portrayal of 
“terrorism” by US presidents is used uncritically and unreflectively across the globe with 
lasting effects (Bartolucci, 2012:563). Exemplified by the international impact of the 
September 11th attacks, Wolf (2003: 5) argues that “truth was asserted and obedience 
exhorted, with the administration imposing a lesser standard of evidence upon itself.” As 
presidential communications elicit a global response and “presidents do not have to resort 
to substantive arguments to sway public opinion” (Cohen, 1995: 87), it is important to 
examine whether this public influence extends as far as impacting the incidence of 






As with other government policies, public communications can create incentives 
and disincentives for engaging in a range of actions. The importance of public 
communications for influencing criminal behavior has a long lineage within criminology. 
In his seminal examination of criminal justice practices, Beccaria (1764a) insisted that 
the public communication of both the laws and the consequences of digression was 
necessary to avoid corruption in governance as well as to deter crime.3 As such, the claim 
that information disseminated by the government is necessary for deterrence and to 
influence criminal decision making is perhaps one of the oldest and most enduring in 
criminology. Presidential communications are unlikely to fundamentally shift an 
audience’s beliefs or attitudes however (Schudson, 2003), and it is consequently doubtful 
that these communication could directly lead to the cessation of terrorism required by 
absolute deterrence (see Paternoster, 1989b). As such, at any deterrent impact of 
presidential communications should be framed in terms of restrictive deterrence, whereby 
rates of terrorism are reduced (Gibbs, 1968; Paternoster, 1989b).  
Within the criminological literature, empirical studies have primarily focused on 
the implementation of physical means to make terrorism harder or less attractive to 
commit in line with restrictive deterrence (see Carson, 2014; Clarke and Newman, 2006; 
Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero, 2005; Fisher and Dugan, 2016a; Morris, 2015). Despite the 
                                                 
3 “Crimes will be less frequent, in proportion as the code of laws is more universally read, and understood; 
for there is no doubt, but that the eloquence of the passions is greatly assisted by the ignorance and 
uncertainty of punishments… Hence we see the use of printing, which alone makes the public, and not a 
few individuals, the guardians and defenders of the laws. It is this art which, by diffusing literature, has 
gradually dissipated the gloomy spirit of cabal and intrigue. To this art it is owing, that the atrocious crimes 





longstanding political popularity of deterrence-inspired legal and policing policies and 
their widespread implementation (Jenkins, 1982), evaluations of these policies have often 
failed to detect any deterrent impacts on terrorism (Carson, 2014; Dugan, Lafree, Piquero 
2005; Lafree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009). With evidence also emerging that many of these 
policies result in violent backlash from terrorist groups (Lafree, Dugan, and Korte, 2009), 
acts of terrorism may be specifically designed to provoke these disproportionate 
responses from governments in order to serve political ends (Carter, 2012; Kydd and 
Walter, 2006). Drawing upon this theoretical heritage, US presidents often provide salient 
reminders of the certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment for engaging in terrorism 
(Bartolucci, 2012: 562; Erjavec and Volčič, 2006). Concordantly, it is of central 
theoretical and policy importance for the field of criminology to examine whether 
speeches such as the following, delivered by President Gerald Ford on October 10th, 
1976, foment violent backlash or deter acts of terrorism. 
Within the last few months, we have witnessed a new outbreak of 
international terrorism, some of which has been directed against persons 
who carry the important burdens of diplomacy… These acts cannot and 
will not be tolerated in the United States, nor should they be tolerated 
anywhere in the world. Preventing or punishing such acts is a prime 
concern of this Government and one which I will pursue with all the force 
of this office. Today, I am pleased to affix my signature to three documents 
which once again demonstrate the commitment of the United States to 
sustain its struggle against international terrorism… The Act for the 
Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
Persons (H.R. 15552) will serve as a significant law enforcement tool for 
us to deal more effectively with the menace of terrorism and will assist us 
in discharging our important responsibilities under the two international 
conventions which I am today authorizing for ratification. An important 
feature of this bill will be to give extra territorial effect to our law in order 
to enable us to punish those who commit offenses against internationally 





Terrorists respond to more than just the threat of punishment however, and they 
display complex decision-making skills (Victoroff, 2005). Originating from similar 
theoretical traditions within criminology, a growing body of literature suggests that 
terrorist groups engage in rational decision making that extends beyond assessing 
whether terrorists are deterred from committing actions (Sederberg, 1995). Conflicting 
with traditional criminological conceptions of deterrence, Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) 
have demonstrated that terrorism may also be reduced by government actions that are 
conciliatory. In this seminal study, Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) exhibit that within 
specific tactical periods, Palestinian terrorism decreased following conciliatory actions by 
the Israeli government. Recent findings further suggest that government actions not 
traditionally linked with terrorism may also influence its incidence. Fisher and Dugan 
(2017), present evidence from the Philippines, Turkey, and the United Kingdom showing 
that when governments are perceived to respond well to natural disasters, subsequent 
terrorism may decrease. Findings such as these provide a basis for exploring a broader 
range of policy options for reducing terrorism beyond target hardening and traditional 
punitive criminal justice responses. If understood well, these additional tactics could be 
used to reduce the likelihood of future attacks. 
At present, mounting theoretical and empirical evidence suggests that non-
material actions including public communications by a government may reduce 
subsequent terrorism. Congleton (2002) argues that terrorism can be seen as the strategic 
use of violence to send political messages, which is but one of a plethora of tactics that 
can be used to influence government decisions and actions. Terrorism can thus be seen as 





further suggests that the rational impetus behind these tactics and their likelihood of 
success should decrease in accordance with efforts to address terrorism. Accordingly, 
public communication is an essential component of government responses to terrorism 
(O'Hair, Heath, Ayotte, and Ledlow, 2008). Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) demonstrate 
that terrorist groups respond to more than just physical counterterrorism policies. 
Presidential communications in particular are an important policy tool that can be used to 
exert authority, even against the will of other political bodies, that could influence 
terrorist decision making and thereby alter the incidence of terrorism (Arthur and Woods, 
2013; Rottinghaus and Maier, 2007). 
Counterterrorism and the Presence, Variation, and Context of Public Communications 
The ability of public communications to provide incentives and disincentives to 
engage in terrorism may vary based on their frequency, sentiment, and political context. 
Within political parlance, it has frequently been assumed that merely giving public 
attention to the presence of terrorism and the actions of terrorist groups can lead to 
increased violence (Neumann, 2007; Sederberg, 1995). From this perspective, as the 
number of presidential communications addressing terrorism increases, so would the 
incentives for subsequent terrorism. This dissertation quantitatively examines this 
prominent claim and tests whether public communications regarding terrorism, from US 
presidents or their press secretaries, lead to increased terrorism. Presidential discussions 
of terrorism however can have the potential to decrease subsequent terrorist violence by 
acknowledging the conflict. Providing evidence from terrorist conflicts in Northern 
Ireland and the Philippines, Toros (2008) argues that public discourse that legitimizes 





increases in the volume of US presidential communications that politically acknowledged 
the conflict can decrease subsequent terrorism are examined. 
Presidential communications regarding terrorism and counterterrorism vary in 
content and sentiment (Sarfo and Krampa, 2013). This variation provides a particular 
opportunity to assess whether different qualities of communication have the potential to 
increase or decrease terrorism. Drawing upon restrictive deterrence and rational choice 
theories, this dissertation asserts that the positive or negative sentiment of US presidential 
communications regarding terrorism displays the benefits or costs for engaging and not 
engaging in terrorism, thus impacting decisions to commit terrorist violence. Specifically, 
communications that are negative or hostile in sentiment may deter terrorists and 
decrease subsequent terrorism by demonstrating negative consequences for terrorist acts. 
Conversely, and in line with the aforementioned rational choice framework, hostile 
communications that have a negative sentiment may also incite increased terrorist 
violence as a backlash. In line with Dugan and Chenoweth’s (2012) findings that 
government actions could also provide incentives for not engaging in terrorism, more 
positive presidential communications may placate terrorist grievances, increase the 
perceived benefits for not using violence, and reduce subsequent terrorism. However, by 
using a positive sentiment, the president could be perceived as weak, and thus lead to 
increased terrorism that seeks to capitalize on this less combative rhetoric. Making use of 
the variation in the sentiment of US presidential public communications concerning 
terrorism, this dissertation documents variations in the sentiment of these public 





sentiment of public communications used to address terrorism across presidential 
administrations. 
Terrorism is also intrinsically related to the political environment in which it 
occurs. As such, even qualitatively similar government actions may yield quantitatively 
different outcomes for terrorism depending on the political period (Dugan and 
Chenoweth, 2012). For any given nation, the political ideology underlying the terrorist 
threats may also vary over time. Consequently, any analysis of the relationship between 
public communications and subsequent terrorism must take into account the political 
environment. Although there is often continuity in the themes, rhetoric, and political 
priorities in presidential speech that endure across administrations (Kuehl, 2012), the 
impacts of both the incidence of communications regarding terrorism and their sentiment 
are consistent across presidential administrations are examined. 
The impact of US presidential communications on terrorism may also be a 
function of each president’s political popularity and the tenure in office. Foreign policy 
crises in particular may lead to increases in an individual president’s authority and power 
to affect policy (Young, 2013), and thus the influence of an individual US president may 
wax and wane over time. Public support also plays a role in determining a president’s 
impacts, as unpopular presidents often only succeed in antagonizing public opinions 
when attempting to influence policy (Sigelman and Sigelman, 1981). As presidents with 
public approval ratings that are significantly higher or lower than average are also more 
likely to adopt unpopular policy positions (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004), both the 





approval ratings. While the incidence of terrorist attacks does not appear to impact US 
presidents’ popularity (Randahl, 2016),4 it is important to examine the reverse 
relationship. Terrorist groups may rationally calculate that their attacks would have 
greater political impact under presidents with lower public support. If true, terrorist 
organizations would be more likely to respond with violence to public communications 
by presidents with lower than average approval ratings. Additionally, presidents with 
above-average approval ratings may incite less violence from their public 
communications as any attacks would be less likely to result in political gains for the 
terrorist organization. Concordantly, this dissertation finally examines whether the 
terrorist response to US presidential communications regarding terrorism is conditioned 
on the president’s public favorability.  
Overview of the Study 
Seeking to identify the role that public communications by governments have 
played in existing counterterrorism strategies, this dissertation examines US public 
communications concerning terrorism delivered by US presidents and their press 
secretaries between 1970 and 2014. Drawing upon the 6,001 transcripts collected by the 
American Presidency Project during this period (Woolley and Peters, 2016), quantitative 
analyses of these communications were conducted in order to estimate the impact of the 
quantity and sentiment of presidential communication concerning terrorism on 
                                                 
4 It should be noted that George W. Bush’s approval rating rose from 51% for the immediately before the 
September 11th attack to 85% for the period directly afterward; the highest approval rating observed for any 
US president between 1970 and 2015. This 34% increase in public approval between consecutive polls also 
marks the largest increase in favorability in the observed period. Despite this individual instance however, 
Randahl (2016) demonstrates that there is little empirical evidence to suggest that US presidential approval 





subsequent terrorism aimed at US targets. Exploring the impact of political context, this 
dissertation examines whether any observed relationships are dependent on 
communications being delivered by the president directly, as opposed to their press 
secretaries, whether they vary across presidential administrations, or whether that 
relationship is dependent upon the level of public approval or disapproval of the 
president. 
Chapter 2 begins by providing a brief overview of the theoretical and empirical 
literature on restrictive deterrence and rational choice are then examined. Drawing upon 
these insights, these perspectives are then applied to terrorist decision making. The key 
findings are then summarized drawing upon the specific literature that examines policies 
based on deterrence and rational choice. Chapter 2 then synthesizes these findings to 
suggest a series of hypotheses to examine the impact of presidential communications on 
terrorism targeting the US. 
Chapter 3 explores the nexus between public communications and terrorism by 
summarizing the previous literature and exploring how terrorist organizations use public 
communications to achieve their goals. It then examines many longstanding political 
beliefs regarding the impact of government communications on violence by summarizing 
the extant literature that has sought to empirically document its impacts. Drawing upon 
this literature, this chapter suggests a number of important communication characteristics 
that could affect terrorism. It concludes by arguing that multiple empirical approaches are 
required to contextualize and understand any observables impacts on terrorism and to 





After examining how central public communications are to terrorism, for both 
terrorists and governments, the Chapter 4 explores the context for understanding the 
impacts of presidential communications on terrorism. Given that national leaders speak 
publicly about terrorism, this chapter begins by justifying the selection of using US 
presidents to examine the potential links between public communications and terrorism. 
Following this discussion, this chapter briefly outlines the terrorist threats faced by each 
of the eight presidential administrations that fall within the scope of this dissertation. This 
chapter also describes important developments in communication media across the period 
between 1970 and 2014, and discusses key differences across presidential administrations 
with regard to their public communication strategies and the characteristics of the 
terrorism that were faced. 
Chapter 5 is devoted to outlining the data and methods that were used to examine 
the previously described hypotheses. After revisiting the hypotheses, each of the data 
sources that were used to create the variables measuring terrorism, presidential 
communications, the mediating, and control variables are presented. The strengths and 
weaknesses of each data source are outlined. After reviewing the multiple autoregressive 
processes identified by the literature, this chapter then presents that structural equation 
modeling (SEM) is an appropriate method for structuring the analyses in light of these 
observations. 
Chapter 6 then presents the findings generated from these analyses. Beginning 
with a description of the distributions of the key independent and dependent variables, 





the four hypotheses. In addition to these primary analyses, this chapter also presents the 
results from a series of sensitivity analyses that were conducted for each hypothesis. 
This dissertation concludes in Chapter 7 with a discussion of the conclusions, 
limitations, and future steps for research examining the impact of presidential 








Chapter 2: Restrictive Deterrence, Rational Choice, and Terrorism 
Acts of terror are designed to elicit political responses (Shpiro, 2002). 
Consequently, focusing solely on the violent outcomes of terrorism may obscure central 
observations and potential means to reduce its incidence (Sederberg, 1995). While 
terrorist organizations may not necessarily expect specific attacks to achieve their explicit 
end goals, the attacks are designed to influence an audience’s behavior and attitudes, and 
to indirectly achieve stated political interests (Badey, 1998; Laqueur, 1999; Victoroff, 
2005). Given that acts of terrorism only directly affect small groups directly, public 
communications present a means for terrorists to maximize the impact of violence, as 
well as a method for governments to potentially stymie this strategy (Shpiro, 2002). In 
fact the leader of Irish political party Sinn Fein, Gerry Adams refered to terrorism as a 
form of “armed propaganda” (Sharrock, 2001: 1). Whether from terrorist organizations or 
by those responding to terrorism, public communications play a central role in shaping 
the behavior of those directly and indirectly involved in terrorist conflicts. This drawn out 
relationship between terrorism and its intended goals demonstrates how terrorist 
organizations operate over long temporal horizons that require a somewhat sophisticated 
understanding of political processes. Drawing upon this logic, this dissertation argues that 
terrorist actions are the product of rational decision making, and presidential public 
communications provide a plausible policy measure to alter the perceived utility of 
engaging in or abstaining from terrorist violence, consequently affecting the rational 
calculus of terrorist organizations.  
This chapter begins with a brief overview of how governments communicate with 





perspectives that are used to explore terrorist organizations’ decision making: restrictive 
deterrence and rational choice. After summarizing each theoretical perspective and its 
underlying assumptions, the chapter then presents the major findings from the empirical 
literature. Drawing upon this discussion, it presents the key differences in predictions 
between these two theoretical traditions to demonstrate that assuming characteristics of 
terrorist decision making may inadvertently lead to increased terrorism. These discussion 
are then used to provide a basis for testing each of these theoretically derived models. 
This chapter then uses each framework to suggest a series of competing hypotheses 
regarding the impact of US presidential communication on subsequent terrorism targeting 
the US.  
Restrictive Deterrence and Crime 
Stemming from the assertion that individuals refrain from committing crime when 
the perceived costs from punishment exceed the likely benefits from crime, deterrence 
theories have a rich history within the field of criminology. Drawing upon the work of 
enlightenment scholars such as Beccaria (1764a) and Bentham (1789), this perspective 
holds that when the severity of the punishment exceeds any benefits gained, there is an 
inverse relationship between the certainty and celerity of punishment with crime. This 
intuitively appealing theory contends that human action is influenced by the likely 
punishments for engaging in crime, and people will not engage in an action unless it has 
potential to increase their wellbeing or utility. Within criminology, this has formed the 
underlying and enduring prediction that individuals may be deterred from committing a 
crime if the severity, certainty, and celerity of punishment exceed the perceived utility of 





means for predicting and understanding crime, early deterrence scholars were more 
concerned with presenting principles to reform criminal justice and punishment policies 
(Paternoster and Fisher, 2017). Consequently, for more than 250 years, the certainty and 
severity of punishment in particular have formed the foundation of nearly all 
contemporary theories of deterrence and have been the inspiration for copious criminal 
justice policies globally (Nagin, Solow, and Lum, 2015). 
Within the considerable body of criminological literature on deterrence, this 
theoretical domain has developed into several separate but interconnected perspectives 
(Jacobs, 2010; Paternoster, 1989b; Stafford and Warr, 1993). Deterrence-based laws and 
policies can be general in nature by preventing would-be offenders from offending; or 
they can be specific by stopping perpetrators from reoffending following their personal 
experience of punishment. Within attempts to deter terrorism, attention has largely been 
limited to general deterrence due to data constraints and policy priorities. Given that 
specific deterrence requires observing how individuals respond to receiving punishment, 
testing specific deterrence hypotheses would require collecting individual data from 
terrorists who routinely demonstrate the ability to avoid detection (Jacobsen, 2010). 
Combined with the high mortality rate for those involved in terrorist conflicts (Holcomb 
et al., 2007), collecting defensible samples with consistent measurements would be 
highly encumbered by non-random attrition due to death (Haviland, Jones, and Nagin, 
2011). 
Beyond these shortcomings, Ross and Gurr (1989) argue that general deterrence is 
more important for counterterrorism policy. Principles of general deterrence are behind 





through anti-terrorism laws, target hardening, and threats of punishment (Clarke and 
Newman, 2006; Gibbs, 1989; Ross and Gurr, 1989). Particularly when viewing terrorism 
at the national level, the most appropriate perspective from which to view the impact of 
counterterrorism policy efforts is the net national impact of deterrence policies through 
general deterrence.  
Ross and Gurr (1989) note that the overall impact of deterrent intervention 
operates primarily through vicarious exposure and perceptions. Terrorist organizations 
and their constituencies perceive punishments and other anti-terrorism policies differently 
than those subjected to punishment, as they have greater terrorist capabilities than 
detained offenders. Consequently the specific deterrence perspective, while important, is 
secondary in comparison to the general impacts of counterterrorism efforts, as 
interventions could yield net increases in terrorism despite reductions achieved through 
incapacitation and specific deterrence. Following this logic, this dissertation focuses 
explicitly on general deterrence and its net impacts on terrorism in order to theoretically 
situate strategic counterterrorism decisions that governments make. 
Deterrence can also be absolute in nature, wherein individuals abstains from 
crime due to their perceived risk of suffering punishment, or restrictive, wherein they 
offend less frequently (Gibbs, 1975; Jacobs, 2010; Paternoster 1989b). No matter how 
persuasive, logical, or stirring a speech is, it is unlikely that terrorists would disengage 
entirely following any presidential communication (see Schudson, 2003). As such, 
absolute deterrence is unlikely, and restrictive deterrence is the more appropriate 
theoretical lens through which to view the impacts of presidential communications on 





relies on general deterrence using aggregate data, its findings will be unable to adequately 
differentiate between restrictive and absolute deterrence. Consequently, while restrictive 
deterrence is the most plausible theoretical pathway for potential impacts, subsequent 
studies focusing on individual perpetrators of terrorism would be better suited to 
empirically evaluate this claim. 
During the previous two and a half centuries, numerous seminal empirical pieces 
have advanced and refined theories of general deterrence within the criminological 
literature. Early studies conducted by Gibbs (1968) and Tittle (1969) suggested that the 
certainty of punishment had a greater and more direct impact on aggregate crime rates in 
the US, supporting Beccaria’s (1764a) assertion that the certainty of punishment carries 
more weight compared to the severity of punishment in deterring crime.5 Although these 
studies advanced criminological debate, they have been criticized for conflating deterrent 
and incapacitation effects (National Research Council, 1978). Similar challenges have 
also limited efforts to isolate the impacts of deterrence. Despite employing longitudinal 
designs to better disentangle these concerns, subsequent studies are criticized for 
assuming that the imprisonment rate is a direct measure of the certainty of punishment. 
Indeed, Durlauf and Nagin (2011) suggested that these studies provide little useful 
information on deterrence.  
Recent studies employing instrumental variable approaches have been more 
successful at identifying the general deterrent impact of different criminal justice policies. 
                                                 
5 “Crimes are more effectually prevented by the certainty, than the severity of punishment… The certainty 
of a small punishment will make a stronger impression, than the fear of one more severe, if attended with 
the hopes of escaping; for it is the nature of mankind to be terrified at the approach of the smallest 





Using this method, Levitt (1998) and Johnson and Raphael (2012) have suggested that 
increased incarceration rates are able to reduce crime. However, Johnson and Raphael 
(2012) also suggest that this impact diminished between 1991 and 2004 compared to the 
period between 1978 and 1990. Echoed by experimental research conducted by Hawken 
and Kleiman (2009) and Kleiman (2009), evidence also suggests that highly certain 
punishments can effectively deter people who had not previously been impacted by other 
criminal justice deterrence efforts. Although Duriez, Cullen, and Manchak (2014:57) 
have accused these findings of providing a “false sense of hope,” Kleiman, Kilmer, and 
Fisher (2014) present a range of independent findings suggesting that swift, certain, and 
fair punishments are indeed able to deter crime. 
This literature has revealed other important insights relevant to the study of 
terrorism. It has long been established that successful deterrence depends on how well the 
message is transmitted to the public (Geerken and Gove, 1977). Thus, for actual decision 
making, perceptions of risks and rewards are more important than objective probabilities 
of punishment (Durlauf and Nagin, 2011; Nagin 1998; 2013). Stated simply, if potential 
offenders are unaware of a policy, that policy cannot impact their decision to engage in 
crime. As mentioned in the introduction, communication of the penalties and 
implementation of criminal justice policies is an essential component of deterrence theory 
that Beccaria (1764a) explicitly noted. Theoretically, without potential terrorists’ 
knowledge of the likely consequences of a criminal action, the mechanism for these 
policies yielding any impact on terrorism is unclear. While strategic effectiveness in 





public (Shpiro, 2002), communicating about these efforts could have broader deterrent 
impacts by influencing other potential terrorists’ perceptions. 
The criminological literature has also revealed that the nature and outcomes of 
criminal decisions vary greatly across situations and offenses (Clarke and Cornish 1985; 
Loewenstein 1996). Particularly in cases where individuals experience emotional arousal, 
the rational decision-making processes targeted by deterrent policies could affect the re-
weighting of short-term and long-term benefits (Bouffard, 2002). Although emotions 
such as anger are unrelated to perceptions of punishment, high levels of anger could 
erode the deterrent value of these interventions (Carmichael and Piquero, 2004). As such, 
rather than assuming pure rationality when analyzing the deterrent impacts of any given 
policy, this literature suggests that rationality is instead “bounded,” whereby individuals 
settle for solutions that appear “good enough” in the moment, through the lens of their 
current emotional condition, instead of objectively maximizing their utility (Berrebi 
2009:170; Simon, 1982). 
Deterrence and Terrorism 
At this point only a handful of studies have tested the effects of general deterrence 
on terrorism. Despite the limited volume of these studies in comparison to other crimes, 
they have revealed important insights regarding whether terrorists may be deterred from 
committing acts of violence. Examining the introductions of metal detectors and security 
personnel in airports, Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero (2005) found that the risk for 
transportation-motivated hijackings was reduced in line with the predictions of 
deterrence. Despite this finding, the introduction of security measures aimed at increasing 





(Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero, 2005). Findings from other terrorism studies have also 
contradicted the predictions of deterrence, as policies aimed to deter terrorism were 
instead associated with subsequent increases through possible backlash effects 
(Argomaniz and Vidal-Diez, 2015; LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009). LaFree, Dugan, and 
Korte (2009) examined six UK strategies aimed at reducing political violence in Northern 
Ireland from 1969 to 1992. Only one of the six operations, Operation Motorman, which 
deployed more than 30,000 armed service personnel, was associated with a reduced risk 
of terrorist violence (LaFree, Dugan, and Korte 2009). Similarly, Argomaniz and Vidal-
Diez (2015) found that Spanish counterterrorism policies6 aimed at deterring terrorism 
committed by the Euzkadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) were more likely to increase terrorism 
than to deter it. 
Findings from more recent studies have been more consistent with the predictions 
of deterrence. Carson (2014) found that two legislative changes that increased the cost of 
eco-terrorism in the US resulted in subsequent risk reductions. Perry, Apel, Newman, and 
Clarke (2016) observed similar findings consistent with deterrence, with regard to suicide 
bombings occurring in Israel following the introduction of the “West Bank Barrier”. 
Although framed in terms of situational crime prevention, the authors note that the 
mechanism for the reductions they was observed through deterrence, “they are deterred 
by the perceived increased risk of offending and discouraged by the perceived increase in 
the effort needed” (Perry et al., 2016: 20). However, previous literature on 
counterterrorism in Israel between 1968 and 1986 has concluded that in this conflict, any 
                                                 






deterrent impacts are often short-lived (Le Vine and Salert, 1996), echoing criminological 
observations that deterrent impacts on crime decay over time (Koper, 1995; Nagin, 1998; 
Sherman, 1990). 
Taken together, these studies provide mixed evidence as to whether government 
policies are able to deter acts of terrorism through increasing the costs of these criminal 
acts. Although the introduction of a large-scale security barrier over a period of twelve 
years (Perry et al., 2016) and the deployment of 30,000 armed service personnel (LaFree, 
Dugan, and Korte, 2009) were found to be successful at deterring terrorism, many 
governments lack the resources required for these interventions, especially considering 
other resource constraints. The majority of examined policies either failed to reduce 
terrorism or required substantial resources. While Carson’s (2014) findings demonstrate 
that legislative changes regarding punishment can be leveraged to reduce eco-terrorism, 
the extant literature provides only limited support for the claim that increasing the 
certainty, severity, and celerity of punishment may deter terrorism. 
These examples argue and demonstrate that actors may be deterred from crime 
and terrorism by more than the perceived certainty, severity, and celerity of official 
criminal sanctions. This has also been recognized in the growing body of criminological 
literature investigating the impact of informal sanctions on deterring crime, and has since 
become a central part of the theoretical deterrence model (see Anderson, Chiricos, and 
Waldo, 1977; Nagin, Solow, and Lum, 2015). While informal sanctions are often 
portrayed as an addition to the classical deterrence model, Beccaria’s (1764) On Crimes 
and Punishments presents that the conveyed sentiments of the law, the judiciary, and 





places Beccaria (1764:38) argues that deterrence can only be achieved when the 
sentiment of laws and punishment are able to overcome “the natural sentiments of 
mankind [sic.]… when the contrary is his greatest interest.” Within Beccarian deterrence 
(1764: 44), conveying moral sentiment through criminal justice policies and public 
advertisements was intrinsic to “sound policy, which is no other than the art of uniting, 
and directing to the same end, the natural and immutable sentiments of mankind.”7 From 
this perspective, both the sentiments conveyed through morality and social institutions act 
in concert with the threat of punishment to unite a population and influence their 
decisions to dissuade them from their individual natural interests and criminal conduct. 
Within classical deterrence, through publicly conveying messages with sentiment that 
affirms pro-societal actions and decries criminal acts, individual decision making is 
altered even on a sub-conscious level. 
To develop the sentiments of one’s own heart, is an art which education 
only can teach; but although a villain may not be able to give a clear 
account of his [sic.] principles, they nevertheless influence his [sic.] 
conduct. (Beccaria, 1764:53). 
Within classical deterrence theory it can concordantly be seen that without 
the conveyed sentiment many potential punishments would be unable to deter 
crime – especially crimes founded upon alternative social and political views such 
as terrorism. Drawing upon this perspective, the importance of conveyed 
                                                 
7 It should be noted that Beccaria considered that the conveyed anti-criminal sentiment would not always 
be successful in deterring crime. Indeed, his work also suggests that the sentiment of the law and of 
governors would eventually be dismissed and potentially lead to increased violence when these sentiments 
and accompanying criminal justice policies were not in line with natural human sentiment. “No advantage 
in moral policy can be lasting, which is not founded on the indelible sentiments of the heart of man. 
Whatever law deviates from this principle will always meet with a resistance, which will destroy it in the 
end; for the smallest force, continually applied, will overcome the most violent motion communicated to 





sentiment can be seen to be increased when the objective certainty and celerity of 
punishment is low. Particularly in the absence of formal sanctions for deterrence, 
the ability to instill informal or moral sanctions through conveying sentiment 
provides an important policy mechanism for deterring crime and terrorism. As 
will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter, there is theoretical 
reason grounded in classical deterrence theory that the presentation of alternative 
political narratives and the portrayed sentiment of these communication regarding 
terrorism may reduce crime and terrorism through deterrence. 
Despite the mixed findings empirical findings and the oversimplification of 
classical deterrence, these patterns still indicate that terrorists engage in rational decision-
making processes. From the perspective of deterrence, or any theory that assumes rational 
actors, specific knowledge of terrorist organizations’ beliefs and preferences should 
contribute to better understanding and prediction of terrorism. If terrorists are not rational 
however, their behavior could not be explained through the above frameworks, as they 
would yield no observable systematic trends except through chance. Albeit contradictory, 
the observable patterns within the above studies’ findings suggest at least some rational 
component to terrorist decision making. Consequently, they suggest that terrorism is a 
strategic choice based upon social conditions and perceived consequences. However, as 
will be discussed further, the deterrence perspective on its own appears insufficient to 





Communication and Deterrence: A Necessity or a Double-Edged Sword? 
An alternative explanation for this pattern of findings is that any deterrent impacts 
are conditional on the actor’s knowledge of the intervention. Without advertisement of 
the policy, even traditionally successful counterterrorism strategies could be doomed to 
fail. As previously discussed, knowledge of the punishment is an essential component of 
deterrence (Beccaria, 1764a). While not recorded in the aforementioned studies, differing 
levels of exposure among each of these interventions may be responsible for the 
divergent findings. The high-investment policies that resulted in reductions in terrorism 
observed by LaFree, Dugan, and Korte (2009) and Perry et al. (2016) were likely also 
more highly publicized, whether intentionally or unintentionally. In Carson’s (2014) 
analysis, substantively similar interventions yielded empirically divergent findings, which 
would be expected if their levels of public exposure varied. This explanation is consistent 
with the growing criminological literature concerning the impact of ambiguity and 
deterrence. Communications publicizing policies could reduce ambiguity regarding the 
certainty and severity of punishment, thus influencing criminal decision making (Nagin, 
1998; Sherman, 1990). Empirically, Loughran, Paternoster, Piquero, and Pogarsky (2011) 
found that when the chance of detection is high, less ambiguous policies have more 
deterrent value than numerically equivalent but more ambiguous interventions. As such, 
by removing ambiguity and advertising that punishment is likely to be certain for acts of 
terrorism, targeted public communications could enhance deterrence.  
Despite this potential, it has been a long-held fear that publicizing interventions 
would undermine their effectiveness by providing terrorists with the opportunity to adapt 





targets (Clarke and Newman, 2006; Dugan and Fisher, 2015), when confronted with 
additional information regarding the allocation of counterterrorism resources, terrorists 
may seek out other “softer” targets (Asal et al., 2009). However, Asal et al. (2009) 
suggest that target selection and particularly the selection of “softer” civilian targets for 
terrorism is driven more by ideological concerns and the desire to promote fear in a 
population. As such, even though potential targets may be abundant, implementing well-
communicated strategies focused on ideologically or strategically desirable targets may 
still plausibly yield deterrent impacts (Dugan and Fisher, 2015).  
Statistically detecting these deterrent impacts is problematic given the rare nature 
of terrorism. As terrorism is a rare occurrence in many contexts, even in the absence of 
successful counterterrorism measures, the interval between attacks could be years (Lynch 
2011). This renders it essentially impossible to statistically determine at most levels of 
temporal aggregation whether the absence of terrorism is a product of counterterrorism, 
as the counterfactual is unobservable. Indeed, this may explain the null findings on the 
impact of metal detectors and security personnel at airports on terrorist-related hijackings 
observed by Dugan, Lafree, and Piquero (2005). Extending this argument, policies aimed 
to deter could still yield counterterrorism benefits even though widespread policies 
following the priorities of these theories may not show any appreciable effect on 
terrorism (Morris 2015). 
Another critique of communicating counterterrorism messages is that any 
engagement with terrorist groups could legitimize their messages and grant greater public 
exposure to their political views (Jenkins, 1982; Neumann, 2007; Shpiro, 2002). Terrorist 





successfully eliciting a change in government policy, thus demonstrating the 
effectiveness of previous terrorist actions. This perspective suggests that all public 
communications regarding terrorism should be avoided in order to prevent benefitting 
terrorist organizations. This extension of deterrence suggests that terrorist organizations 
may benefit even when a president publicly presents deterrent messages that aim to 
minimize the occurrence of terrorism. 
Zero-Sum Terrorism Assumptions 
You see, if you believe in pitting one group of people against another, you 
can't get anything done. If you believe that politics is zero-sum—we've got 
one winner and one loser—you're not going to get positive things done on 
behalf of the people (Bush II, 2002). 
The above deterrence perspectives are comprised of a range of underlying 
assumptions regarding the nature of humanity and terrorist conflicts. In addition to the 
long-held assumption that terrorists, like other humans, decide upon actions by rationally 
calculating the likely risks and rewards of their action, Turk (1982) argues that deterrence 
approaches assume that terrorist conflicts are zero-sum in nature. Zero-sum situations 
occur when one person’s or organization’s gain is equivalent their opponent’s loss. 
Within zero-sum situations, the overall net change in benefit or utility is zero, regardless 
of the actual outcome. As such, gains in zero-sum interactions can come only at the 
expense of the opponent’s losses. If true within terrorism conflicts, any gains for terrorist 
groups necessarily result in losses for the opposing government. Proponents of this 
perspective suggest that terrorism can be reduced only through deterrence or by 
diminishing the relative capacity of terrorist organizations (Anderton and Carter, 2006; 





of possible counterterrorism actions are limited in scope to those that damage or harm 
terrorist organizations and/or their constituencies. Further, if terrorist conflicts are zero-
sum, the consequences for policy may be magnified, with investments in non-productive 
counterterrorism strategies necessarily increasing the likelihood of terrorism by 
exhausting finite government resources (Sandler and Arce, 2007).  
Many of the above concerns regarding the use of public communications for 
counterterrorism are derived from this zero-sum assumption. Relying on rhetoric doctrine 
rather than analytic understandings of terrorism, the politically intuitive appeal of 
deterrence-based policies with zero-sum assumptions have driven longstanding “no 
retreat; no surrender” counterterrorism policies replete within many global terrorism 
conflicts (Sederberg, 1995: 295). From these assumptions it is unsurprising to hear 
arguments that communications of any kind can undermine the militaristic strategies that 
are often politically lauded, particularly in the US (Papcharissi and Oliveira, 2008).  
Opponents of this zero-sum perspective have criticized its simplistic 
understanding of terrorist decision making, and its ambivalence to analytic advances that 
would lead to dismissing this assumption (Frey and Luechinger, 2003; Sederberg, 1995; 
Shpiro, 2002; Victoroff, 2005). Rothe and Muzzatti (2004: 327) contend that publicly 
framing terrorism from a zero-sum theoretical perspective has “contributed to 
unnecessary levels of panic and fear, misguided public consciousness, and the 
development of legislation creating negative social ramifications yet to be seen.” If the 
zero-sum deterrence assumptions are indeed incorrect, then policies adopted from the 
analytic misunderstandings derived therefrom could have the paradoxical impact of 





zero-sum perspective on terrorism could thus increase terrorism by fomenting public 
discord, antagonizing political opponents, and preventing the use of effective strategies 
that may reduce terrorism through non-punitive means. 
Today, we see the collapse of strongmen and fragile states breeding 
conflict and driving innocent men, women, and children across borders on 
an epic scale. Brutal networks of terror have stepped into the vacuum… 
Effectively, they argue for a return to the rules that applied for most of 
human history and that predate this institution: the belief that power is a 
zero-sum game, that might makes right, that strong states must impose 
their will on weaker ones, that the rights of individuals don't matter, and 
that in a time of rapid change, order must be imposed by force. On this 
basis, we see some major powers assert themselves in ways that 
contravene international law. We see an erosion of the democratic 
principles and human rights that are fundamental to this institution's 
mission; information is strictly controlled, the space for civil society 
restricted. We're told that such retrenchment is required to beat back 
disorder, that it's the only way to stamp out terrorism or prevent foreign 
meddling (Obama, 2015). 
While President George W. Bush (previous quote, page 39 referred to politics in 
general, President Barack Obama (above) referred specifically to terrorism when clearly 
stating that US policy should no longer adhere to zero-sum beliefs.8 Indeed, despite the 
prominence of the zero-sum rhetoric, Carruthers (1999) presents that in practice 
counterterrorism institutions have adopted policies that are in opposition to these 
assertions. Consequently in both rhetoric and policy, zero-sum perspectives are 
inadequate frames through which to understand terrorism regardless of their prevalence 
(Anderton and Carter, 2006; Jindapon and Neilson, 2009; Turk, 1982). It is thus 
necessary to adopt a theoretical perspective that can account for the above criticisms to 
zero-sum-based policies and can incorporate policy outcomes beyond deterrence. 
                                                 






Echoing the arguments outlined by Sederberg (1995), this dissertation theoretically 
engages with alternative forms of terrorist decision making to better understand the likely 
outcomes of policies that are designed to reduce terrorism. To this end, the following 
section outlines rational choice theory as an alternative to deterrence theories that assume 
a zero-sum relationship within terrorism conflicts. 
Rational Choice 
Assumptions of rationality within criminological theory are not unique to 
deterrence theories. They are inherent in control, opportunity, and rational choice theories 
as well. Similar to deterrence, rational choice theories argue that people make decisions 
about how they should act by comparing the costs and benefits of crime through rational 
processes. Unlike deterrence however, rational choice theories suggests that criminal 
decision making can be influenced through situational stimuli and a host of other 
motivations in addition to formal criminal sanctions (Lilly, Cullen, and Ball, 2016). More 
in tune with Simon’s (1982) notion of bounded decision-making processes, rational 
choice theories recognize offenders “are generally doing the best they can within the 
limits of time, resources, and information available to them” (Clarke and Cornish, 2001: 
25). Within the subjective utility models this perspective allows, criminal acts are just 
one of many possible outcomes and are influenced rationally by many sources, under the 
broader theoretical umbrella of rational choice theory (Matsueda, Kreager, and Huizinga, 
2006). Importantly for counterterrorism, from a rational choice perspective, policy 
options beyond “simply deterring unwanted behavior through punishment” may also be 





Although many scholars refer to Beccaria’s (1764a) On Crimes and Punishments 
as the root of rational choice within criminology, his An Attempt at an Analysis of 
Smuggling (Beccaria, 1764b) arguably left the bigger influence on the development of 
rational choice theories (Paternoster and Fisher, 2017). Employing an economic 
perspective toward the study of crime, Beccaria (1764b) presented a mathematical 
representation for a merchant’s decision to either legally spend money on imported goods 
and incur a tax, or alternatively to engage in smuggling to avoid paying the tax (see 
Equation 1 below). In the equation below, u is the value of merchandise being smuggled, 
x is the minimum amount of merchandise that would need to be profitable for the 
smuggler (unknown), and t/u is the tax rate. In this lesser known essay, Beccaria (1764b) 
suggests that the merchant’s risk is proportional to the number of customs inspectors and 
inversely proportional to the volume of the merchandise being acquired. In examining the 
rational processes behind the decision for merchants to engage in smuggling, Beccaria 
(1764b) provided one of the earliest examples of what has come to be known as an 
intertemporal decision involving risk under uncertainty within the criminological rational 
choice literature (Paternoster and Fisher, 2017). Unlike Beccaria’s (1764a) assertions on 
deterrence and the role of legal punishments, his understanding of smuggling introduced 
the notion that decisions can be modeled in the same manner that economics can be 
modeled, at least in theory,9 and also should incorporate and balance multiple forms of 
costs and benefits for an actor. 
                                                 
9 According to Beccaria; “algebra [can be used] in the analysis of anything that is capable of increasing or 
decreasing, and to all things which exhibit mutually comparable relationships. Even political sciences can 
therefore makes use of algebra … political phenomena are highly dependent on many isolated decisions 
and human passions which cannot be specified precisely. A political system composed of numbers and 










Developed further by Becker (1968) two hundred years later, rational choice 
theories of crime assume that offenders are no different from non-offenders, and at a 
basic level, humans are similar in terms of their desire to maximize the profitability of 
their behavior. In his updated economic model of crime, Becker (1968) presented an 
equation describing a would-be offender’s decision-making calculus (see Equation 2 
below). In this model, p is the probability of being detected in the commission of a crime, 
f is the severity of the sanction given apprehension, and y is the gain from successfully 
completing the crime without apprehension. From this perspective, an offender’s 
expected utility is the weighted function of the costs and benefits of the crime, and 
individuals make decisions to commit crime by comparing their expected derived utility 
from crime with the expected utility of other possible actions (Becker, 1968). 
(2)     𝐸𝑈 =  𝑝𝑈(𝑦 − 𝑓)  +  (1 − 𝑝)𝑈(𝑦) 
In Becker’s (1968) model is it clear that rational choice theory is a separate 
theoretical perspective from deterrence theory. As it can be seen in the final term [(1 −
𝑝)𝑈(𝑦)], the value derived from crime increases as y increases (the gains that are derived 
from offending). While deterrence scholars and researchers have focused almost entirely 
on the anticipated certainty and severity of sanctions to predict and understand criminal 
decisions, rational choice theories additionally predict that the anticipated benefits of 






Criminological research conducted from the rational choice perspective has 
demonstrated that numerous possible sources of criminal gains including emotional gains 
can substantially influence offending decisions (Bouffard, 2002; Bouffard, Exum, and 
Paternoster, 2000; Nagin, 2007). Becker’s (1968) model and its derivatives are consistent 
with deterrence theories, with regard to the impact of hypothesized changes in the 
certainty and severity of formal legal punishment. They also include other factors not 
limited to target hardening and the presence of guardians, which are directly captured by 
the final term in the above algebraic representation of rational offender decision making 
(Equation 2 on page 44). Concordantly, deterrence can be seen as one of many rival 
hypotheses within a broader rational choice framework. 
Rational Choice and Terrorism: Beyond Zero-Sum 
Terrorism researchers have criticized deterrence theory when used on its own for 
its inability to anticipate the different utility structures and reactions of terrorists 
(Victoroff 2005). As demonstrated in the previous section, rational choice is a broad and 
multi-dimensional theory for understanding human behavior that is able to account for a 
wide variety of utility structures that include strategic and political elements. This is an 
important distinction for both the theoretical understanding of terrorism and the 
development of counterterrorism policies. By focusing purely on deterrent policies, 
governments are limited to a set of strategies that are not tailored to the subject matter 
with which they are dealing. As such, this dissertation heeds Paternoster’s (1989a) advice 
that deterrence should be tied into a larger theory of rational choice, and should be 
considered but one pathway related to criminal decisions that exists among many others 





Within the more complicated utility structure inherent in rational decision 
making, which takes into account the potential gains from crime as well as non-punitive 
costs of committing crime, popular zero-sum assumptions become less viable. Dugan and 
Chenoweth (2012) showed that across political periods, government efforts to improve 
the benefits of non-terrorist actions were generally related to decreases in terrorism, 
rather than those decreases being solely a function of punitive efforts. Further, non-
punitive government actions such as responding well to natural disasters may benefit both 
governments and terrorist constituencies, thus simultaneously benefitting terrorists and 
decreasing the likelihood of terrorism (Fisher and Dugan, 2017). In these cases, the 
sources of the underlying grievances may be placated, resulting in positive outcomes for 
one or both parties (Frey and Luechinger, 2002).  
Combined with the empirical observation that terrorist attacks persist and often 
increase as a backlash to the threat of punishment (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012; LaFree, 
Dugan, and Korte, 2009), studies employing a rational choice perspective have now 
demonstrated that governments and terrorist organizations may both simultaneously gain 
utility through placation or lose utility through backlash from counterterrorism policies. 
Consequently, this dissertation argues that little empirical evidence supports the 
popularly held beliefs that terrorist conflicts are zero-sum in nature, and further submits 
that other social and political contextual factors influence terrorist decisions rather than 
just the nature of punishment and policy. 
A rational choice perspective is also compatible with other enduring empirical 
observations within the terrorism literature. Hamm (2004) and Kruglanski et al. (2009) 





fulfilling personal goals to be recognized or as part of a quest for personal significance. 
Such individuals thus placed lower relative concern on potential punishments that they 
may receive for their actions, and are more concerned with personal desires and the well-
being of their constituency or political movement that may even be enhanced through 
punishment (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). However, the deterrence perspective should 
not be discounted entirely, as in addition to the aforementioned studies supporting 
deterrence, indiscriminate violent repression has been found to be associated with a 
reduction in insurgent attacks in Chechnya (Lyall, 2009). Concordantly, hostile 
government actions toward terrorists may either deter subsequent attacks or play into 
existing terrorist narratives and result in increased terrorism through backlash (Kydd and 
Walter, 2006; Mesquita and Dickson, 2007). 
Similarly, positive actions toward terrorists or their constituencies may not 
necessarily result in reductions in terrorism. Such positive actions may be interpreted as 
displays of weakness, upon on which terrorist groups may capitalize through increased 
violence. Particularly when it comes to communication, Byman (2006: 403) asserts that 
positive communications “reward the use of terrorism, tangibly demonstrating that 
groups can kill innocents and yet become legitimate interlocutors.” This potentially zero-
sum scenario where terrorist organization gain political and strategic advantage at the 
expense of government’s is one of the leading explanations as to why governments have 
generally explicitly been against negotiations and other forms of public communication 
(Byman, 2006). Concordantly, both positive and negative policy approaches to terrorist 







Drawing upon the above theoretical discussion regarding government 
communication and its potential links to terrorism, this dissertation introduces four sets of 
hypotheses. These hypotheses were selected in order to discern which aspects of 
government communications impact subsequent terrorism, and whether any observed 
impacts appear to support either deterrence or broader rational choice theories. As will be 
expanded upon in Chapter 4, this dissertation selected the United States (US) as an ideal 
context to examine these potential relationships given its global importance in 
counterterrorism (Erjavec and Volčič, 2006:298; Osuri and Banerjee, 2004). As the US 
government explicitly uses presidential speech to respond to terrorism (US Department of 
State, 2006: 4) and terrorists are known to receive and react to US presidential messages 
(O'Hair, Heath, Ayotte, and Ledlow, 2008; Payne, 2009; Toros, 2008), this dissertation 
focusses upon the impacts of US public communication delivered by either the president 
or presidential press secretary on subsequent terrorism. 
 This dissertation firstly examines whether the volume of government speech 
concerning terrorism affects subsequent terrorism. From this sentiment-neutral 
perspective, this dissertation will examines whether increases in the political attention 
granted to terrorism in the form of the number of public communications in each month 
concerning terrorism leads to an increase in subsequent terrorism, or whether increases in 
the number of public communications and greater acknowledgement leads to a decrease 
subsequent terrorism targeting the US. Concordantly, the first two hypotheses that this 





Hypothesis 1a: The number of speech acts by a government will   
   increase subsequent terrorism (attention). 
Hypothesis 1b: The number of speech acts by a government will   
   decrease subsequent terrorism (acknowledgement). 
In evaluating the above hypotheses, it is important to note that meaningful 
heterogeneity in the content of these speech acts might be obscured by only examining 
the volume of government speech acts concerning terrorism. As such, the second set of 
hypotheses that this dissertation tests concern the sentiment of speech that is used in 
government speech acts. Drawing upon the above theoretical examination, the presence 
of positive or negative sentiment within these speech actions by each government will be 
examined to see how variation in speech impacts subsequent terrorism. Importantly for 
theoretically understanding the relationship between government communications and 
terrorism, the following hypotheses are designed in order to differentiate between 
deterrence theories and the broader set of rational choice theories that were previously 
discussed.   
Hypothesis 2a: Negative speech will be related to decreases in 
subsequent terrorism (deterrence) 
Hypothesis 2b: Negative speech will be related to increases in 
subsequent terrorism (backlash) 
Hypothesis 2c: Positive speech will be related to decreases in 
subsequent terrorism (placation) 
Hypothesis 2d: Positive speech will be related to increases in 
subsequent terrorism (display of weakness) 
 Each of the above hypotheses has been presented under the assumption that the 
relationship between government public communications and terrorism is consistent 
across presidential administrations. As this dissertation has previously argued that 





it is delivered in (see Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012), it is vital to begin to examine 
whether the impact of public communications is conditioned by political factors or 
political regime changes. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between Presidential speech and 
subsequent terrorism will vary across administrations 
 
The final set of hypotheses test whether any observed impacts of government 
speech acts on subsequent terrorism are dependent on political forces that span across 
presidencies. Whereas Hypothesis 3 seeks to examine variation between presidential 
administrations, the Hypothesis 4 seeks to explore whether the impacts are invariant or 
whether there is important variation within presidential administrations. As the influence 
of an individual US president may vary over time, domestic public support also plays a 
role in determining the impact of presidents. As unpopular presidents may only succeed 
in antagonizing public opinions through their public communications and other actions 
(Sigelman and Sigelman, 1981), both the nature and impact of presidential public 
communications may be influenced by public approval ratings. 
Hypothesis 4:   As public support becomes increasingly favorable or  
    unfavorable (absolute value increases), the impact of  
    presidential speech on subsequent terrorism will   





Chapter 3: The Influence of Public Communication on Terrorism 
Within criminology, deterrence and rational choice theories were not developed 
with public communications as the focus. As such, the previous hypotheses are 
theoretically applicable to any government action that could influence the rational 
calculus to commit terrorism. This chapter explains this dissertation’s focus on whether 
public communications are able to influence the incidence of terrorism. It expands upon 
the discussion of the impact of presidential communications from the previous chapter, 
and further elucidates these hypotheses in light of the extant literature exploring a number 
of adjacent communications topics. 
Public Communication and Terrorism 
Over the course of the twentieth century and continuing at a more rapid pace in 
the twenty-first century, conflicts have been transformed by the involvement of interest 
groups that are “linked, informed, and mobilized by the media of communication” 
(Brown, 2003: 88). Now that public communication is seen as a domain for conflict in its 
own right, O'Hair, Heath, Ayotte, and Ledlow (2008) have argued that terrorism and 
potential government responses should be viewed through its lens. From a criminological 
perspective however, even if it is not the primary lens through which to understand 
terrorism, public communication can be seen as an intrinsic part of recent conflicts 
(Amble, 2012). This has been echoed in the practical efforts made by governments 
including the US, where an effective public communication policy has become an 
integral part of the politics of conflict and an essential element in international efforts 
against terrorism (Shpiro, 2002). Changing political expectations have made public 





diplomacy and negotiations with sub-state actors traditionally being covert (Eban, 1998). 
Further, it has been acknowledged that public communication may have the potential to 
diminish terrorist violence directly (Byman, 2006; Sunstrom, Briones, and Janoske, 
2013). Drawing upon this body of work, there is evidence that public communications are 
relevant to terrorism and may impact the development of these conflicts. 
The use of public communications to manage public opinion and frame modern 
conflicts has been commonplace now for more than a century (Lasswell, 1927), with 
communications developing into a crucial battleground for terrorism (Shpiro, 2002; 
Amble, 2012). Public communications have been a prominent tactic for terrorist groups 
that use them to garner support, gain greater attention through the media, and as a catalyst 
for political change (Richards, 2004). The development of global communication 
networks further encouraged organizations with both licit and illicit goals to use public 
channels to advance their political positions and solicit support against governments 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998). Due to the widespread availability of independent formal 
media outlets, the public may hear a plurality of views on any debate (Shpiro, 2002). 
Numerous terrorist groups have used this independence to their advantage in the attempt 
to fundamentally restructure political discourse for their specific political ends 
(Bockstette, 2008). Also used as a means to legitimize alternate political, social, and 
religious messages (Bockstette, 2008), terrorist groups use public communications to 
justify the use of violence even when that violence contradicts their overall political 
goals. According to Weimann (2004: 6), terrorist organizations typically do this through 





no choice other than to turn to violence. Violence is presented as a 
necessity foisted upon the weak as the only means with which to respond 
to an oppressive enemy… The terrorist organization is depicted as 
constantly persecuted, its leaders subject to assassination attempts, its 
supporters massacred, its freedom of expression curtailed, and its 
adherents arrested. This tactic, which portrays the organization as small, 
weak, and hunted down by a strong power or strong state turns the 
terrorists into the underdog. 
 Terrorist organizations routinely employ these techniques, which have grown 
more effective as it has become easier for audiences to selectively consume the pluralistic 
media information available (Amble, 2012). These organizations have also strategically 
used public communications to augment the impact of violence. Shpiro (2002) describes 
how terrorist organizations often attempt to demonstrate their reluctance for violence by 
notifying local police and the media prior to bombings. Framed as a means to enable the 
evacuation of bystanders and thus minimize casualties, announcing terrorist attacks in 
advance also enabled terrorist groups such as the ETA in Spain and the IRA in the United 
Kingdom to maximize their public exposure by ensuring that the media had sufficient 
time to arrive at the scene and document the impending destruction. This remains an 
important concern for government counterterrorism efforts, particularly as terrorist 
organizations use public attention to build constituencies and maintain their support, 
which in turn can improve the organizations’ longevity and survival (McCauley 2006). 
These benefits for terrorist organizations present moral dilemmas for media 
organizations seeking to promote an informed citizenship without further incentivizing 
acts of violence. Shpiro (2002: 81) argues that in these cases journalists should “find a 
balance between satisfying public demand for information and providing terrorists with a 





particularly given the recent proliferation of alternate media sources. Due to increased 
media competition and consumers’ ability to decide which communications they will 
patronize (Strömberg, 2002; Amble, 2012), terrorist organizations have a wealth of 
traditional and non-traditional media outlets to which they may turn to amplify their 
messages. These conditions enable terrorist groups to present and control a public 
narrative in the short term (Jenkins, 1982), with relatively little that media outlets can 
implement in order to stymie the incentives for future acts of terrorism capitalizing upon 
public communications. Importantly from the rational choice perspective presented in the 
previous chapter, this indicates that public communications increase the likely benefits 
that may be derived from terrorism, potentially leading to increased future terrorism. 
Public Communications as Counterterrorism 
Governments have a host of policy options that could be used to influence the 
incidence of crime and terrorism beyond legislating and overseeing the applications of 
laws and criminal justice. While much of the previous investigations within the terrorism 
literature have been limited to investigating means to constrain physical opportunities for 
terrorism (Lynch, 2011; Morris, 2015), governments can and have used public 
communications in the attempt to alter the rational impetus for terrorist organizations. 
Militaries and governments routinely employ communications strategies to engage with 
terrorist conflicts, regardless of ongoing academic and political debates as to whether 
public communications help or hinder the peaceful resolution of conflict (Carruthers, 
1999). Further, a growing body of literature documents how private media companies 
(Storie, Madden, and Liu, 2014), non-government organizations (Sundstrom, Briones, 





2003; Jenkins, 1982; Sarfo and Krampa, 2013; Zhang, 2006) use public communications 
to respond to terrorism. As Jenkins (1982) asserts, governments can use public 
communications politically to negate the aforementioned short-term gains garnered by 
terrorist organizations. 
The rhetoric against terrorism almost always exceeds the amount of 
resources devoted to combatting it. Although governments have a clear 
advantage in the long run, they are almost always at a disadvantage in 
dealing with individual episodes. Terrorists create dramas in which they 
and their victims are central figures… Such perceptions may corrode the 
links between the governed and the government and may contribute to 
public support for drastic measures to counter terrorism (Jenkins, 
1982:17). 
Public communications delivered by governments are thus also an essential part 
of counterterrorism strategies that are less extreme in nature. There is important 
heterogeneity within government communications regarding terrorism, and presidential 
communications in particular serve an important and unique function. Unlike the majority 
of government communications with a populace that are more akin to dialogue, 
presidential speech “is governing” and is monadic in nature (Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and 
Bessette, 1981: 159, emphasis in original; McMillan and Reagan, 1983; Moon, 2002). In 
their own words, President Carter asserted that when communicating the president needs 
to act as the “leader of the people” rather than a “head of government,” and President 
Nixon would engage in “anti-rhetoric” that aimed to lower the voices of dissidents rather 
than engage with them (Ceaser, Thurow, Tulis, and Bessette, 1981: 158-160).  
Continuing to the present day and exemplified within communications concerning 
terrorism, presidential communications are used specifically to discredit terrorist-





Department of State, 2006: 4). In line with Jenkins’ (1982) characterization, one of the 
major goals of the public communications delivered by the president is to provide an 
alternative perspective to the draconian portrayal of the government offered by terrorist 
organizations’ narratives (Carter, 2012; Kydd and Walter, 2006; Toros, 2008). 
Governments pursue this rhetorically by arguing that terrorist organizations are the actual 
oppressors (Zhang, 2007), as well as through promoting messages of resilience in the 
face of violence (McCrisken, 2011).10 
Governments also use public communications strategically to diminish the impact 
of terrorist communications through direct appeals to the media to refrain from showing 
terrorist speeches, in order to diminish the volume of these messages (Shpiro, 2002). 
Appealing to the previously noted moral concerns of the media and stressing their 
autonomy, the following quote is one example of when US presidents and their press 
secretaries have also used public communications to directly entrust the media in 
negating terrorist communications. Such messages are also designed to establish 
perceptions of openness and cooperation with the media to enhance mutual confidence 
(Shpiro, 2001). 
Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the National Security Advisor, this morning called 
a group of network executives to raise their awareness about national 
security concerns of airing pre-recorded, pre-taped messages from Osama 
bin Laden that could be a signal to terrorists to incite attacks. It was a 
very collegial conversation. At best, Osama bin Laden's message is 
                                                 
10 “Our experience and reality itself shows clearly that these self-styled realists are wrong. Our open and 
public grappling with economic and social problems cannot obscure the extraordinary achievements of our 
society as a whole. The democratic nations are magnets for young students from all over the world. The 
democratic world is a center of intellectual and technological invention. It's a great focus of cultural 
creativity. It's undergoing a major resurgence of religious belief, and our political institutions establish and 
exhibit a resilience unmatched by any society in the totalitarian world… We have no reason to fear change, 
new ideas, or new problems. We do not rely on military invasions by so-called friendly neighbors, much 





propaganda, calling on people to kill Americans. At worst, he could be 
issuing orders to his followers to initiate such attacks. Dr. Rice asked the 
networks to exercise judgment about how these pre-recorded, pre-taped 
messages will air. She stressed that she was making a request, and that 
editorial decisions can only be made by the media… I think it's fairly 
obvious. The means of communications out of Afghanistan right now are 
rather limited. One way to communicate outside Afghanistan to followers 
is through Western media. (Fleischer, 2001: 2). 
Echoing the strategic calculus employed by the ETA and the IRA, the US 
government has also involved the media to enhance the impact of physical 
counterterrorism strategies. For example, Shpiro (2002: 81) notes that “timing of the first 
US military strikes against the Taliban seems to have been planned according to 
television primetime rating schedules and not only by military necessities.” As 
governments may gain reputational regard from their stakeholders through overcoming 
and dealing with salient threats (Kaniasty and Norris, 2004), advertising successful 
counterterrorist operations in this manner demonstrates that both terrorist organizations 
and governments employ overlapping public communications tactics. 
The above quote from President George W. Bush’s press secretary Ari Fleischer 
(page 49) also exhibits that presidential press secretaries serve a key communication 
function that augments communications directly from a president. Towle (1997: 299) 
presents that presidential press secretaries are a pivotal arm of presidential 
communications, being either the “mouthpiece” or “representative” of the president on 
important policy matters. Similarly to the president, when acting as a “mouthpiece,” press 
secretaries often communicate in a monadic fashion to disseminate information (Towle, 
1997). When acting as a representative however, the press secretary “interprets the 





of the president (McMillan and Ragan, 1983; Spragens and Terwoord, 1980: 1). Given 
that press secretaries concordantly communicate as an extension of the president and 
employ similar monadic strategies, this dissertation argues that communications from 
presidential press secretaries are part of the suite of communications that US presidents 
employ. 
The previous literature on the nexus between public communications and 
governments has relied primarily on theoretical arguments and qualitative analyses of 
individual events. Consequently, relatively little is known regarding the quantitative 
impacts of government communications on terrorism. This gap in the literature is 
particularly important as the handful of studies that have sought to quantitatively examine 
the impacts of presidential communications have produced findings that have 
contradicted many of the central assumptions made by the previously discussed studies. 
For example, while it has often been asserted that presidential rhetoric is important in 
shaping public opinion, “very few studies focus directly on the effect of presidential 
leadership on opinion” (Edwards 2003:26). While this literature has expanded since this 
claim with evidence showing that presidential public communications influence their 
public approval ratings (Druckman and Holmes, 2004; Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2010), 
perceptions of the current state of the economy (Cohen and Hamman, 2003), and the 
importance of drugs and crime (Oliver, 1998; Oliver, Hill, and Marion, 2011), overall 
presidential messages have had little to no impact on an audience’s beliefs or attitudes 
(Schudson, 2003). However, Tedlin, Rottinghaus, and Rodgers (2011), suggest that this 
conclusion was premature and misses important and policy-relevant heterogeneity. While 





public opinions, they do find that the president’s core constituency and their ‘putative 
opponents’ can be influenced by public communications (Tedlin, Rottinghaus, and 
Rodgers, 2011). Despite the predominantly null findings that previously predominated 
this literature, there is thus more recent evidence that presidential public communications 
may have an impact the opinions of those who are opposed to the government. 
 Whether an event is considered a terrorist act is a much-debated topic, and 
scholars have argued that definitions of terrorism are loaded with cultural biases and 
other assumptions (Bartolucci, 2012; Ruby, 2002). The US president however plays an 
important social role in defining acts as terrorism, with these designations being 
uncritically followed internationally with long lasting impacts (Bartolucci, 2012; Erjavec 
and Volčič, 2006; Osuri and Banerjee, 2004). Further affirming the monadic nature of 
presidential communications, these assertions pressured the obedience of others to accept 
these claims regardless of the evidence provided by presidents and their press secretaries 
(Bartolucci, 2012; Wolf, 2003). As presidents have latitude to selectively declare acts of 
terrorism and declarations of terrorism are dependent on political and other biases 
(Bartolucci, 2012; Ruby, 2002), it is likely that there would be some divergence between 
the politically subjective definitions used by presidents and any consistently 
operationalized definition of terrorism. Although investigating the impacts of this 
variation in the designation of terrorism falls beyond the scope of the present study, this 
use of this latitude is an important avenue for future research. 
The Importance of the Frequency of Public Communications 
US presidents use their public communications to gain media coverage for their 





groups (Kiousis and Strömbäck, 2010). Beyond the messages directly delivered in these 
public communications, the behavior of previous presidents has indicated that there are 
also potential benefits for increasing the frequency of public communications. 
Particularly when presidents are in reelection years, when their approval rates have fallen, 
or following hard political decisions, US presidents increase the frequency of their public 
communications in the attempt to enhance their public support and to exert control over 
public narratives (Brace and Hinckley, 1993). Unlike routinized speeches such as the 
State of the Union addresses which have broad and resonant impacts (Young and Perkins, 
2005), scholars have also advocated that presidents should increase the frequency of their 
non-routine public communications in order to gain support for their policies and increase 
their impact on stakeholders (Patel, 2004).  
The frequency of public communications concerning terrorism has been one of 
the most debated elements of counterterrorism strategy. As it has been previously 
discussed, many have projected fears that any form of direct or indirect public 
communication with terrorist groups should be avoided in order to prevent benefitting 
terrorist organizations (Neumann, 2007; Toros, 2008). As any communication may 
increase the legitimacy of terrorist organizations and grant their political views greater 
national and international exposure (Jenkins, 1982; Neumann, 2007), it has been a tacit 
prediction that increases in public government discussions of terrorism would lead to 
increased terrorist violence. Consequently, it is of primary policy and theoretical interest 
to empirically test whether increases in presidents’ publicly discussing terrorism 





From a rational choice perspective, the frequency of government public 
communications may have two different impacts on terrorism. Drawing on the previously 
mentioned argument, paying greater attention to terrorist conflicts (increases in the 
frequency of public communication concerning terrorism) may increase the incentives for 
terrorism, leading to an increase subsequent attacks. Amble (2012) however argues that 
governments cannot afford to ignore public communications in their efforts to combat 
terrorism, with Byman (2006) suggesting that engaging in communications with terrorist 
organizations is pivotal step toward peaceful resolution of these conflicts. Concordantly, 
acknowledging terrorist conflicts in what Byman (2006: 404) termed “diplomacy by 
declaration” can be used as a strategic means to instigate peace talks and reduce the 
impetus for violence. The acknowledgement of terrorist conflicts within public 
communications by governments may also increase civilian emergency preparedness and 
government preparedness for dealing effectively with acts of terrorism, reducing both the 
potential benefits from terrorism for terrorist organizations and costs of terrorism for 
civilians and governments (Lemyre, Lee, Turner, and Krewski, 2007). 
The Importance of Sentiment in Public Communications 
This dissertation has previously presented a number of examples of presidential 
communications regarding terrorism to demonstrate that presidents have used a variety of 
public communications strategies. These salient examples represent only a handful of the 
different public communications governments use to frame, control, and react to terrorist 
conflicts. In light of this variation, it is necessary to provide a framework to summarize 
the content of these communication techniques and examine their impacts on subsequent 





section argues that variation in the sentiment of public communications concerning 
terrorism can elicit differential impacts on subsequent terrorism.  
Sentiment is a crucial element of written and spoken human communications. 
Human communications naturally contain “expression of opinions, appraisals, attitudes, 
and emotions toward entities, events, and their attributes” (Dang-Xuan, Stieglitz, 
Wladarsch, and Neuberger, 2013: 799). These different elements express tone and value 
toward a subject, and shape how recipients perceive what is being discussed (Hornstein, 
Masor, Sole, and Heilman, 1971; Jervis, 2015; Kinder 1978). These expressions of tone 
and value are combined within the concept of sentiment and specifically include 
evaluative statements and predicative judgments (Liu 2011; Pang and Lee 2008). 
Particularly in high-volume information settings, sentiment plays a pivotal role in 
influencing others’ decision making (Dubey, Rana, and Ranjan, 2016). Often in lieu or in 
spite of other information sources, individuals form their perceptions, evaluations, and 
decisions by analyzing other peoples’ projected views (Dubey, Rana, and Ranjan, 2016). 
Individuals typically use sentiment unsystematically to form opinions, however 
researchers, businesses, and organizations have developed techniques to measure and 
analyze sentiment systematically (Liu 2011). Operationalized within a vast and growing 
literature from the field of computer science, “sentiment analysis is defined as the task of 
finding the opinions of authors about specific entities” (Feldman, 2013: 82). 
Although sentiment has been expressed in a variety of manners, it is most 
commonly represented as a numeric scale relating to the balance of positive and negative 





computer-based language processing techniques that have been developed over the last 
20 years, the sentiment of a given text can be expressed as a numeric indicator using 0 as 
a neutral marker. Early sentiment analyses simply scanned for and counted words 
contained within a dictionary and calculated the number of these words that were either 
positive or negative in sentiment. These techniques have since been abandoned due to 
their inability to detect and account for context and linguistic modifiers (Anstead and 
O’Loughlin, 2014). More recently developed methods for measuring sentiment employ 
natural language processing, where a computer essentially “reads” a given text and 
attributes a sentiment value to it (Kao and Poteet, 2007). Using this approach, sentiment 
is calculated by examining the entirety of the text’s meaning, rendering it easier to 
measure the context of any given statement (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2014). Coupled 
with iterative human corrections and software updates to amend the sentiment scores 
generated from specific portions of text, the accuracy and reliability of sentiment analysis 
packages increases over time (Anstead and O’Loughlin, 2014). 
Sentiment analysis does not look for qualitative differences between different 
types of speech or text, and instead provides a replicable and non-normative means to 
compare and measure all communications. Coupled with its ability to detect subtle 
difference in the sentiment between communications that may be difficult for subjective 
measures to articulate (Cui, Mittal, and Datar, 2006), sentiment analysis can 
systematically differentiate between positive, negative, and more neutral messages. 
Recent packages allow users to set a subject as neutral in order to gauge variation in 
sentiment around this topic (Fisher and Dugan, 2017). The sentiment scores of the quotes 





the generally negative subject area of terrorism. President Jimmy Carter’s message of 
resilience yielded a positive sentiment score (0.469) even though it mentioned “military 
invasions” and “terrorism.”11 Conversely, President George W. Bush’s call to arms 
following acts of terrorism12 has a negative sentiment, with a score of -0.622.13  
Similarly, President Gerald Ford’s commitment to deterring terrorism also 
presents a negative sentiment, -0.655.14 Despite the inclusion of the typically positive 
phrase “pleased to affix my signature,” current sentiment analysis packages such as that 
used for this dissertation are able to detect that this phrase is an affirmation of negative 
sentiment. Using early sentiment analysis tools, this phrase would have a neutralizing 
effect on the excerpt’s sentiment score. However contemporary packages are able to 
correctly observe that this passage is actually slightly more negative in sentiment than 
Bush II’s statement. Consequently, while one may seek to qualitatively distinguish 
between Ford’s and Bush II’s messages, using modern sentiment analysis, these different 
communications fall near one another on the sentiment scale. 
                                                 
11 “The democratic nations are magnets for young students from all over the world. The democratic world 
is a center of intellectual and technological invention. It's a great focus of cultural creativity. It's undergoing 
a major resurgence of religious belief, and our political institutions establish and exhibit a resilience 
unmatched by any society in the totalitarian world… We have no reason to fear change, new ideas, or new 
problems. We do not rely on military invasions by so-called friendly neighbors, much less on terrorism, to 
sustain the idea of liberty. It stands on its own merit” (Carter, 1980a). 
12 “These terrorists will not be stopped by negotiations or by appeals to reason or by the least hint of 
conscience. We have only one option: we must and we will continue to take the fight to the enemy” (Bush 
II, 2003: 2). 
13 These sentiment scores were calculated with the open access Sentiment Analysis Online Beta software 
available at sentimentanalysisonline.com. This sentiment analysis package is described in more detail in 
Chapter 5, and is the analysis package for all primary analyses. 
14 “These acts cannot and will not be tolerated in the United States, nor should they be tolerated anywhere 
in the world. Preventing or punishing such acts is a prime concern of this Government and one which I will 
pursue with all the force of this office. Today, I am pleased to affix my signature to three documents which 
once again demonstrate the commitment of the United States to sustain its struggle against international 





This systematic approach for quantifying tone and value features the ability to 
differentiate positive and negative sentiment independently of the text’s purpose. The 
previous examples of presidential communications demonstrate that sentiment analysis 
software can identify cases where the expressed sentiment is in line with theoretical 
predictions (on diagonal cases where expression of deterrence were negative in sentiment 
and asserting resilience yielded positive sentiment scores). However, there is important 
variation in sentiment that would be missed if communications were coded purely as to 
their purpose, due to the natural variation in communications and the nuanced political 
environment surrounding terrorism (Sarfo and Krampa, 2013). For example, deterrence-
based communications with the purpose of highlighting the United States’ general 
counterterrorism capabilities may have either negative15 or positive sentiment.16 While 
both speeches emphasize that the US will work with other nations to reduce the rewards 
for engaging in terrorism, President Clinton uses combative language such as “thwart” 
and “fight,” whereas President Reagan highlights the consistency and solidarity in 
counterterrorism in his deterrence message. 
                                                 
15 “I especially want to thank all involved in this important process. This arrest is a major step forward in 
the fight against terrorism. Terrorism will not pay. Terrorists will pay. We will continue to work with other 
nations to thwart those who would kill innocent citizens to further their own political aims” (Clinton, 1995, 
sentiment score -0.092). 
16 “America will continue to deploy military forces throughout the free world as proof of solidarity with our 
Allies and other friendly nations, and as a deterrent to those who might threaten our peace and freedom. 
Forward deployments not only underscore our national policies, but also provide valuable exercises and 





Similarly, the sentiment analysis package employed by this dissertation is able to 
differentiate between positive17 and negative18 initial reactions to terrorist events. These 
two cases, in which both President Bill Clinton and President George W. Bush condemn 
terrorism, are contextually similar. While overall each speech has a fairly neutral 
sentiment, Clinton highlighted that recovery efforts diminished the attack’s impacts 
whereas Bush II projected that recovery efforts would enable the ongoing fight against 
terrorism. Consequently, while the purpose and themes are similar between these 
speeches, this key divergence in framing drives the distinction in overall sentiment. These 
examples demonstrate that sentiment is not entirely determined by the context or purpose 
of the text. Rather it can detect off-diagonal cases where specific recovery and resilience 
messages may have a negative tone (Bush II, 2002), and messages of deterrence may 
have a positive sentiment (Reagan, 1987). 
Furthermore, sentiment software that accounts for subject matter can also reveal 
important insights regarding the implicit or explicit strategies employed in these 
communications. Presidents and their press secretaries have time to prepare their 
remarks, aim to exhibit a unified “executive image,” and will be held accountable if they 
                                                 
17 “The attack on American diplomatic personnel in Pakistan today outrages all Americans. I have 
instructed relevant U.S. Government agencies to work with the Government of Pakistan to apprehend the 
perpetrators of this cowardly act. I want to thank the Government of Pakistan for the excellent cooperation 
it has already provided. Our hearts go out to the families of Gary Durell, a communicator, and Jacqueline 
van Landingham, a consulate secretary, who were killed. We pray for the speedy recovery of Mark 
McCloy, a consulate spouse, who was wounded. Attacks such as these should make the international 
community rededicate itself to efforts to stamp out terrorism everywhere” (Clinton, 1995, sentiment score 
0.009). 
18 “The United States condemns the terrorist attack carried out by militants in Jammu and Kashmir 
yesterday. On behalf of the American people, I extend my condolences to the families of the victims and 
the people of Jammu and Kashmir, whose citizens were killed in this attack. Yesterday's attack was also 
aimed at destroying opportunities for South Asia to build a future that is more stable, more peaceful, and 
more prosperous. We will not allow terrorists to succeed in this larger mission. The United States will not 
yield in its determination to work with the people of South Asia to fight terrorism and to build a better 





deviate too widely from the expectations of their offices (Schaefer, 1997: 97). In line with 
this controlled image that US presidents have presented, one would expect to see 
relatively few presidential communications with extreme sentiment scores even on a 
topic as emotive as terrorism. This control and consistency of presidential messages can 
be evidenced in Figure 3.1 below, which presents the distribution for individual 
communications regarding terrorism between 1970 and 2014. As one would expect, the 
average sentiment for individual communications was negative (?̅?=-0.047, SD=0.222). 
The sentiment analysis package employed by this dissertation also supports Schaefer’s 
(2011) observation of control, with 80% of all presidential communications regarding 
terrorism having a sentiment score between -0.245 and 0.187. Taken together, these 
observations suggest that sentiment analysis software can detect important differences 
between communications, and that these sentiment scores align with the qualitative 






Figure 3.1: The distribution of sentiment scores for presidential communications regarding 
terrorism 1970-2014 
Figure 3.1 also displays that there are cases when presidents have projected 
sentiment that was very positive and very negative in nature with regard to terrorism. 
Indeed, many of the examples discussed in this chapter fall within the highest and lowest 
deciles of presidential communications.19 If these communications are as unique, as this 
distribution suggests, then one would expect to see qualitative differences between the 
most negative and most positive deciles of presidential communications with respect to 
the most commonly used words that convey sentiment within their texts. When the 
contents of the 1200 presidential communications representing the lowest and highest 
deciles of sentiment scores were examined using NVIVO,20 it was evident that the 
                                                 
19 The sentiment score for the lowest decile was -0.245 and the sentiment score for the highest decile was 
0.187. 
20 For this discussion, the 100 most used words within each set of 600 communications were identified 





contents and prominence of the most commonly used words varied (see Figure 3.2 
below). Beginning with the 100 most frequently used words in the 600 most negative 
sentiment communications, assertive words such as “know,” “now,” “take,” and “get” 
were used prominently. The relatively large font size of these words also indicates that 
these words were used quite extensively in comparison to other words. In comparison, 
the 100 most frequently used words within the 600 most positive communications 
comprised more inclusive words such as “cooperation,” “support,” “commitment,” and 
“help.” The comparatively smaller font for the most frequently used words also indicates 
that among these words there was more variation. 
 
Figure 3.2: The 100 most frequently used words conveying sentiment from the 10% least 
positive and the 10% most positive communications 
Thirty-seven words appear on both lists, including “progress,” “process,” and 
“peace.” Despite appearing in the 100 most frequently used words in both subsets, the 
frequency of use demonstrates another key difference between these communications.21 
“Progress” was the 100th most frequently used word in the lowest decile for sentiment 
                                                 
or did not convey sentiment. These excluded words included office titles such as “president” and “prime” 
“minister,” common words such as “that” and “one,” and country names including “Afghanistan” and 
“Iraq.” 
21 A table containing the frequencies of the 100 words that were used most often in the upper and lower 





score, but was the 46th most frequently used in the highest decile. Conversely, “process” 
was the 22nd most used word for the most negative communications but was ranked 76th 
within the positive communications. Taken together, this provides some evidence that 
“process” was emphasized more in negative communications, and “progress” was more 
central when conveying positive overall sentiment. Similarly, “peace” was the 36th most 
frequently used word for the most negative decile of communications, but was 7th within 
the most positive communications. Although this analysis is limited without the context 
and potentially divergent meaning of some words, this variation is further evidence that 
sentiment analysis is able to detect meaningful and potentially policy-relevant variation 
in presidential communications.  
Beyond these measurement advantages, sentiment plays a pivotal role in 
influencing others’ decision making by either affirming behavior or pushing people in 
another direction (Dubey, Rana, and Ranjan, 2016). Stock traders, for example, are 
positively influenced by the either bullish or bearish public sentiments expressed by other 
traders (Kurov, 2008). Similarly, expressions of national sentiment have also been 
positively connected to the pricing patterns for gambling on European football (soccer), 
whereby bookmakers overrate the winning chances of their national team and bettors 
refrain from wagering against their own team even under favorable odds (Braun and 
Kvasnicka, 2013). In both of these economic examples, individual behavior is influenced 
by the sentiment of previous messages. Even when the sentiment is irrelevant to the 
outcome, as is the case in expressions of national pride on the performance of a soccer 
team, people are more likely to base their future economic behavior in line with the 





Within political events however, this relationship is less clear. The expression of 
political sentiment has been found to be irrelevant (DiGrazia, McKelvey, Bollen, and 
Rojas, 2013), positively related (Sanders & den Bosch, 2013; Sang and Bos , 2012), or 
negatively related to voting behavior (Jugherr, Jürgens, and Schoen, 2012). 
Consequently, while many have touted that sentiment analysis provides an opportunity to 
more accurately predict political events including the outcome of elections (see Ceron, 
Curini, Iacus, and Porro, 2014), it is at present unclear how individual political decisions 
are shaped by the sentiment of communications. One longstanding explanation for this is 
that those who consume more information, and are thus exposed to more sentiment, tend 
to be more extreme in their political views and also more likely to act upon these views 
(Palfrey and Poole, 1987). One reason for this may be that individuals who have extreme 
views are more invested and reactive to individual messages, making them more likely to 
respond either in line with or against the sentiment to which they are exposed (Palfrey 
and Poole, 1987). Thus, while those who have more moderate views have little incentive 
to gather and process additional information to inform their actions (Palfrey and Poole, 
1987), those who hold more extreme political positions, such as potential terrorists, are 
more likely to adjust their future actions in line with these political sentiments. 
Concordantly, as exposure to sentiment has the ability to polarize or balance the peoples’ 
views and actions (Bray and Noble, 1978; Trier and Hillmann, 2017), the sentiment of 
presidential public communications may be able to shift the attitudes and behavior of 
potential terrorists either toward or away from violence. 
Drawing upon this literature, evidence suggests that political actors such as 





presidential messages. In line with the theoretical discussion informed by deterrence and 
rational choice theories, evidence also suggests that both positive and negative sentiment 
public communications may lead to either increases or decreases in terrorism. Focusing 
firstly on communications that are negative in sentiment, deterrence theories would 
predict that the impetus for terrorist violence may be reduced (moderated toward 0). 
Drawing upon rational choice predictions however, it is also plausible that 
communications that have a negative sentiment may also elicit a violent backlash from 
terrorist groups, as their views are polarized (perceived incentive for violence moves 
away from 0) by these communications. Also in line with rational choice theories, public 
communications that are positive in sentiment could either placate the motivation for 
terrorism and lead to reductions in terrorist violence, or be interpreted as a display of 







Chapter 4: The US Context and Terrorism 
The US plays a pivotal role in framing issues of international security (Bartolucci, 
2012), and represents an ideal nation to examine the impact of head-of-state speech on 
terrorism (see Schudson, 2003; Edwards, 2003). US presidential discourse in particular 
has been instrumental in defining what terrorism is and who perpetrates it (Bartolucci, 
2012; Wolf, 2003), and the US perspective on counterterrorism has influenced many 
nations around the world (Erjavec and Volčič, 2006). Most notably observed through the 
profound international impacts from the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Bartolucci 
(2014:1) has argued that the US presidential framing of these events was “uncritically 
accepted and widely reproduced,” becoming one of the principal security discourses 
globally. As they regularly employ hyperbole, repetitions, and “us” versus “other” 
representations, Bartolucci (2012:562) also claims that these public communications 
“condition the contemporary life of individuals and groups all around the world.”  
If public communications do affect terrorism, this dissertation argues that the US 
would be the most likely place to observe an impact. However, if null findings are 
observed in the US context, Bartolucci’s (2010; 2012; 2014) assertions regarding US 
influence may be limited to merely influencing how terrorism is framed politically on the 
international stage, rather than affecting the incidence of terrorism. The subsequent 
analysis thus yields important insights into the strategic implementation of public 
communication as a counterterrorism approach. During the 45 years examined by this 
dissertation, the world experienced dramatic changes with respect to communication 
technology and to the political contexts surrounding terrorism. This chapter outlines some 





counterterrorism for each US president since 1970. These contextual factors then serve to 
inform the third and fourth hypotheses that this dissertation tests. 
The Importance of Context 
The impact and interpretations of communications depend partially upon the 
source of that speech, and likely vary across political contexts (Zarefsky, 2004; 
Stepanova, 2011). Communications from presidents are central for rallying groups of 
people to assist in achieving policy objectives (Kernell, 2007), and the emotion and 
sentiment that a president conveys is central for the effects of presidential speech on 
public opinions (Buchanon, 2010). Presidents have a variety of channels through which 
they can communicate publicly. They can communicate indirectly through their press 
secretaries (McMillan and Ragan, 1983; Towle, 1997; Spragens and Terwoord, 1980), 
written statements, policy documents, and directly through speeches and public addresses 
(Kernell, 2007). Many of these channels are reserved for the president alone and hold 
great political and social importance. For example, the US Constitution requires the 
president to deliver information to Congress regarding the State of the Union. These 
annual addresses reach a mass audience through dedicated television and media coverage, 
and have also been observed to influence the president’s “opponents” (Tedlin, 
Rottinghaus, and Rodgers, 2011: 506). Due to the president’s unique power to increase 
attention to specific policy concerns (Cohen, 1995), communications delivered by US 
presidents and their press secretaries should carry more weight than other political 
players and stakeholders with less relative power. 
This dissertation also examines whether the impact of public communications on 





Each of the eight presidencies examined by this dissertation faced different terrorist 
threats and political counter-movements. In light of these varying influences and threats, 
government actions may have had a variable impact of counterterrorism actions across 
political periods (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). As the political and social context in 
which a message is received is central to the interpretation and meaning ascribed to that 
message (Zarefsky, 2004), this chapter briefly documents the changing political and 
terrorist landscape between 1970 and 2014. 
Political and idiosyncratic differences between presidents may also condition 
violent and non-violent responses to presidential public communications. Since 1868, all 
US presidents have been official representatives of one of only two political parties – the 
Republican Party and Democratic Party. Each has its own unique policy platform,22 with 
the scope of the welfare state and national security being major issues that have 
determined support for presidential candidates in the recent past (Abramowitz, 2002). 
Given that political leanings and levels of ethnocentrism have strongly predicted civilian 
views on terrorism and responses to terrorism (Kam and Kinder, 2007), the presidents’ 
political identities alone may influence how their public communications are received. 
Beyond this, presidents’ individual political stances, and variation in the ideology, goals, 
and methods employed by terrorists during their tenure, may also drive important 
differences across presidencies. To explicate this variation in context, this chapter briefly 
outlines the approach to terrorism employed by each of the eight presidents who this 
dissertation will examine. It then presents the monthly frequency of terrorism and civil 
                                                 
22 See https://prod-cdn-static.gop.com/static/home/data/platform.pdf for the most recent Republican 






unrest that confronted each president, and provides a brief description of the words used 
by each president and their press secretaries when discussing terrorism. 
Richard Nixon (January 20, 1969 – August 9, 1974) 
Terrorism in the US has roots that extend well before the observation period of 
this dissertation, and each presidency faced its own unique political tension and terrorist 
threats. Contemporary counterterrorism strategies began under the Nixon administration 
(Sloan, 1993; Williamson, 2011), and had a formative impact on how future US 
governments and the world would define, understand, and respond to terrorism. Prior to 
Nixon, groups that are now designated as domestic terrorist organizations, such as the Ku 
Klux Klan, were often either ignored or treated as purely criminal organizations (Sloan, 
1993). Even following increases in Puerto Rican terrorism, culminating with the 
attempted assassination of President Truman in 1950, terrorism was dismissed as not 
rising to the level of a major threat requiring any systematic policy responses (Sloan, 
1993).  
Continuing into Nixon’s administration, the term terrorism was used loosely, 
often as a synonym for various forms of domestic and international hijacking, air piracy, 
and guerilla warfare (Naftali, 2005). Practically, terrorism was thus poorly defined and 
understood, which permitted the Nixon administration to craft its responses to terrorist 
situations unencumbered by established political positions. Williamson (2011: 45) 
contends that for the majority of Nixon’s tenure, “terrorism [w]as a second class issue to 
which the US could respond flexibly when it aligned with the country’s broader foreign 
policy interests.” Instead of focusing on terrorism, the administration primarily paid 





diplomatic relations with China, and pursuing a détente with the Soviet Union 
(Williamson, 2011). However, following the 1972 Munich Olympic terrorist attack by 
Black September, the mounting pressure and proximity of airline hijackings, and the 
political latitude that these events created, the Nixon administration introduced the US 
policy of “no concessions” for any demands from terrorist groups on March 2nd 1973: 
On March 1, 1973, Ambassador Cleo A. Noel, Jr., Deputy Chief of 
Mission George Curtis Moore, and Belgian Charge d'Affaires Guy Eld 
were seized at a reception at the Saudi Arabian Embassy in Khartoum, by 
members of the Arab terrorist organization, Black September. As you 
know, we had a problem in Latin America last year; we have one here this 
year. I don't mean to suggest it is that hazardous everyplace, but it is a 
problem and it is a risk that an ambassador has to take. As far as the 
United States as a government giving in to blackmail demands, we 
cannot do so and we will not do so. Now, as to what can be done to get 
these people released, Mr. Macomber is on his way there for discussions. 
The Sudanese Government is working on the problem. We will do 
everything that we can to get them released, but we will not pay blackmail 
(Nixon, 1973, emphasis added). 
 Beyond this unscripted statement that indelibly changed official US policy 
concerning terrorism, Nixon also established the Cabinet Committee to Combat 
Terrorism (CCCT) in 1972 to “gather intelligence on terrorist organizations and plots, as 
well as to consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism domestically 
and internationally” (Barber, 2016: 2). Along with creating the corps of US Air 
Marshalls, Nixon’s ad hoc approach to counterterrorism established enduring agencies 
that would be charged with combating terrorism well after his resignation on August 9th, 
1974 (Williamson, 2011). Calling for the international community to develop solutions to 
terrorism in a speech before the UN General Assembly as early as 1970, Nixon used 
public communications to unify other nations against common terrorist threats and to 





 In addition to terrorism, these US presidents also faced dissent and counter-
movements. Events of civil unrest can provide additional hostility and have the potential 
to radicalize and influence existing terrorist organizations. Following the previous 
assertion that terrorist organizations may be more likely to respond with violence to 
presidents with lower than average approval ratings, this dissertation also contends that 
the societal discontent displayed by civil unrest may also mediate the relationship 
between presidential communications and terrorism. The Nixon administration was 
confronted by 580 incidents of civil unrest from 1970 to Nixon’s impeachment in 1974.23 
The monthly frequency of terrorism and these civil unrest events24 can be seen below in 
Figure 4.1. Many of these civil unrest events attracted international attention, and were 
among the most conspicuous incidents that Nixon faced. For example, Kent State 
University was the setting for one of many civil unrest events in the form of students 
protesting the Vietnam War. It drew international attention after the Ohio National Guard 
opened fire at the students, killing four and wounding nine of them (see Hall and Hewitt, 
                                                 
23 These data were sourced from the Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED) (Nardulli 
and Hayes, 2011). As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, events of civil unrest were defined in 
this database as: “happenings that unsettle the routines and expectations of citizens, cause them to be 
fearful, and raise their anxiety about the future” (Nardulli and Hayes, 2011:1). The SPEED database also 
collects actions by governments and political attacks. As these events were either committed by the 
government or were considered terrorist actions and also recorded by the GTD (see Nardulli and Hayes, 
2011 for a discussion of the overlap with the GTD), civil unrest events for the purposes of this dissertation 
were restricted to “political expression” events which were defined as “Political expression events are the 
public articulation, by non-governmental actors, of threatening or unwelcome political messages” (Nardulli 
and Hayes, 2010:2). 
24 Drawing upon the observations of Naftali (2005) Williamson (2011) the political definition of terrorism 
varied immensely within the Nixon administration and all other presidencies. In order to provide systematic 
data that are comparable across presidencies, terrorism data for Figure 4.1 and all subsequent analyses were 
gathered from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5, 
acts of terrorism were defined in this database as: “intentional act of violence or threat of violence by a 
non-state actor” where two of the following three criteria were also met; “the violent act was aimed at 
attaining a political, economic, religious, or social goal; the violent act included evidence of an intention to 
coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the 
immediate victims; and the violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law” 





1970). These civil unrest events demonstrated the value of communication in American 
society, but Hall and Hewitt (1970: 26) claim they may also have “embittered” and 
escalated violence in the protest movement. The potential interconnections between civil 
unrest and terrorism targeting the US domestically and internationally can be observed in 
Figure 4.1, with both following similar patterns over the course of Nixon’s presidency 
(r=0.679). Rate of incidence for both terrorism and civil unrest saw sharp increases in 
early 1970, followed by a decrease from 1971 forward. The average monthly frequency 
was lower for civil unrest (?̅?= 10.55, SD= 9.65) compared to terrorism (?̅?=21.27, 
SD=17.27) during this period (t=4.02, p<0.001). 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Monthly frequency of terrorism targeting US interests and civil unrest under the 
Nixon administration 
 The Social, Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED) also codes civil 



























Hayes, 2011: 9).25 In order to provide comparable figures across presidencies,26 data were 
collected for the number of civil unrest events per month for each president, within the 
seven categories that are recorded by SPEED. 
Table 4.1: The definitions for the seven types of civil unrest from the SPEED data presented 
below 
Type of Unrest Definition 
Public Order Imminent Threat to Public Order - Destabilizing acts, often the 
result of other the manifestation of popular discontent by others 
Retribution The desire to seek revenge for the actions perpetrated by other 
individuals, groups, or organizations is one of the oldest 
sources of discontent 
Class Conflict This subcategory captures a number of factors related to the 
quality of work environments that can give rise to discontent. 
These work environments deeply 
affect individual outlooks and overall satisfaction with life and 
they can be an important source of economic and class-based 
discontents. This subset includes such things as the availability 
of jobs, pay levels, and working conditions – all of which can 
generate public protests and sometimes give rise to violent 
attacks. So too can the treatment of other workers and general 
concerns over labor rights.27 
Political Desires While concerns with political liberties and freedom have long 
been of concern to individuals, the increasing reach of the 
modern state has made them an important driver of civil unrest, 
including civil wars. The pretest suggested that three categories 
of political rights are especially prominent: equality, freedom 
of expression (especially the treatment of dissidents), and the 
right to self-determination (independence from a colonial ruler, 
independence from an existing state, demands for greater 
autonomy, etc.). 
Retain Political Powers While ideological concerns and the desire for specific political 
rights and liberties are important sources of civil unrest, in 
many instances it is simply the desire for political power – 
including the control and the spoils that it can bring. These 
desires manifest themselves in three ways: acts aimed at 
maintaining, enhancing or securing political power. 
                                                 
25 Within the SPEED data, an event is considered to be “rooted” in something if it is clear that a specific 
issue or grievance is the origin or motivating factor for the event (Nardulli and Hayes, 2011: 3). The full 
narrative definitions for each of these seven categories can be found at: 
http://www.clinecenter.illinois.edu/publications/SPEED-An_Overview_of_the_SSP.pdf.  
26 The SPEED database only contains events until the end of 2005. Consequently,  these comparisons were 
unable to be completed for the remainder of the Bush II administration or the Obama administration. 
27 According to Nardulli and Hayes (2011) examples of civil unrest incidents rooted in class conflict 





Ecological Resource Scarcity Discontent rooted in such resource scarcities. Moreover it is 
concerned with resource scarcities derived from ecological 
factors and/or population pressures – as opposed to scarcities 
derived from economic inequalities or government policies, 
which would be more properly categorized as economic or 
governance matters. 
Personal Security Safety is also a core human desire; threats to personal safety 
that generate popular discontent can come from crime sprees, 
widespread civil unrest, organized terrorism and/or 
international threats.28 
 
Figure 4.2 below displays these data for Nixon. Under the Nixon administration, 
class conflict was identified as the most prominent root reason behind incidents of civil 
unrest, with an average of more than 3 incidents per month (f=166). Not all civil unrest 
was motivated by attempts to reduce power disparities within US society. These data also 
captured civil unrest events that attempted to retain existing political power (f=44), which 
was third most common during this period. In comparison, there were relatively few 
incidents of civil unrest events with roots in personal security (f=2) and public order 
(f=9). 
 
                                                 
28 According to Nardulli and Hayes (2011) examples of civil unrest incidents rooted in personal security 
include: protests of political and criminal enterprises, night vigils to reclaim public spaces, and public 







































Figure 4.2: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the Nixon 
administration 
 The early 1970s were also marked by a high number of terrorist attacks that 
targeted US interests both domestically and abroad. Drawing upon data from the Global 
Terrorism Database (GTD), Table 4.2 below displays the top 20 groups identified as the 
perpetrator of the 1,170 attacks that targeted the US under Nixon’s tenure. A number of 
these attacks were coded as being committed by an unknown perpetrator (f=142 for 
domestic attacks, f=125 for international attacks).29 Similar to the civil unrest data and 
the qualitative accounts above, the groups represented in this table suggest once again 
that class conflict was a major motivator for domestic terrorist violence. Left-wing 
militants were the most frequently identified terrorist grouping, followed by black 
nationalists, then student radicals. Again demonstrating the less frequent counter-
movement that occurred in the US, white extremists were identified as the perpetrator in 
39 terrorist attacks, with specific groups such as the Ku Klux Klan being attributed to 
seven attacks. The most frequent terrorist organizations targeting the US internationally 
were the Turkish People's Liberation Army, Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo from 
Argentina, and Tupamaros from Uruguay. Only Black September was identified in the 
top 20 terrorist organizations both domestically and internationally, committing six 
attacks in the US and nine overseas. This lack of overlap domestically and abroad 
suggests that the US encountered different terrorist threats on US soil compared to the 
rest of the world under the Nixon administration. 
Table 4.2: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Nixon administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
                                                 
29 The perpetrator for terrorist attacks in the GTD is coded as unknown if “no information about the 





1 Left-Wing Militants  169 Unknown  125 
2 Unknown  142 Turkish People's Liberation Army  25 
3 Black Nationalists  82 Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo 19 
4 Student Radicals  71 Tupamaros  14 
5 Weather Underground, Weathermen  39 Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine 
11 
6 White Extremists  39 Black September  9 
7 Black Liberation Army  34 Baader-Meinhof Group  7 
8 Armed Revolutionary Independence 
Movement  
30 Eritrean Liberation Front  5 
9 Jewish Defense League (JDL)  29 Comite Argentino de Lucha  
Anti- Imperial  
4 
10 Chicano Liberation Front  28 Extraparliamentary Opposition 
(APO)  
4 
11 Black Panthers  24 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  4 
12 Strikers  23 Palestinians  4 
13 Zebra killers  20 New People's Army (NPA)  3 
14 Armed Commandos of Liberation  13 Peronist Armed Forces (FAP)  3 
15 Chicano Radicals  10 Revolutionary Communist League 
(LCR) 
3 
16 Puerto Rican Nationalists  10 Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP)  2 
17 Secret Cuban Government  8 Irish Republican Army (IRA)  2 
18 Ku Klux Klan  7 Jewish Defense League (JDL)  2 
19 Black September  6 Lebanese Socialist Revolutionary 
Organization 
2 
20 Individual  6 Montoneros (Argentina)  2 
 
Both terrorism and civil unrest featured prominently within presidential terrorism 
communications, and the 100 most used words under the Nixon administration are 
displayed below in Figure 4.3. Despite there being more domestic (f=887) than 
international attacks against the US (f=283), greater attention was paid to international 
threats in these communications. This is evidenced by the prominence of the words 
“international,” “Vietnam,” “Soviet,” “countries,” “foreign,” and “Asia” in Figure 4.3. 
This is in line with Williamson’s (2011) observation that Nixon and his press secretaries 
paid substantial attention to the Vietnam War and pursuing a détente with the Soviet 
Union, and demonstrates that the contents of presidential communications regarding 





Hall and Hewitt’s (1970: 18) observation that Nixon deflected issues of civil unrest to 
instead focus on “communication breakdown” and policy, the words “agreement,” 
“programs,” “policy,” “development,” and “support” were all among his most commonly 
used words in terrorism communications. The absence of the word “terrorism” from the 
100 most used words also lends support to the qualitative account above that “terrorism 
[w]as a second class issue” for Nixon (Williamson, 2011: 45). Indeed, Nixon and his 
press secretaries only used the word terrorism 57 times between January 1970 and his 
impeachment in 1974. 
 
 
Figure 4.3: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Nixon 
administration 
Gerald Ford (August 9, 1974 – January 20, 1977) 
The terrible increase in violence and terrorism throughout the world has 
sharpened our awareness of the need to assure rigorous protection for 
sensitive nuclear materials and equipment. Fortunately, the need to cope 
with this problem is now broadly recognized. Many nations have 





strengthening their physical security and by cooperating in the 
development of international guidelines by the IAEA. As a result of 
consultations among the major suppliers, provision for adequate physical 
security is becoming a normal condition of supply (Ford, 1976a). 
By the time Gerald Ford assumed the presidency in 1974, the CCCT had an 
established track record, producing detailed protocols on how the US would respond to 
future incidents of terrorism (Williamson, 2011). Ford placed a lower priority on 
terrorism as a policy issue compared to Nixon, leaving it to federal agencies such as the 
CCCT and the CIA to respond strategically to growing threats from nuclear terrorism and 
increased Palestinian terrorism (Naftali, 2005). In addition to the ongoing conflicts in 
Vietnam and the Middle East, Ford’s administration also was deeply involved in fighting 
the Khmer Rouge, during which the US dropped more than 250,000 tons of bombs on 
Cambodia (Brinkley, 2007). Despite these military decisions, Ford publicly emphasized 
the importance of protecting human rights in matters of conflict (Brinkley, 2007). In a 
decision that would guide counterterrorism efforts for the next 20 years, under Executive 
Order 11,905, Ford forbade any person employed by or acting on behalf of the US 
government from engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, assassination (Abramowitz, 
2002).30  
Nevertheless, after pardoning Nixon, much of Ford’s presidency was marred by 
poor public perceptions. While Nixon recounted that both the public and his colleagues 
perceived Nixon as aloof and calculating in his messaging (Nixon, 1978), Ford’s public 
image “need[ed] to be more presidential… to improve his perception of being 
knowledgeable and competent” (Brinkley, 2007:135). Even after delivering “high-toned” 
                                                 






speeches aimed to brand Ford as a statesperson, the lingering jokes regarding Ford’s 
intellect from sources as varied as former President Johnson, Newsweek, and Saturday 
Night Live hurt Ford’s image and undermined much of his perceived authority (Brinkley, 
2007). 
Acts of civil unrest and terrorist attacks corresponded less during the Ford 
administration than they did under Nixon (r=0.2091), and can be seen below in Figure 
4.4. Civil unrest followed a similar pattern to terrorism throughout Ford’s administration 
its rate of incidence was lower. Across Ford’s tenure, there were more terrorist events per 
month than civil unrest (t=8.913, p<0.001), with an average of 17.133 terrorist attacks 
(SD=6.862) and 4.767 civil unrest events (SD=3.266). 
 
Figure 4.4: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Ford administration 
 Class conflict was also the most common motivator for events of civil unrest, with 
57 such events occurring across Ford’s 30 months in office (see Figure 4.5 below). 
Similar to the Nixon administration, there were few incidents of civil unrest events with 
















































































































































civil unrest under Ford was lower in comparison to Nixon generally (t=-3.533, p<0.001), 
however it should be noted that it was not possible to statistically distinguish the average 
monthly frequency of terrorism between these two administrations (t=-1.565, p=0.122). 
 
Figure 4.5: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the Ford 
administration 
 Like Nixon, under the Ford administration there was little overlap between the 
groups who were the most frequent perpetrators of terrorist violence domestically or 
internationally (see Table 4.3 below). Indeed, no group appeared on the top 20 list for 
both domestic and international attacks, once again suggesting meaningful differences in 
terrorism occurring in the US from that targeting the US abroad. Many terrorist threats 
also persisted into the Ford presidency. Organizations such as the Jewish Defense League 
and the Chicano Liberation Front were among the most prevalent domestic terrorist 
groups; and Ejercito Revolucionaria del Pueblo, the Baader-Meinhof Group, and the 
Turkish People's Liberation Army continued to be among the top seven organizations that 





































Table 4.3: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Ford administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion 
Nacional 
59 Unknown  65 
2 New World Liberation Front 
(NWLF)  
59 Montoneros (Argentina)  29 
3 Unknown  43 Baader-Meinhof Group  17 
4 Cuban Action  11 Turkish People's Liberation 
Army  
10 
5 Jewish Armed Resistance  10 Arab Communist Organization  8 
6 Jewish Defense League (JDL)  10 Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-
Fascist 
6 
7 National Front for the Liberation 10 Ejercito Revolucionaria del 
Pueblo 
5 
8 Cuban Exiles  8 Armed Proletarian Power  5 
9 George Jackson Brigade  8 23rd of September Communist 
League  
4 
10 Independent Armed 
Revolutionary Commandos 
8 Armed Proletarian Nuclei 
(NAP)  
4 
11 Individual  8 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  4 
12 United Freedom Front (UFF)  6 Revolutionary Cells  4 
13 Weather Underground, 
Weathermen  
6 Eritrean Liberation Front  3 
14 American Indian Movement  5 Anti-Zionist Commandos  3 
15 Fred Hampton Unit of the 
People's For 
5 Youth Action Group  3 
16 Omega-7  5 Revolutionary People's 
Struggle (ELA)  
2 
17 Red Guerilla Family  5 Maruseido (Marxist Youth 
League)  
2 
18 Croatian Nationalists  4 Guerrilla Army of the Poor 
(EGP)  
2 
19 Chicano Liberation Front  3 Irish Republican Army (IRA)  2 
20 Latin America Anti-Communist 
Army 
3 Armed Communist Formations  2 
 The Ford administration used the word terrorism relatively more frequently than 
Nixon, with it falling among the 100 most frequently used words in terrorist 
communications (see Figure 4.6). However, due in part to his shorter tenure in office, 
Ford and his press secretaries had fewer public communications, and therefore used the 
word “terrorism” only 27 times. When converted to a monthly rate, Ford (?̅?=0.9) actually 





that Ford and his press secretaries used were “intelligence,” “foreign,” and “nuclear,” 
again suggesting a great focus on international issues. This again occurred despite a 
majority of terrorist attacks targeting the US occurring domestically (f=308) compared to 
internationally (f=206). 
 
Figure 4.6: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Ford 
administration 
Jimmy Carter (January 20, 1977 – January 20, 1981) 
All the nations expressed their commitment to us as rapidly as possible to 
encourage the Iranian Government to end the act of international 
terrorism which they have perpetrated against 53 innocent Americans, 
against our Nation, and against the rest of the world, indeed. This holding 
of innocent hostages is unacceptable. It violates every principle of 
international law and human decency. All the nations have committed 
themselves again to us that they would do everything in the world they 
could, through private, diplomatic channels and through their public 
statements and actions, to secure the rapid release of the American 
hostages (Carter, 1980b) 
 In contrast to both Nixon and Ford, Berggren and Rae (2006:610) characterize 





stomach for “politics as usual.” His political legacy and effectiveness have been much 
debated, particularly given that “Carter received lower levels of support from members of 
the House than one would expect given the influence of party, ideology, and presidential 
popularity” (Fleisher and Bond, 1983:753). Rather than being a result of inter-party 
politics, Carter actually received higher-than-average policy support from Republicans, 
leading Fleisher and Bond (1983) to conclude that this lack of support stemmed from 
moderate and liberal Democrats. Carter’s presidency has been celebrated for eschewing 
previous support for anti-Communist dictators in numerous conflicts, and denounced for 
supporting pro-Soviet leftists at the expense of traditional US allies (Soares, 2006). 
Despite his overall focus on protecting human rights (Carleton and Stohl, 1985), “it is 
commonly argued that the Carter Administration’s foreign policies in general were 
confused, incoherent, lacking in strategy, and inconsistent” (Cottam, 1992: 123). Cottam 
(1992) further suggests that similar to Nixon, Carter attempted to balance national 
security with human-rights policy on a case-by-case basis, instead of through an 
overarching strategy. 
Despite these criticisms, Carter’s policies regarding terrorism, violence, and 
international conflict were similar to Nixon’s and Ford’s (Soares, 2006). Indeed, one of 
the more salient changes he made was to increase the size of the US military. In light of 
growing fears of Soviet domination, Carter’s administration oversaw a great expansion of 
the US military budget and he notably threatened to use “any means necessary” to 
counter Soviet military moves into Afghanistan (Müller, 2005: 212). This has been 
contrasted with his other decisions to move away from the US domination of Central 





Exacerbated by the media’s preoccupation with the hostages taken by Iran in 1979, there 
was a frequent disconnect between Carter’s hawkish actions concerning terrorism and 
other forms of violence and his more dove-like perceptions in the US public (Müller, 
2005). 
As seen in Figure 4.7 below, terrorism targeting the US decreased over the course 
of Carter’s presidency (?̂?=-0.193, p=0.004) while civil unrest was relatively stable 
(?̂?=0.141, p=0.080). These trends are in line with Müller’s (2005) previous observation 
that internal political turbulence was somewhat divorced from the US experience of 
international violence and political conflict. Notable peaks in terrorism occurred in March 
1977, and in civil unrest in November 1979 and July 1980, further demonstrating the 
separation of these trends. Unlike during Nixon’s and Ford’s tenures, a negative 
correlation is evident between the monthly incidence of terrorism and civil unrest (r=-
0.111). On average, the US experienced 12.532 incidents of terrorism and 15.894 civil 
unrest events per month (t=-1.659, p=0.102) during Carter’s tenure. In comparison to the 
Ford administration, terrorism was lower under Carter (t=-2.930, p=0.005) and civil 
unrest was higher (t=3.345, p=0.001), further demonstrating this period’s overall 







Figure 4.7: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Carter administration 
 A total of 420 civil unrest incidents were recorded while Carter was in office. The 
distribution of the root motivations behind civil unrest was much more consistent with 
previous presidencies. As seen below in Figure 4.8, class conflict was once again the 
primary motivation for civil unrest (f=127), followed by political desire (f=40), and 
attempts to retain political power (f=27). In contrast, the SPEED data identified only 





























































Figure 4.8: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the Carter 
administration 
 The disconnect between the perpetrators of domestic and international terrorism 
was also evident under the Carter administration, with no groups being among the most 
frequent known aggressors for both geographic categories (Table 4.4). The most frequent 
terrorist organizations to commit attacks on US soil were the Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberacion Nacional, Omega-7, and the New World Liberation Front. The Sandinista 
National Liberation Front was the only organization to commit more than 10 acts of 
terrorism against the US internationally. Once again it should be noted that a great deal of 
international attacks against the US were committed by an unknown perpetrator. Out of 
the 345 terrorist attacks that targeted the US beyond its borders, the GTD data lists the 
perpetrator as unknown in 34.2% of them. 
Table 4.4: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Carter administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberacion Nacional  
48 Unknown  118 
2 Unknown  45 Sandinista National Liberation 
Front 
12 
3 Omega-7  31 Fighting Popular Rally  7 
4 New World Liberation 
Front (NWLF)  
26 Montoneros (Argentina)  7 
5 Individual  21 Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation 
6 
6 Revolutionary Commandos 
of the People 
15 People's Liberation Forces 
(FPL)  
6 
7 George Jackson Brigade  12 Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  5 
8 Independent Armed 
Revolutionary Commandos 
11 Union of the People (UDP)  5 
9 Anti-Abortion Activists  10 Che Guevara Brigade  4 
10 Puerto Rican Nationalists  10 M-19 (Movement of April 19)  4 
11 Luis Boitel Commandos  9 Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front 
3 
12 Jewish Defense League 
(JDL)  
8 First of October Antifascist 
Resistan 
3 
13 Ku Klux Klan  7 Marxist-Leninist Armed 






14 May 19 Communist Order  7 Popular Revolutionary Bloc 
(BPR)  
3 
15 Croatian Nationalists  5 Revolutionary Commandos of 
Solidarity  
3 
16 International Committee 
Against Nazism  
5 Turkish People's Liberation 
Army  
3 
17 Organization of Volunteers  5 April 6th Liberation Movement  2 
18 Croatian Freedom Fighters  4 Guerrilla Army of the Poor 
(EGP)  
2 
19 Jewish Armed Resistance  4 Guerrillas  2 
20 Macheteros  4 Irish Republican Army (IRA)  2 
 Turning to the content of presidential communications concerning terrorism under 
Carter, the most prominently used words once again featured an international focus. As 
displayed in Figure 4.9, “world,” “Soviet,” “international,” and “Iran” were among the 
100 most frequently used words. Although it did not appear in the 100 most frequently 
used words, “terrorism” was used 195 times (?̅?=4.149), which was more than four times 
more frequently than for either Nixon or Ford. Words such as “together” and 
“democratic” were also among the 100 most frequently used words, further signaling that 






Figure 4.9: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Carter 
administration 
Ronald Reagan (January 20, 1981 – January 20, 1989) 
Well, I think terrorism is the hardest thing to curtail. As a matter of fact, 
I've said for many years that probably the only defense you have against 
terrorist attacks is really infiltration to try and find out in advance what 
their plans are. And in the last few years that's been made more difficult. 
We're doing our best to try and correct something like that… Well, why 
would anyone want to just park a car with a bomb in a street where they 
don't even know the people that are going to be killed and blow them up? 
That's exactly why they have the word "terrorist." Their belief is—there 
isn't a motive in the individual that they're killing. The great, senseless 
cruelty and tragedy of it is simply to create terror by making people 
generally feel unsafe (Reagan, 1982). 
Although Ronald Reagan’s election was partially a backlash to Carter’s handling 
of the Iranian hostage crisis, many of Reagan’s policies shared similarities with Carter’s 
(Müller, 2005). Continuing the expansion of the US military and other foreign conflict 
strategies, Reagan enjoyed much more domestic support than his predecessor (Müller, 





came to foreign policy – he tended to hand the keys of each department or agency to an 
appointee, fully trusting each with a substantial amount of delegated power” (Wills, 
2004: xii). Unlike previous presidents, Reagan’s public communications and ability to 
create political narratives were central to fomenting support for his policies and for 
launching the US’ first war on terrorism (Gilboa, 1990). Establishing terrorist attacks as 
“acts of war” rather than criminal acts presents a marked departure from previous 
administrations. This new rhetorical framework placed terrorism within a broader set of 
cultural narratives surrounding America’s previous war experiences, justified a military-
based rather than a criminal justice response, and transformed the administration into a 
“war presidency” (Jackson, 2006). 
Reagan matched this shift in rhetoric with the government actions that he 
sanctioned. As this new framing “blurred the disparate causes of international terrorism 
and the varied motives of terrorist groups,” it enabled more consistent and military-based 
response to terrorism that “called into the question the Reagan administration's 
willingness to adhere strictly to international law” (Joyner, 1988: 29). Reagan (1985: 
104) highlighted the growing influence of foreign governments that were “actively 
supporting a campaign of international terrorism against the United States, her allies, and 
moderate Third World states.” Reagan’s use of a wide variety of public communications 
succeeded in entrenching Nixon’s “no concessions” stance, established clear narratives as 
to the causes of terrorism, suggested methods to prevent future terrorist attacks, and 
brought terrorism to the forefront of the public’s mind (Hinckley, 1989). 
Terrorism and civil unrest (f=629) followed much more similar patterns during 





and Ford administrations (r=0.123). The peaks of terrorism and civil unrest did occur 
more than a year apart however, in April 1986 and December 1984, respectively. For the 
second successive administration terrorism was observed to decrease on average (?̂?=-
0.061, p=0.001) while civil unrest was relatively stable (?̂?=-0.0202, p=0.233). Less 
terrorism (?̅?=10.177) occurred per month than civil unrest (?̅?=11.078, t=-1.969, 
p=0.050), however the numeric difference between these two event types was lower for 
Reagan (0.901 events per month) than it was for Carter (3.362 events per month). 
 
Figure 4.10: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Reagan administration 
 Class conflict was once again the modal root motivation behind events of civil 
unrest within Reagan’s tenure. As seen below in Figure 4.11 however, the monthly 
incidence of terrorism was much lower for Reagan than for Carter for almost all 
motivation types and for civil unrest (t=-2.17, p=0.032). The only exception to this trend 
was for retribution, which increased from 0.17 events per month under Carter to 0.28 


























































































































































Figure 4.11: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the 
Reagan administration 
 When combined together, anti-abortion activists were responsible for more acts of 
terrorism than any other groups, regardless of the geographic incidence of their attacks 
(see Table 4.5). Six out of the 20 most prolific terrorist organizations domestically were 
the same as during the Carter administration (Anti-Abortion Activists, Macheteros, 
Jewish Defense League, Omega-7, May 19 Communist Order, and the Ku Klux Klan), 
and four organizations remained in the top 20 for international attacks as well (M-19, 
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front, Guerrilla Army of the Poor, and the 
Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation). 
Table 4.5: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Reagan administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Anti-Abortion Activists  67 Unknown  204 
2 Unknown  56 Shining Path (SL)  42 
3 Macheteros  28 Basque Fatherland and 
Freedom (ETA)  
27 
4 Jewish Defense League (JDL)  27 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement 
21 
5 United Freedom Front (UFF)  19 Red Army Faction (RAF)  18 
6 Omega-7  18 M-19 (Movement of April 19)  17 






































8 Individual  14 National Liberation Army of 
Colombia 
15 
9 May 19 Communist Order  12 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic 
Front (FPMR)  
12 
10 Fuerzas Armadas de Liberacion 
Nacional 
11 Revolutionary People's Struggle 
(ELA)  
11 
11 Organization of Volunteers 10 Lorenzo Zelaya Revolutionary 
Front 
8 
12 Cuban Exiles  8 New People's Army (NPA)  8 
13 The Order (Silent Brotherhood)  8 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
8 
14 Guerrilla Forces for Liberation  7 Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation Front 
7 
15 Armenian Secret Army 6 Guerrilla Army of the Poor 
(EGP)  
6 
16 Aryan Nation  5 African National Congress  5 
17 Justice Commandos for the 
Armenian 
5 November 17 Revolutionary 
Organization 
5 
18 Ku Klux Klan  5 Revolutionary Cells  5 
19 Animal Liberation Front (ALF)  4 Action Directe  4 
20 Covenant, Sword and the Arm 
of the Lord 
4 Armenian Secret Army for the 
Liberation 
4 
 Unsurprisingly given that Reagan had established terrorism into a new level of 
prominence, (Gilboa, 1990), he and his press secretaires used the word “terrorism” more 
frequently, as can be observed below in Figure 4.12. Throughout Reagan’s 
administration, “terrorism” was used 747 times, equating to 7.781 times per month, a 
187.5% increase over Carter’s montly rates. Evidencing Reagan’s war-like framing of 
terrorism (Gilboa, 1990; Jackson, 2006), words including “defense,” “weapon,” 
“military,” and “war” also featured among the 100 most frequently used words in these 
terrorism communications. Hinckley’s (1989) observation that Reagan’s terrorism 
narratives had a future-oriented and strategic tone can also be corroborated by the 






Figure 4.12: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Carter 
administration 
George H. W. Bush (January 20, 1989 – January 20, 1993) 
We can't fool ourselves. Those who would challenge us, and we're seeing 
it right now as we try to decide what we should do over in Iraq, those who 
would challenge freedom's gains are many. We continue to face threats in 
the world of terrorism where a lot of good work has been the antiterrorist 
work. And the intelligence contributing to that out here has been fantastic. 
Many here are concerned about and have worked on weapons 
proliferation. And of course, I remain very much concerned about that 
(Bush I, 1993). 
 The presidency of George H. W. Bush (Bush I) witnessed a number of major 
global events, including the fall of the Berlin Wall and German Unification, as well as the 
end of the Cold War with Soviet Union. Continuing many of the international diplomatic 
relationships that he began during his vice-presidency under Reagan, Bush I exercised a 
great deal of caution in his approach to defense and to the declining influence of 





suppression of pro-democracy protestors in Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Bush I 
administration imposed only limited sanctions against China despite widespread calls for 
a punitive response (Knott, 2005). Despite previous allegiances between Manuel Noriega 
and the Reagan administration, Bush I demonstrated that he was not tied to previously 
established strategic stances. Following Noriega’s indictment on drug trafficking charges 
and the killing of a US serviceman by his military forces, Bush I deployed the US 
military to overtake the Panamanian military under Operation Just Cause, which 
eventually resulted in Noriega’s surrender and imprisonment on drug charges (Knott, 
2005). 
Responding to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Bush I began to assemble an 
international coalition to oppose this occupation, beginning the Persian Gulf War. 
Culminating in a wave of airstrikes under Operation Desert Storm, Bush I and the Iraqi 
leadership agreed to a ceasefire in 1991 after two months of fighting (Knott, 2005). Prior 
to this conclusion, Reese and Buckalew (1995: 40) assert that Bush I routinely presented 
the “illusion of triumph” with regard to the Persian Gulf War, portraying war protesters 
as anti-patriotic. Employing Reagan’s rhetorical approach, Le Billon and El Khatib 
(2004: 109) argue that this “war of liberation” for the Kuwaiti people was a public 
justification for expanding the “war on terrorism” to include oil-funded state dictators. 
Echoed by Wright (2007) and Gershkoff and Kushner (2005), Bush I’s public 
redefinition of US and global security within his public communications related to the 
Persian Gulf War would help to frame and foreshadow the strategic objectives that his 
son, George W. Bush, would present during the second “war on terrorism,” following the 





In comparison to previous administrations, Bush I was confronted with fewer 
incidents of civil unrest per month compared to Reagan (t=-3.340, p=0.001), Carter (t=-
3.923, p<0.001), and Nixon (t=-4.540, p<0.001). This was not the case in comparison to 
Ford however, whereno statistically significant difference was observed between the two 
in the monthly rate of civil unrest (t=-0.807, p=0.423). Terrorism did increase under Bush 
I in comparison to Reagan (?̅?=14.104, t=2.846, p=0.006), further suggesting that civil 
unrest and terrorism do not necessarily follow similar patterns within the US. As can be 
seen below in Figure 4.13, there was also a marked peak in terrorism in January and 
February of 1991. 
 
Figure 4.13: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Bush I administration 
 Further remarking the Bush I presidency from his predecessors, the incidence of 
























was not the modal motivator and was instead replaced by political desires (f=33).31 In 
addition, no civil unrest events were coded as being driven by ecological resource 
scarcity or personal security during this four-year period. Taken together, these figures 
indicate that once again, political dissent may have meaningfully differed in both 
prevalence and motivation across different presidencies. 
 
Figure 4.14: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the Bush 
I administration 
 Numerous similarities in the perpetrators of terrorism emerged between the 
Reagan and Bush I administrations. Excluding the unknown and individual categories, 
five terrorist perpetrator categories from the top 20 under Reagan were also present for 
Bush I (Table 4.6: Anti-Abortion Activists, Animal Liberation Front (ALF), Cuban 
Exiles, Macheteros, and the Army of God). The most frequent perpetrator, Anti-Abortion 
Activists, also remained consistent across the two presidencies. The perpetrators of 
international terrorism against the US also remained displayed a number of similarities, 
                                                 
31 Within the SPEED database, political desires include the explicit desire to increase: equality, freedom of 





































with eight of the top 20 most prolific terrorist organizations being the same for both Bush 
I and Reagan (Shining Path, Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement, National Liberation 
Army of Colombia, Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, New People's Army, 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, and the November 17 Revolutionary 
Organization). While these similarities may be driven by the high number of number of 
international attacks committed by unknown perpetrators (53.0% of all international 
attacks under Bush I), this continuity is unsurprising given the political continuity 
following from the Reagan administration, during which Bush I served as the Vice 
President. 
Table 4.6: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Bush I administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Anti-Abortion Activists  42 Unknown  287 
2 Unknown  36 United Popular Action Movement  28 
3 Animal Liberation Front (ALF)  8 Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front 
(FPMR)  
21 
4 Americans for a Competent 
Federal Judiciary 
5 New People's Army (NPA)  19 
5 Pedro Albizu Campos 
Revolutionary 
4 Dev Sol  18 
6 Popular Liberation Army (Puerto 
Rico)  
4 Tupac Amaru Revolutionary 
Movement 
15 
7 Up the IRS, Inc  4 Shining Path (SL)  9 
8 Cuban Exiles  3 National Liberation Army of 
Colombia 
8 
9 Tontons Macoutes  3 November 17 Revolutionary 
Organization 
7 
10 Anti-Environmentalist  2 Farabundo Marti National 
Liberation 
6 
11 Christian Liberation Army  2 20 December Movement (M-20)  4 
12 Individual  2 Brunswijk Jungle Commando  4 
13 Macheteros  2 Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)  4 
14 Puerto Rican Nationalists  2 Milicias Rodriguistas  4 
15 Animal Rights Activists  1 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
4 
16 Anti-Government Group  1 Gracchus Babeuf  3 
17 Army of God  1 Narco-Terrorists  3 





19 Earth First!  1 Pirates  3 
20 Earth Night Action Group  1 Revolutionary People's Struggle 
(ELA)  
3 
 The similarities between the Reagan and Bush I administrations are most evident 
however with regard to the words that they most frequently used when discussing 
terrorism. Of the 100 most frequently used words, 79 were the same across both 
presidencies. Indeed the 28 most frequently used words by Bush I were contained within 
the 100 most frequently used words by Reagan. “Got” was the most frequently used word 
by Bush I that was not in the top 100 for Reagan. Bush I and his press secretaries used the 
word “terrorism” 184 times (3.833 times per month), approximately half the rate that 
“terrorism” was mentioned within the Reagan administration (7.781 times per month). 
The word cloud of the 100 most frequently used words by Bush I and his press secretaries 
can be seen below in Figure 4.15. 
 






Bill Clinton (January 20, 1993 – January 20, 2001) 
Justice in this case must be swift, certain, and severe. And for anyone who 
dares to sow terror on American land, justice must be swift, certain, and 
severe. We must move on with law enforcement measures quickly. We 
must move so that we can prevent this kind of thing from happening again. 
We cannot allow our entire country to be subjected to the horror that the 
people of Oklahoma City endured. We can prevent it and must do 
everything we can to prevent it. I know that we would do this together 
without regard to party, and I'm looking forward to this discussion of it 
(Clinton, 1995). 
Bill Clinton was the first president to enter office after the conclusion of the Cold 
War, and he inherited a much less predictable geopolitical context than many of his 
predecessors (Badey, 1998). In addition to the fall of the Soviet Union, a number of 
political readjustments were required in Clinton’s early tenure to respond to the aftermath 
of the Persian Gulf War and rapid escalations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia (Badey, 
1998). Initially, and in contrast to the allusions of war made by previous presidents, 
Clinton’s counterterrorism strategy and rhetoric primarily focused on findings means to 
prevent terrorism (Feste, 2011; Waugh and Sylves, 2002). Clinton broadly employed his 
conflict-avoidance strategy through informally styled public communications (Feste, 
2011). In tune with this approach, when confronted by the 1993 World Trade Center 
bombing after only one month in office, the Clinton administration responded by 
producing a publicly discernable and cohesive counterterrorism policy (Badey, 1998).   
Clinton’s initial approach to terrorism, particularly in rhetoric, developed over the 
course of his administration. Adhering to his commitment to employ the best available 
resources to combat terrorism, Clinton’s administration initially publicly advocated for 
“bridging the gap” to bring about closer collaboration between academics and 





began to respond to terrorist attacks by using classic deterrence language as evidenced in 
the above quote, and eventually language reminiscent of Reagan’s allusions to terrorism 
as war (Badey, 1998). Confronted by the Oklahoma City Bombing and following the 
destruction of two East-African US embassies by Al-Qaida, Clinton increasingly turned 
to the same rhetorical devices employed by Reagan (Davis, 2003). Toward the end of his 
second term, Clinton was weakened by domestic political issues, including the Monica 
Lewinski scandal, which brought about his eventual impeachment. This led Clinton to 
adopt a more hardline approach to terrorism, as he lacked the political capital to mobilize 
security agencies to address the terrorist threat in line with his initial, less combative 
approaches (Feste, 2011). 
Despite the less predictable geopolitical landscape that Clinton inherited 
following the close of the Cold War (Badey, 1998), as it can be seen in Figure 4.16 
below, terrorism targeting the US declined over the course of his presidency (?̂?=-0.083, 
p<0.001).32 However, this trend was evident only for attacks targeting the US overseas 
(?̂?=-0.060, p<0.001) and not domestically (?̂?=-0.023, p=0.103). The opposite trend was 
apparent for civil unrest in the US, which increased over this period (?̂?=0.030, p=0.010). 
While this may be partially due to the extremely low levels of civil unrest under Bush I, 
these diverging trends once again suggest that civil unrest and terrorism do not have a 
positive statistical relationship within this period. 
                                                 
32 As it can be seen below, terrorism data from 1993 were unfortunately missing from the GTD and were 
not included in Figure 4.16 or any subsequent analyses or discussions. A full description of this can be 






Figure 4.16: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Clinton administration 
 The civil unrest distribution observed under every presidency other than Bush I 
resumed under Clinton, with class conflict again observed to be the modal motivator. 
Ecological resource scarcity and personal security-based civil unrest events did return 
during these years but were limited to 6 and 4 separate incidents respectively. With these 
exceptions, the monthly incidence of all other motivation types was lower under Clinton. 
Thus, despite the overall positive trend of civil unrest under Clinton, there were 
numerically fewer incidences of civil unrest under his tenure compared to every previous 
president that has been discussed, however this difference was not statistically different 
























































































































































Figure 4.17: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the 
Clinton administration 
 The Clinton presidency was also the first to experience attacks by Al-Qa ida 
against the US (see Table 4.7). Perhaps marking the changing geopolitical conditions, the 
Clinton administration also saw less continuity in the 20 most prolific groups that 
targeted the US internationally, with only four groups in common with Bush I 
(Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, National Liberation Army of Colombia, 
November 17 Revolutionary Organization, and the New People's Army). In line with the 
geo-instability after the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly in former Communist 
strongholds, these terrorist groups were from Colombia, Cyprus, and the Philippines. 
Domestically, five groups perpetrator types remained in the top 20 under Clinton (Animal 
Liberation Front, Army of God, Anti-Government Group, Macheteros, and Earth First!). 
The Clinton administration also experienced the return of Ku Klux Klan terrorist attacks 
after their relative absence under Bush I. 
Table 4.7: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Clinton administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 




































2 Individual  49 Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
19 
3 Anti-Abortion Activists  39 National Liberation Army of 
Colombia 
11 
4 Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF)  
33 Other  6 
5 Aryan Republican Army  16 November 17 Revolutionary 
Organization 
5 
6 Earth Liberation Front (ELF)  16 Al-Qa ida  4 
7 The Justice Department  13 Individual  3 
8 Army of God  6 Recontras  3 
9 Coalition to Save the 
Preserves (CSP)  
6 Revolutionary Nuclei  3 
10 World Church of the Creator  6 Simon Bolivar Guerrilla 3 
11 Anti-Government Group  4 The Extraditables  3 
12 White Extremists  4 al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya (IG)  3 
13 Macheteros  3 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)  2 
14 Neo-Nazi Group  3 Anti-Establishment Nucleus  2 
15 Earth First!  2 Bandits  2 
16 Farm Animal Revenge 
Militia (FARM)  
2 New People's Army (NPA)  2 
17 Ku Klux Klan  2 Palestinians  2 
18 Maccabee Squad and the 
Shield of David  
2 Afrikaner Resistance 
Movement (AWB)  
1 
19 Palestinians  2 Al Faran  1 
20 Phineas Priesthood  2 Al Hadid  1 
 
One of the key observations regarding Clinton’s terrorism communications was 
that he employed a closer collaboration between academics and policymakers (Crenshaw, 
2000). While “policy” was among the 100 most used words by Clinton, it was the 93rd 
most frequently used word. “Policy” was said 2,353 times by Clinton and his press 
secretaries, nearly double the most used word by Bush I (“think,” f=1,291), and nearly as 
many times as the most frequently used word by Reagan (“people,” f=2,409). The full list 
of the 100 most frequently used words by Clinton and his press secretaries can be seen 
below in Figure 4.18. Beyond using language that was reminiscent of Reagan’s allusions 





words by Clinton were also the same as those used by Reagan. Despite this abundance of 
similarities, the absence of the words “Soviet,” “nuclear,” “war,” “military,” and 
“defense” do however confirm key differences in the language and political framing used 
between Clinton and Reagan.  
 
Figure 4.18: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Clinton 
administration 
George W. Bush (January 20, 2001 – January 20, 1993) 
Today our Nation saw evil, the very worst of human nature. And we 
responded with the best of America, with the daring of our rescue workers, 
with the caring for strangers and neighbors who came to give blood and 
help in any way they could. Immediately following the first attack, I 
implemented our Government's emergency response plans. Our military is 
powerful, and it's prepared. Our emergency teams are working in New 
York City and Washington, DC, to help with local rescue efforts. Our first 
priority is to get help to those who have been injured and to take every 
precaution to protect our citizens at home and around the world from 





 More than any other preceding US president, terrorism and responses to terrorism 
were central to the presidency of President George W. Bush (Bush II). Drawing upon the 
techniques employed by Reagan and with an increased focus on religion, Bush II’s 
administration saw the revival of terrorism as an act of war (Turek, 2014). Prompted by 
the September 11th, 2001, attacks in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington, Bush II 
and his administration enjoyed an unprecedented increase in public approval and political 
support as the US populace “rallied around the flag” (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003: 
37). Bush II framed these terrorist attacks as vile and heinous, and further claimed that a 
decisive US response was essential for ongoing security from terrorism and other 
existential threats (Buckley and Singh, 2006). Within a nation reeling from the stark 
reminders of individual mortality from the September 11th attacks, Bush II was able to 
use his public communications to increase his long-term favorability (Landau et al., 
2004), a key factor for his reelection in 2004 (Abramowitz, 2002; Campbell, 2005). 
 It was within this political climate that Bush II proceeded to centralize and 
nationalize policy formerly controlled by state governments in education, sales tax, 
emergency management, infrastructure, and elections administration (Posner, 2007). 
After initiating major tax cuts in 2001 (Yagan, 2015) and beginning wars in Afghanistan 
in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Bush II’s administration eroded the national economic surplus 
left by Clinton’s (Canova, 2008). Notwithstanding the economic downturn at the end of 
his second term, through Bush II’s calls for multilateral and global responses to terrorism, 
both the prominence of Islamic terrorism and the use of US militarism to combat 





 Both terrorism and civil conflict followed very similar monthly patterns for the 
first five years of Bush II’s presidency (r=0.448). As it can be seen in Figure 4.19 below 
however, across the period that can be examined, no statistically significant differences 
were observable in the month incidence of terrorism and civil unrest (6.983 vs. 8.467, 
t=0.490, p=0.626). Also, with the exception of May 2002 and the end of 2005, both 
terrorism and civil unrest in the US had nearly identical monthly peaks. For this final 
period, the trajectory of civil unrest was also negative (?̂?=-0.083, p=0.041), as one would 
predict given the “rall[y] around the flag” phenomenon following the September 11th 
attacks (Hetherington and Nelson, 2003: 37). Terrorism, whether overseas or domestic, 
did not witness any observable trends in its incidence during this period. 
 
Figure 4.19: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Bush II administration 
 In line with every presidency with the exception of Bush I, the modal motivation 
for civil unrest was once again class conflict (Figure 4.20). Contrary to the “rall[y] 
























































































































































witness numerically more incidents of civil unrest that Clinton did per month (3.115 vs. 
2.85 under Clinton). This difference however was not statistically significant (t=0.416, 
p=0.679). 
 
Figure 4.20: The average number of civil unrest events per month by motivation under the Bush 
II administration 
 The Bush II presidency also saw remarkably little variation in the variety of 
organizations that were recorded as having committed terrorist attacks on US soil (see 
Table 4.8). Only nine different groups were recorded in total; three of which were white 
supremacist groups and another three were environmental groups. For only the second 
time in the period being examined, a terrorist group was featured in the top 20 most 
prolific terrorist groups both domestically and internationally - Al-Qa’ ida. Al-Qa’ ida 
and associated movements were observed to be responsible for four attacks on US soil 
and 21 attacks against the US overseas. Only three groups remained on the top 20 
international list from the Clinton administration (Al-Qa’ ida, Revolutionary Armed 






































Table 4.8: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Bush II administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Earth Liberation Front (ELF)  48 Unknown 257 
2 Unknown  43 Taliban 37 
3 Individual  34 Tawhid and Jihad 16 
4 Animal Liberation Front (ALF)  23 Al-Qa ida in Iraq 13 
5 Anti-Abortion Activists  10 Individual 7 
6 Al-Qa ida  4 Other 6 
7 Coalition to Save the Preserves 
(CSP)  
2 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 3 
8 Neo-Nazi Group  2 Al-Qa ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula 
3 
9 Revolutionary Cells-Animal 
Liberation Front  
2 Al-Qa’ida in Yemen 3 
10 White Extremists  2 Mariano Moreno National 
Liberation 
3 
11 Ku Klux Klan  1 Movement for the Emancipation 3 
12   New People's Army (NPA) 3 
13   Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia 
3 
14   Abdullah Azzam Brigades 2 
15   Al-Qa’ ida 2 
16   Chechen Rebels 2 
17   Hamas (Islamic Resistance 
Movement) 
2 
18   Islamic Army in Iraq 2 
19   Jemaah Islamiya (JI) 2 
20   National Liberation Army of 
Colombia 
2 
The Bush II administration also saw the revival of terrorism as an act of war 
within political parlance (Kellner, 2004; Turek, 2014) and “war” was the 23rd most used 
word in terrorism communications by Bush II and his press secretaries (f=12,102). This 
framing was so prevalent that “war” was used more often than “terrorism” (f=8,047) in 
communications regarding terrorism. As seen below in Figure 4.21 below, the top 100 
words used by the Bush II administration did share 76 words in common with Clinton, 
however it should be noted that “war” was one of the unique words in the top 100 






Figure 4.21: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Clinton 
administration 
Barack Obama (January 20, 2009 – January 20, 2017) 
Now is the time for a new era of international cooperation that 
strengthens old partnerships and builds new ones to confront our common 
challenges and to defeat terrorism worldwide. Terrorism continues to 
represent one of the greatest challenges to international peace, stability 
and security. We reiterate, in the strongest terms, our firm condemnation 
of this phenomenon in all its forms and manifestations. All acts 
of terrorism - by whomever committed - are criminal, inhumane and 
unjustifiable, regardless of motivation, especially when they 
indiscriminately target and injure civilians. In particular suicide 
bombings - and recruiting the young or disadvantaged to carry out such 
acts - as well as abductions and the taking of hostages are repugnant 
practices (Obama, 2009a). 
 As evidenced in the above quote, and in contrast to Bush II, the Obama 
administration moved to reframe terrorism as a criminal act rather than an act of war. 
Distancing himself from Bush II, Obama immediately began constructing a 
counterterrorism campaign that was perceived to be morally acceptable, more focused on 





political framing, Obama’s counterterrorism strategies expanded Bush II’s commitment 
to militaristic counterterrorism tactics, as demonstrated by his pursuit and targeted killing 
of the Al-Qa’ ida leader Osama bin Laden (McCrisken, 2011). Exemplified through his 
deployment of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, to target terrorist 
operatives in countries including Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen (Boyle, 2013), Obama’s 
administration killed dozens of high-value terrorist targets, while also ending the Iraq war 
(McCrisken, 2011; Williams, 2010). Consequently, Jackson (2011: 406) concludes that 
“the actual practices of the war on terror will continue along their current trajectory under 
[the remainder of Obama’s] administration with only slight tactical adjustments.” 
 The Obama administration saw the fewest terrorist attacks per month of the eight 
administrations (?̅?=2.875), even fewer than the 6.125 per month against the US under 
Bush II (t=6.320, p<0.001). As can be seen in Figure 4.22, in the period observed, there 
were no more than 10 attacks at any given point, and five months elapsed without a 
single attacks being recorded. Prior to Obama, Clinton had the lowest maximum number 






Figure 4.22: Monthly frequency of terrorism and civil unrest under the Obama administration 
 Similar to Bush II, in the Obama years, relatively few domestic attackers were 
attributed to specific attacks (n=11). Indeed, out of the 85 domestic attacks, the 
perpetrator was either an unaffiliated individual or unknown in 81.18% of attacks, 
potentially masking key trends in the motivation behind these attacks (Table 4.9). The 
most prolific international terrorist organization was the Taliban, marking a key 
consistency between the terrorist threat faced by both Bush II and Obama. 
Table 4.9: The top 20 perpetrators of domestic and international terrorist attacks that targeted the 
US under the Obama administration 
Rank Domestic Attacks International Attacks 
1 Individual  46 Unknown  44 
2 Unknown  23 Taliban  15 
3 Animal Liberation Front 
(ALF)  
6 Al-Qa ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula 
8 
4 Sovereign Citizen  2 Al-Shabaab  5 
5 Veterans United for Non-
Religious Members 
2 Movement for the 
Emancipation 
5 
6 Al-Qa ida in the Arabian 
Peninsula 
1 Haqqani Network  4 
7 Anarchists  1 Individual  4 


































9 Minutemen American 
Defense  
1 Islamic State of Iraq and the 
levant 
3 
10 Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP)  
1 New People's Army (NPA)  3 
11 The Justice Department  1 Ansar al-Sharia (libya)  2 
12   Donetsk People's Republic  2 
13   Revolutionary Armed Forces 
of Colombia 
2 
14   Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP)  
2 
15   Ahlu-sunah Wal-jamea 
(Somalia)  
1 
16   Al-Qa ida  1 
17   Al-Qa ida in the Lands of the 
Islamic Magreb 
1 
18   Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (Ansar 
Jerusalem)  
1 
19   Asa'ib Ahl al-Haqq  1 
20   Baloch Liberation Front 
(BLF)  
1 
 In a key departure from Bush II, Obama and his press secretaries did not use the 
word “war” among the 100 most frequently used words in communications concerning 
terrorism. Further, even the word “terrorism” was also not among the most frequently 
used words by the Obama administration. Despite these key differences, 41 of the top 50 
and 77 of the 100 most frequently words used words were common across both 
presidencies. This abundance of similarities with notable key individual differences once 
again suggests that while the framing may vary across presidencies, there are numerous 






Figure 4.23: The 100 most used words used in presidential communications under the Clinton 
administration 
Evidenced in the above overviews, each US president employed a different stance 
toward terrorism within their administrations. Despite these differences, numerous 
similarities emerged in both the language used as well as the nature of the terrorist 
threats. Although similarities may be expected between the Reagan and Bush I 
presidencies, in light of the observed differences in the terrorist threat, terrorism 
communications, and the nature of civil unrest, there is concordantly reason to believe 
that the impact of presidential communications on terrorism may vary across 
administrations in light of the evidence provided above. 
Differential Impacts of Sentiment in Public Communications 
Evidenced in the above overviews, each US president employed a different stance 
toward terrorism within their administrations. These different approaches likely yielded 





was set within either criminal justice or war agendas (Scheufele, 2000). As such, there 
may be administration-level differences in the effect of public communications on 
terrorism, as predicted by Hypothesis 3.33  
Even within presidencies however, it is evident that political support varied over 
time. As public support also plays a role in determining the impact of presidents in a 
variety of policy domains, presidents’ popularity may determine whether their 
communications antagonize or ameliorate existing tensions (Sigelman and Sigelman, 
1981). Further, foreign policy crises, including terrorism, can lead to changes in a 
president’s authority and power to affect policy (Young, 2013). As well, presidents with 
public approval ratings that are significantly higher or lower than average are also more 
likely to adopt unpopular policy positions (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004). Thus there 
may be key political factors such as presidential approval that impact how terrorist 
organizations interpret and respond to public communications, central to Hypothesis 4.34 
  As tendered in Chapter 1, terrorist groups may rationally calculate that their 
attacks would have greater political impact under presidents with lower public support. If 
true, terrorist organizations would be more likely to respond with violence to public 
communications by presidents with lower than average approval ratings. Additionally, 
presidents with above-average approval ratings may incite less violence from their public 
communications, as any attacks would be less likely to result in political gains for the 
terrorist organization. Concordantly, the dissertation examines whether the terrorist 
                                                 
33 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between Presidential speech and subsequent terrorism will vary across 
administrations. 
34 Hypothesis 4: As public support becomes increasingly favorable or unfavorable (absolute value 






response to US presidential communications regarding terrorism is conditioned on the 
president’s public favorability. 
Key Changes to Political Communications and the Media 
 Beyond presidential variation, changes to both society and the media have had 
formative and enduring impacts on political communication (Wyatt, 1998, Blumler and 
Kavanagh, 1999). Since the end of World War II (1939-1945), political communications 
have become increasingly “diverse, fragmented, and complex,” changing their overall 
manner (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 209). Advances in communication technology 
and increased accessibility may also yield qualitative differences in the effects of 
presidential communications on terrorism. 
 Political communication in 1970 was dominated by television, and politicians, 
including the president, would rely on press conferences, interviews, and briefings to 
draw a political “line” and shape the political landscape (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 
212). The proliferation of televisions, along with the media’s commitment to even-
handed news, reduced presidents’ ability to control political narratives and granted 
greater exposure to multiple perspectives on policy issues (Blumler and Kavanagh, 
1999). Compared to previous decades, this enlarged the direct audience for political 
messages and engaged those who had not previously been reached (Jin and Lutz, 2013). 
Increased exposure to political media resulted in increasingly negative public opinions 
toward politics (Jin and Lutz, 2013). Those wishing to show dissent also used it to 
escalate political grievances and gain national recognition (Delmont, 2016). In response, 
politicians began pretesting their messages and adopted a highly positivistic approach to 





Driven by further technical advances and the increased desire for 24-hour news, 
the age of “media abundance” that followed also changed both the mechanisms for 
political communications as well as audience expectations (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999: 
213). Exacerbating the tensions that began in the previous era, political communications 
were increasingly shaped by anti-elitist populism, pressures for increased 
professionalism, and changes in how people receive politics (Blumler and Kavanagh, 
1999). The reach and celerity of political messages were amplified by continued 
advances in technology including computers, handheld devices, and the internet, and 
resulted in the expectation that politicians will be able to provide a coherent response 
strategy immediately after an policy issue arises (Blumler and Kavanagh, 1999). With the 
subsequent emergence of “new media” and growth of the Internet, political messages 
have been subjected to snowballing scrutiny and public pressure as a function of the 
increased attention (Kahn and Kellner, 2004; Whitten-Woodring and James, 2012). As 
activists and dissenters have also been able to present alternative political narratives 
through the same media channels, political communications increased in importance for 
conflict as technological advances have broadened their impact (Kahn and Kellner, 2004; 
Whitten-Woodring and James, 2012). 
This brief account of the broad changes to public communications suggests that 
trends in technology and political communications may also condition the impact of 
presidential communications. With presidential communications being subjected to 
increasingly stringent expectations and gaining greater international exposure throughout 
the examined period, these changes may have increased the likelihood of terrorists 





growth of new media and accessibility to influence political discourse, these 
communications trends may have also provided alternative, non-violent pathways to 





Chapter 5:  Data and Methods 
Drawing upon the above theoretical discussion regarding government 
communication and its potential links to terrorism, this dissertation tests four sets of 
hypotheses to examine whether presidential public communications affect subsequent 
terrorism. These hypotheses were selected in order to distinguish which aspects of 
presidential communications impact subsequent terrorism, whether any observed impacts 
appear to support either restrictive deterrence or broader rational choice theories, and 
whether the source or context of these communications changes their impact. Before 
introducing the data and methods that were used to test these hypotheses, this chapter 
begins by briefly restating the four hypotheses. 
Revisiting the Hypotheses 
This first hypothesis examines whether increases in the number of presidential 
communications concerning terrorism affect the incidence of subsequent terrorism. From 
this sentiment-neutral perspective, this dissertation tests whether increases in the number 
of public communications concerning terrorism and granting greater political attention to 
the existing grievance leads to an increase in subsequent terrorism; or whether increases 
in the volume of US presidential that politically acknowledge the conflict can decrease 
subsequent terrorism. 
Hypothesis 1a: The number of speech acts by a government will   
   increase subsequent terrorism (attention). 
Hypothesis 1b: The number of speech acts by a government will   
   decrease subsequent terrorism (acknowledgement). 
While hypothesis 1 provides a useful baseline, it may obscure meaningful 





terrorism. As such, the second set of hypotheses concern the sentiment of speech that is 
used in presidential communications. Applying restrictive deterrence and rational choice 
perspectives, the next set of hypotheses test how variation in sentiment impacts 
subsequent terrorism targeting the US. 
Hypothesis 2a: Negative speech will be related to decreases in 
subsequent terrorism (deterrence) 
Hypothesis 2b: Negative speech will be related to increases in 
subsequent terrorism (backlash) 
Hypothesis 2c: Positive speech will be related to decreases in 
subsequent terrorism (placation) 
Hypothesis 2d: Positive speech will be related to increases in 
subsequent terrorism (display of weakness) 
 This dissertation has argued that government communications derive some of 
their meaning from the specific political and social contexts from which they are 
delivered. Hypotheses 3 and 4 examine the assumption that the relationship between 
government public communications and terrorism is consistent across and within 
presidential administrations. 
Hypothesis 3: The relationship between presidential communications 
and subsequent terrorism will vary across 
administrations 
 
Hypothesis 4:  As public support becomes increasingly favorable or  
    unfavorable (absolute value increases), the impact of  
    presidential communications on subsequent   
    terrorism will increase (clarity of the political   
    situation/unity) 
Data 
To test these four hypotheses, data were compiled from a range of sources to 





favorability of US presidents between 1970 and 2014. This section describes how these 
data were collected and how these key phenomena were operationalized. In order to 
observe how the impacts of presidential communication on terrorism vary over time, the 
data were combined into a time-series dataset using the month as the unit of analysis.  
It takes time to plan, organize, and perpetrate terrorist attacks, often requiring the 
acquisition of technical and financial resources to execute (Hoffman, 2008; Nesser, 
2008). As such, there is a temporal lag between any stimulus that alters terrorist decision-
making and the terrorist event itself. Given the covert nature of terrorist planning and 
preparation, it is difficult to estimate how long this lag may be and to what extent it varies 
across attacks. Santifort, Sandler, and Brandt (2012) suggest that hostage-taking and 
similar forms of terrorism may take months to plan, however other more routine forms of 
terrorism are much faster to plan and implement. Systematically collected data produced 
by Smith et al. (2017) further suggest that around half of all terrorist preparatory actions 
occur within one month of the attack, with 75% of environmentalist preparatory actions 
happening less than 30 before an attack. Following the lead of other terrorism scholars 
(see Benlemach, Berrebi, and Klor, 2010; 2014; Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012; Fisher and 
Meitus, 2017) the month was selected as the unit of analysis for the following analysis to 
capture the temporal lag between presidential communications and the potential effects 
on terrorist attacks. 35 
To investigate the hypothesized relationships, data were collected from a variety 
of sources covering a period of 45 years (January 1970 – December 2014), yielding 540 
                                                 
35 A lag of two months was also tested for each of the analyses however these models predominantly did 





months of observations. As will be discussed below in greater detail, data for the primary 
dependent variable, the count of terrorist events were unavailable for 1993, leaving a 
final analytic sample of 528 months. 
Dependent Variable – Terrorism 
The primary dependent variable for this dissertation was constructed using data 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD). As this dissertation was concerned with 
observing the general impacts of presidential communication on terrorism, this dependent 
variable was operationalized as the number of terrorism events occurring in the US or 
that targeted at least one US national on foreign soil. This primary dependent variable 
was designed to look at the aggregate impact, and treats all attacks as equivalent, 
regardless of magnitude. As such, the September 11th attacks are regarded as being 
equivalent to less harmful acts of terror targeting the US. To address this limitation, 
secondary analyses are also conducted using the frequency of number of deaths from 
these terrorist attacks to explore the impact of presidential communications or terrorism 
fatalities. This dependent variable was operationalized as the number of total confirmed 
fatalities for the incident including all victims and attackers.36 Finally, in order to see 
whether any observed effects were limited to domestic or international terrorism targeting 
                                                 
36 The terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001 resulted in 3,002 deaths according to the GTD. As the 
average number of monthly deaths due to terrorism is 6.654 excluding the month of September, 2001 
(?̅?=12.201 including September, 2001), each analysis was run with and without this month in order to 






the US,37 a series of sensitivity analyses are conducted using attacks on US soil and 
attacks against US citizens abroad as the dependent variables. 
The GTD is an event-based database that records more than 120 variables 
pertaining to the date, geographic location, target of the attack, perpetrators involved, 
weapons used, and outcomes of terrorist incidents (LaFree, 2010; LaFree and Dugan, 
2007; LaFree, Dugan, Fogg, and Scott, 2006). This open-access database documents 
more than 150,000 terrorist incidents that occurred globally between 1970 and 2015 
(START, 2017). Unfortunately the original collectors of the GTD data, Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Services (PGIS), lost data for 1993, which were therefore omitted from the 
present analyses. Despite this limitation, the GTD has been commonly used to examine 
terrorism within the extant literature (see Enders, Sandler, and Gaibulloev, 2011; LaFree 
and Ackerman, 2009; LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw, 2009; Young and Dugan, 2011). 
The data contained within the GTD database were collected through content 
reviews of global newspapers and other media sources, in addition to government and 
military reports (LaFree and Dugan, 2007). As such, the GTD includes information on 
both domestic and international terrorism from developed and developing nations 
(LaFree and Dugan, 2007). Terrorism is defined within the GTD as “the threatened or 
actual use of illegal force and violence to attain a political, economic, religious, or social 
goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation” (LaFree and Dugan, 2007: 184). For an 
                                                 
37 International terrorist attacks against the US were identified when the nationality of the target that was 
attacked was the US, but the attack occurred on non-US soil. For example, a terrorist attack against a US 





event to be included as a terrorist incident within the GTD, it must adhere to the 
following three criteria: 
i. The incident was intentional (the result of a conscious calculation on the part 
of the perpetrator) 
ii. The incident included some observable level of violence or the threat of 
violence 
iii. The perpetrator of the incident was a sub-national actor. 
In addition to these three conditions, an event must meet two of the following 
three criteria in order to have been included in the GTD:  
i. The violent act was aimed at attaining a political, economic, religious, or 
social goal  
ii. The violent act included evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) other than the 
immediate victims 
iii. The violent act was outside the precepts of International Humanitarian Law 
(START, 2009). 
The GTD also calculates the number of individuals killed in terrorist attacks using 
data gathered from newspapers and government reports (START, 2016). As noted above, 
this figure includes both the victims and perpetrators killed by terrorist attacks. 
Consequently, for the following analyses the number of terrorist victims was calculated 
by subtracting the number of terrorists killed from this figure for all overall fatalities. 
Fatalities caused by a terrorist attack may not be immediate, and more accurate 
information on deaths may not be available until a period after these events. 
Consequently, the number of fatalities stemming from a terrorist attack may change over 
time. To account for these issues, the GTD usually records the number given by the most 





to the estimate being sourced from the claims of the group that perpetrated the attack, the 
GTD triangulates the estimates given by all sources to arrive at a figure that is agreed 
upon by a majority of sources (START, 2016). In cases where an estimate cannot be 
triangulated using independent sources, the lowest estimate provided from a valid source 
is recorded (START, 2016). 
The GTD is both collected and maintained free from government or commercial 
influences. Originally collected by a private business (PGIS), it has since been assembled 
by private contractors and independent researchers from the University of Maryland and 
the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism 
(START). Although the original collection of GTD data was funded by the US National 
Institute of Justice, and is now funded by the US Department of Homeland Security and 
the US State Department, the separation of data collection from a government agency is a 
strength of this dataset. This separation limits the potential for political biases to 
influence either the data collection procedure or the operational definitions. While 
maintained as a single database, the GTD has employed four generations of data 
collection.38 To account for these methodological changes across the 45-year study 
period, a series of dummy variables using the first period of data collection (1970-1997) 
as the base category are used in line with Dugan and Distler’s (2016) suggestions. 
Another notable limitation of the GTD is that the data are primarily collected 
from media sources. This however may also be considered a strength of these data as they 
                                                 
38 For the years between 1970 and 1997 data for the GTD were collected by the Pinkerton Global 
Intelligence Services (PGIS), between 1998 and 2007 data were collected by the Center for Terrorism and 
Intelligence Studies (CETIS), for 2008 through to the end of October 2011 data were collected by the 
Institute for the Study of Violent Groups (ISVG), and from November 2011 onward the GTD data have 





bypass official records which are inherently biased. Due media companies’ priorities, the 
GTD data are likely biased toward the inclusion of newsworthy terrorism targets and 
tactics such as suicide attacks and political assassinations (LaFree, 2010). Conversely, 
failed terrorist attacks occurring in more remote areas are less likely to be captured by 
these media sources (LaFree, 2010), leading to systematic underestimations of the 
number of terrorist incidents. However, given media focus on the US, these 
underestimations are likely smaller in comparison to developing nations. 
Despite these limitations, the longevity and detail contained within the GTD 
allows for meaningful long-term research at multiple levels of geographic and temporal 
aggregation. This is the only available terrorism dataset spanning the timeframe selected 
by this dissertation that covers both domestic US terrorist attacks as well as attacks 
targeting US interests elsewhere. Consequently, in spite of the aforementioned 
limitations, due to its temporal scope, its consistency of measurement, and the 
independence of its data collection process, the GTD was selected as the most appropriate 
source to measure the monthly incidence of terrorism. 
Primary Independent Variables – Presidential Communications 
The primary independent variables that are examined by this dissertation 
concerned the public communications used by US presidents and their press secretaries 
regarding terrorism. As these communications contain many important elements that may 
influence the incidence of terrorism targeting the US, this dissertation uses a number of 
measures to examine whether any of these elements have a detectable impact on 
terrorism. To measure US presidential speech, data were compiled from the American 





online and open-access resource provides a searchable database of 120,595 presidential 
public communications (defined as delivered by US presidents or their press secretaries) 
covering the years 1789 to 2016 (Woolley and Peters, 2016). This resource has been used 
by numerous studies examining presidential communications (see Arthur and Woods, 
2013; Bartolucci, 2012; Coleman, 2013; Dodds and Danforth, 2010; Edwards, 2003; 
Hughes, 2009; Jamieson, 2007; Olsen et al., 2012; Randahl, 2016), and it is “the only 
online resource that has coded and organized into a single searchable database, all 
presidential speeches and papers” (Bartolucci, 2012: 565).  
Within this archive, the APP research team has coded each communication in 
order to delineate its important characteristics. These include whether the original 
medium was in oral or written format, whether it was delivered by either the president or 
press secretary, and whether it was part of an election campaign (Woolley and Peters, 
2016). In order to begin to engage with the qualitative differences in presidential 
communications, the variety of communication types contained within this database are 
used to conduct sensitivity analyses and to examine whether the format of 
communications conditions their impact on terrorism. The communication types include: 
inaugural addresses, addresses to congress, State of the Union addresses, addresses to the 
UN General Assembly, news conferences, written messages, and written memoranda. 
Campaign documents such as debate transcripts were excluded from the compiled dataset 
as they are representations of a presidential candidate rather than the holder of that 
political office. After excluding the previously mentioned communications, these 
procedures yielded a total of 72,263 public communications that were delivered by US 





included in this study as they were the primary medium for communicating 
counterterrorism policy changes. As the medium of communication may influence its 
impact on terrorism however, numerous sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine 
whether the distinction between written and spoken communications is meaningful within 
this context. 
In order to identify the presidential communications that concerned terrorism, a 
systematic search was conducted of the APP database between 1970 and 2014 using the 
search term “terrorism.” This search term was selected because any communications that 
contained this word were explicitly connected to terrorism. The word terrorism was used 
throughout the time period being examined, and its common use helped to distinguish 
terrorist violence from other forms of war and crime. Additional searches using the term 
“terror” did not yield any additional relevant public communications. Terms such as 
“assassination” and “bombing” were also trialed as additional key words, however both 
included events that were explicitly connected to warfare or were framed as other forms 
of violence. As such, the compiled dataset contains all official public communications 
that explicitly mention terrorism that were delivered by presidents and their press 
secretaries. These procedures yielded an analytic sample of 6,001 presidential 
communications that explicitly mentioned terrorism. The dissertation calculated the 
monthly frequency of these communications to test the first set of hypotheses. 
It should be noted that many of these presidential communications discussed 
related economic, diplomatic, and social issues in addition to terrorism. As many of these 
discussions are intertwined and discuss terrorism obliquely, much of the sentiment that is 





issues within these communications. For example, discussions of climate change and the 
environment were often connected to exacerbating the underlying causes of terrorism 
generally,39 and economic matters were often discussed as being intrinsic to terrorism 
preparedness and/or the consequences of terrorism.40 Consequently, although terrorism 
was one of many topics discussed in these communications, the environmental and 
economic concerns that were concurrently addressed were central to framing and 
understanding the threat and likely consequences of terrorism. As such, tangentially 
related policy matters were pivotal to many discussions of terrorism targeting the US and 
thus were not excluded from the compiled dataset. It should be noted however that the 
inclusion of additional material beyond these related concerns may lead to potential 
measurement error, loss of efficiency, and Type II errors. However, delineating between 
relevant and irrelevant issues related to terrorism within each communication would be 
both subjective and resource intensive, given the size of the dataset. Thus this dissertation 
elected to retain the entire transcript of each of the 6,001 communications. 
As presidential communications may have a differential impact when they 
introduce policy initiatives, these instances were also coded to enable a variety of 
sensitivity analyses. Drawing upon the independent codes produced by the APP, the 
following communication categories were coded as policy initiatives: statements of 
                                                 
39 “We have to understand the urgency and magnitude of this environmental issue as a global crisis. We 
have to work to stop famine and stabilize population growth and prevent further environmental 
degradation. If we fail, these problems will cause terrorism, tension, and war” (Clinton, 1994). 
40 “And if a terrorist threat—if terrorism is a threat to the supply of our energy supply, then I believe it 
makes sense to address that terrorist threat by doubling the size of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, so that 
rather than 750 million gallons of crude oil in storage, in case there's a disruption based upon a terrorist 
threat, there's a billion-five. In other words, if we're saying dependence on oil creates a terrorist threat, let's 
do something about it now. Let's say that if the threat does come, there's enough crude oil in storage to be 





administration policy, executive orders, veto messages, veto signings, bill signings, 
memoranda, and signing statements. Importantly, these communications capture the 
public introduction of major US counterterrorism policies. While the data compiled for 
the following analysis do not include the implementation of overt and covert 
counterterrorism initiatives, these public introductions mark official transitions in US 
counterterrorism policy, and unlike covert actions, engage with the political dimensions 
of terrorism. Thus, while it would be ideal to also include these counterterrorism actions 
in the models, many of the key counterterrorism actions are included in these documents. 
The consequences of these omissions are further discussed in Chapter 7. 
Sentiment of Communications 
This dissertation analyzes the sentiment of presidential communications regarding 
terrorism as another set of primary independent variables. In order to minimize 
subjectivity and allow replication, a sentiment analysis software package, Sentiment 
Analysis Online (2016), was obtained to measure sentiment. As discussed in Chapter 3, 
sentiment analysis software has been developed in order to systematically record and 
analyze “opinions, sentiments, evaluations, appraisals, attitudes, and emotions towards 
entities such as products, services, organizations, individuals, issues, events, topics, and 
their attributes” (Liu, 2012: 7). At the time of writing, a number of openly available 
packages for measuring sentiment on a number of different scales were available, but 
most automatically coded all language describing terrorism as negative, making them 
inadequate for the present research purposes. Sentiment Analysis Online (2016) allows 
users to set a topic as neutral, so that the sentiment calculation would extract deviations in 





used by numerous other studies to examine sentiment analysis and to operationalize the 
tone of texts (see Barna and Dugan, 2016; Elhenfnawy et al., 2016; Fisher and Dugan, 
2017; Teh et al. 2015; Teh et al. 2016). 
Sentiment Analysis Online provides quantitative scores of the sentiment 
contained in a body of text; ranging from -1 if the sentiment is “very bad”, to 1 if the 
sentiment is “very good” (Sentiment Analysis Online, 2016: 1). With the month as the 
unit of analysis in this dissertation, this analytic approach provided the opportunity to 
summarize the monthly sentiment in a variety of strategic ways. These alternative 
measurement strategies are used to reveal different elements of the relationship between 
presidential communications and terrorism targeting the US. Public communications in 
concert with one another can prime the audience, provide political framing, or set broader 
agendas (Scheufele, 2000). As such, this dissertation combines the insights from multiple 
measurement strategies (frequency, net sentiment frequency, average, and net sentiment), 
to provide better policy direction. As such, the following five different measurement 
strategies are used to elucidate the impact of these communications. 
The first strategy measures the monthly frequency of presidential communications 
concerning terrorism to evaluate the attention and acknowledgement hypotheses.41 This 
measurement strategy represents the strictest set of theoretical assumptions by treating all 
communications as equal in their ability to impact terrorism in the following month. This 
initial perspective provides a baseline for understanding the additional value that can be 
gained from including mediating factors and the sentiment of communications. 
                                                 
41 Hypothesis 1a: The number of speech acts by a government will increase subsequent terrorism 






Sensitivity analyses are also conducted in order to investigate whether they are delivered 
by the president or a press secretary, and whether they are introducing a policy initiative. 
The remaining four measurement strategies incorporate the sentiment of 
presidential communications and are used to test hypotheses 2-4. The frequency of 
conciliatory or repressive monthly government actions can have a cumulative impact or 
need to reach a certain a threshold in order to impact subsequent terrorism, as Dugan and 
Chenoweth (2012) demonstrate in their investigation of Israeli government actions on 
Palestinian terrorism. In order to provide results that engage with Dugan and 
Chenoweth’s (2012) findings, the second analytic approach investigates whether the 
monthly frequency of positive and negative presidential communications regarding 
terrorism affects subsequent terrorism. For the purposes of this dissertation, a 
communication was coded as positive if its sentiment score was greater than 0 and 
negative if its sentiment score was less than 0. Both of these frequencies were included 
these models. 
The number of positive and negative statements may also be an important aspect 
of presidential communications. Assuming that all positive and negative communications 
hold equal value, this strategy aims to assess whether the net sentiment expressed by 
presidents and their press secretaries by subtracting the monthly frequency of negative 
communications from that of positive communications (net sentiment frequency). While 
considered, it was not viable to examine the ratio of positive to negative communications 
due to the existence of months with no positive communications, no negative 
communications, or no communications concerning terrorism whatsoever. This net 





one type of communication from months that had relatively few but consistent 
communications. 
Capitalizing on sentiment analysis software’s ability to detect subtle differences in 
sentiment, this dissertation also assesses the effect of the average monthly sentiment 
score, and the monthly sum of sentiment scores on subsequent terrorism. The average 
monthly sentiment score is used to indicate one form of overall tone, and the net monthly 
sentiment scores was used to indicate the cumulative monthly impact or prominence of 
terrorism communications. Each measurement method is used to highlight different 
elements of broader presidential communications strategies. Viewing all of these findings 
together, this approach is designed to produce a number of insights into specific 
communications strategies that would yield the greatest counterterrorism benefits. For 
example, if increases in the count of negative public communications is related to 
decreases in terrorism in the following month, but a negative relationship between the 
sum of sentiment scores and subsequent terrorism is also observed, then this would 
suggest that to minimize terrorism, governments should use frequent presidential 
communications that are only slightly negative in nature. 
Moderating Variables 
In addition to these key independent variables, the following analyses include 
moderating and control variables. The moderating variables that were selected pertain to 
the presidential approval rating. In order to produce interpretable findings, presidential 
approval rating was operationalized as a series of dummy variable that distinguish 
between months where the president had higher than average approval ratings, and when 





highest decile. Each of these operationalization strategies is tested to determine if 
findings are sensitive to other cut points, and these multiple strategies are used to more 
systematically determine where any meaningful differences may exist for the 
hypothesized moderating relationship. 
Presidential Administration 
 In order to test Hypothesis 3, each of the aforementioned models are also run 
separately for each administration. Despite the low sample sizes for some 
administrations, particularly Ford who was only in office for 30 months, these models are 
determined to have sufficient statistical power to be able to detect statistically significant 
impacts of presidential communications on terrorism. 
Presidential Approval Rating 
 Central to Hypothesis 4, presidential favorability can also moderate the impact of 
presidential communications. Data from Gallup’s presidential approval polls were 
obtained (Gallup Analytics, 2017) to measure presidential favorability. These polls 
maintained the same questioning throughout the entire study period and specifically 
asked the question, “Do you approve or disapprove of the way [first & last name] is 
handling his job as President?” These data consist of 3,101 separate polls and presented a 
consistent means for measuring US presidential favorability among the US public.  
These Gallup polls each surveyed approximately 15,000 US adults aged 18 and 
older living in all 50 US states as well as the District of Columbia (Gallup Analytics, 
2017). Across all of the years that were included in the following analyses, Gallup 





cellphones (Gallup Analytics, 2017). When a landline telephone number was contacted, a 
participant was selected at random for inclusion in the sample based on which adult 
member of the household had the next upcoming birthday (Gallup Analytics, 2017). In 
order to ensure that the sample was not dependent on proficiency in English, polling 
interviews were also available in Spanish for respondents who were primarily Spanish 
speaking (Gallup Analytics, 2017). 
It should also be noted that the final favorability estimates generated by Gallup 
are subject to a variety of sampling quotas. In order to adjust for reduced landline usage 
in the US, more recent polls have included a minimum quota of 60% cellphone 
respondents (Gallup Analytics, 2017). Gallup also included additional minimum quotas 
based on the time zone and region of respondents in order to increase each sample’s 
representation of the US populace at the time (Gallup Analytics, 2017). To account for 
these sampling procedures, Gallup employed a variety of weights to adjust the estimates 
for nonresponse, unequal selection probability, and double coverage of landline and 
cellphone users in the two sampling frames (Gallup Analytics, 2017). Gallup also 
weighted its final samples to match the US population according to gender, age, race, 
Hispanic ethnicity, education, region, and population density (Gallup Analytics, 2017). 
Only the post-weighting estimates are publicly available, and these were collected for use 
in subsequent analyses. 
Many times between 1970 and 2014, Gallup conducted multiple presidential 
favorability surveys per month. To obtain a monthly measurement in these instances, 
these multiple counts were averaged for both presidential approval and disapproval rates. 





presidential favorability, many of which were due to the organization suspending polling 
due to major ecological events such as the effects of Hurricane Sandy in 2012. For the 28 
individual months between January 1970 and December 2014 during which no Gallup 
presidential polls were conducted, linear interpolations were used to impute these missing 
data. Sensitivity analyses are also conducted to identify whether these interpolated values 
had any impacts on the substantive findings of each model.  
Control Variables 
Both the incidence of terrorism and presidential communications concerning 
terrorism were also likely influenced by the occurrence of previous acts of terrorism. As 
such, this dissertation also collected data measuring the count of terrorist attacks 
occurring over four previous months to control for this influence. By controlling for the 
potential impacts from earlier attacks in this manner, the estimated relationship between 
presidential public communications concerning terrorism and subsequent terrorist attacks 
was less distorted (Dugan and Chenoweth, 2012). This concordantly enables the 
following analysis to better isolate any effects of presidential communications on terrorist 
attacks occurring in the following month. 
 As a lower proportion of successful attacks may indicate a lower likelihood of 
future success, all models include the proportion of successful attacks occurring in the 
previous month. Within the GTD, an attack is recorded as successful if it achieves the 
tangible effects intended by that particular method (START, 2016). While this does not 
mean that the attack necessarily achieved the goals of the terrorist organization, it 
indicates that a bomb actually exploded or an assassination attempt succeeded at killing 





attacks as successful if any of the methods used achieved their tangible effects (START, 
2016). 
 In order to control for civil unrest in the US, data were gathered from the Social, 
Political, and Economic Event Database (SPEED). This database contains event data 
capturing events of civil unrest and covers the years between 1946 and 2005, and was 
compiled from the digitized historical archives of the New York Times and Wall Street 
Journal as well as two intelligence agency news services: the Summary of World 
Broadcasts (UK) and the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (US) (Hayes and 
Nardulli, 2011). For the purposes of this dissertation, data were collected for the 2,437 
political expression events contained within this database.42 To avoid double events that 
were considered by the GTD to be terrorism, all events that were judged to be politically 
motivated attacks by SPEED were omitted from the civil unrest variable.43 Unfortunately 
as these data do not cover the entire temporal window examined by this dissertation, the 
potential influence of civil unrest can only be viewed for the first seven presidencies 
(excludes the Obama Administration and the final 3 years of the Bush II Administration). 
As such, these control variables are only used within sensitivity analyses for hypothesis 3 
and this dissertation highlights that these sensitivity analyses may not be generalizable 
beyond the period they are measured for. 
As presented in Chapter 4, different administrations placed varied importance on 
terrorism in comparison to other policy domains. To account for this relative importance, 
                                                 
42 Political expression events were defined as: “the public articulation, by non-governmental actors, of 
threatening or unwelcome political messages” (Hayes and Nardulli, 2013: 2). 
43 Politically motivated attacks were defined as: “physical acts, perpetrated by humans for political 





the following models also control for the proportion of presidential communications in 
the prior month that mentioned terrorism, calculated by dividing the monthly count of 
communications concerning terrorism by the total number of communications (both 
obtained from the American Presidency Project). In addition, the data collection period 
for the GTD was included as outlined previously. 
The length of time a president had been in office (tenure) is also included as a 




Below is a table that provides the operational definitions and sources for all 
variables contained within the subsequent analysis. 
Table 5.1: List of variables, their operationalization, and their sources  
Variable Operational Definition Source 
Frequency of Terrorism Frequency of terrorist attacks in each 
month.  
GTD 
Killed by Terrorism The number of confirmed fatalities from 
terrorism in each month including all 




The frequency of presidential and press 
secretary communications that contain 
the word terrorism. 
APP 
Policy Communications The frequency of presidential and press 
secretary communications that contain 
the word terrorism that introduced 
policy initiatives. 
APP 
Frequency of Positive 
Sentiment Statements 
The count of Terrorism 
Communications with sentiment scores 
greater than 0. 





Frequency of Negative 
Sentiment Statements 
The count of Terrorism 
Communications with sentiment scores 
less than 0. 
APP and SAO 
Net Frequency of 
Sentiment Statements 
The count of Terrorism 
Communications with sentiment scores 
greater than 0 minus the count of 
Terrorism Communications with 
sentiment scores less than 0. 
APP and SAO 
Average Sentiment 
Score 
The average sentiment score for 
Terrorism Communications in the 
previous month. 
APP and SAO 
Net Sentiment Score The summation of all sentiment scores 
for Terrorism Communications in the 
previous month. 
APP and SAO 
Presidential 
Administration 
A set of dummy variables differentiating 
each presidential administration. 
APP 
Previous Focus on 
Terrorism 
The proportion of Terrorism 
Communications in the previous month. 
APP 
Tenure in Office The count of the president’s months in 
office prior to the current month. 
APP 
Approval Rating The proportion of US citizens who 
reported that they approved of the way 
that the current president was is 
handling their job as President. 
Gallup 
Disapproval Rating The proportion of US citizens who 
reported that they disapproved of the 
way that the current president was is 
handling their job as President. 
Gallup 
Successful Attacks The proportion of successful attacks in 
the previous month. 
GTD 
Civil Unrest The monthly frequency of political 
expression events that are the public 
articulation, by non-governmental 
actors, of threatening or unwelcome 
political messages. 
SPEED 
GTD Collection Period A set of dummy variables differentiating 
each GTD collection Period. 
GTD 
Analysis 
The previous chapters have identified a number of attributes that an analytic 
model should include in order to test the four hypotheses identified by this dissertation. 





month should be included in order to account for the necessary planning and 
implementation time required by terrorist attacks (Nesser, 2008). Presidential 
communications are also subject to a variety of political influences, including the 
previous incidence of terrorism and the success of previous attacks. In addition, 
presidential communications may also be a function of previous communications as part 
of an ongoing policy approach. Each of these factors may also both direct impact on 
terrorism and indirect effects through communications, and should therefore be 
accounted for in a modeling strategy. Consequently, due to the need to estimate these 
multiple and specific autoregressive requirements across multiple time periods 
simultaneously, the modeling strategy requires a quantitative method that is flexible 
enough to meet all of these requirements. The methodology should also impose correct 
and specific temporal ordering for all variables, and mutually estimate the effects of 
communication on terrorism and terrorism on communication. 
To analyze these data and account for all of these empirically theoretically 
derived factors, this dissertation uses structural equation modeling (SEM). A structural 
equation model is a theoretically derived and hypothesized pattern of directional and non-
directional linear relationships that include a set of measured and latent variables 
(MacCallum and Austin, 2000). Unlike traditional regression analyses, SEMs assume 
probabilistic causality rather than deterministic causality, allowing for changes to occur 
in outcomes based upon probability (Kline, 2016). The purpose of SEMs is thus to 
account for both variation and co-variation of the measured variables, and these models 
allow for the specification of the directionality structure of relationships within a model 





structure within these models also allow SEMs to include autoregressive influences 
(Gollob & Reichardt 1991). As this dissertation has highlighted that terrorism and 
communications are likely both influenced by previous terrorism and affect future 
terrorism, this feature further renders SEM as an analytic strategy that is able to account 
for all of the influences highlighted by this dissertation across multiple units of time 
simultaneously (Maxwell, Cole, and Mitchell, 2011). 
Model specification is crucial within SEM, as even theoretically meaningless 
models may be shown to have statistical value (Millsap, 2007). Although prominent 
scholars traditionally advocate for a single primary model, due to the multifaceted nature 
of public communications and their potential impact(s) on terrorism, this dissertation 
argues that multiple models will reveal important insights, particularly through 
disconfirming hypotheses (Bollen, 1989). As multiple measurement strategies are 
required to better understand the potentially nuanced impact terrorism communications 
may have on subsequent terrorism, the broad models that are used to test each hypothesis 
are structurally similar as demonstrated through diagrams below. In order to ensure 
correct temporal ordering, every independent variable was measured in the month prior to 
the variable it is predicting. The only exception is lagged terrorism (discussed in greater 
detail below), which was measured for the four sequential months preceding the outcome. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Prior to formally testing the hypotheses, a descriptive analysis of the major 
dependent and independent variables is also conducted in order to document the 
distribution of each variable and discusses implications for the existing literature or the 





Testing the Hypotheses 
This dissertation uses SEM to evaluate the relationship between presidential 
communications and subsequent terrorism. Although a variety of sensitivity analyses are 
examined, three broad SEM models are used to test the four hypotheses. These broad 
models are displayed in Figures 5.1-5.3 below. Beginning with the model that was 
designed to test Hypothesis 1,44 Figure 5.1 highlights that the primary relationship of 
interest (represented by the thicker line) linked Presidential Terrorism Communications 
(Count) to Terrorism (Count). This one-month lag between the primary independent 
variable and the dependent variable is consistent across all models. For parsimony, the 
primary control variables for the GTD collection period and the control variables for 
sensitivity analyses such as civil unrest have been omitted from these figures. 
Additionally, for each of the following models (Figures 5.1-5.3), all predicted count 
variables are estimated using the negative binomial distribution. 
                                                 
44 Hypothesis 1a: The number of speech acts by a government will increase subsequent terrorism 







Figure 5.1: Baseline model for testing Hypothesis 1 
In addition to this primary relationship, the impact of time in office (tenure), the 
proportion of successful attacks in the prior month, the presidential attention paid to 
terrorism in the previous month (proportion of previous terrorism communications), the 
president’s approval rating in the previous month, and the count of terrorism in a number 
of preceding months were also estimated. Taking advantage of the ability of SEM to 
model autoregressive influences, this study also estimates the effect of previous terrorism 
(t-2 and greater) on terrorism communications (t-1), simultaneously with the primary 
relationship (terrorism communications at t-1 on terrorism at t), as displayed in Figure 
5.1. In addition, this model was used to estimate the affect of previous terrorism (t-2 and 
greater) on the proportion of successful attacks (t-1), the presidential attention paid to 





Turning to Hypothesis 2,45 Figure 5.2 displays the augmented model that is used 
to estimate the effects of the sentiment of terrorism communications on terrorism in the 
following month. The majority of this SEM is identical to that shown in Figure 8, with 
two major differences. First, the primary relationships of interest are now the monthly 
count of positive sentiment terrorism communications (t-1) and the monthly count of 
negative sentiment terrorism communications (t-1) on the count of terrorism (t). 
Secondly, the count of negative and positive terrorism communications at t-2 are also 
included in order to account for the previous sentiment of terrorism communications on 
the primary independent variables measured at t-1. 
 
Figure 5.2: Baseline model for testing Hypothesis 2 (count) 
 As mentioned above, the average, sum, and net sentiment frequency may also 
affect terrorism in the following month, the models expressed in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are 
                                                 
45 Hypothesis 2a: Negative speech will be related to decreases in subsequent terrorism (deterrence) 
Hypothesis 2b: Negative speech will be related to increases in subsequent terrorism (backlash) 
Hypothesis 2c: Positive speech will be related to decreases in subsequent terrorism (placation) 





amended for these continuous primary independent variables. Similarly to Figure 5.2, 
Figure 5.3 also models the impact of the previous sentiment of terrorism communications 
(t-2) on terrorism communications at t-1. 
 
Figure 5.3: Baseline model for testing Hypothesis 2 (average, sum, and difference) 
 The three structural models displayed above (Figures 5.1-5.3) are also used 
separately for data from each administration in order to test Hypothesis 3.46  
Turning finally to hypothesis 4,47 the models expressed in Figures 5.1-5.3 are first 
used to examine whether presidential approval ratings have a direct impact on terrorism 
targeting the US. To investigate this relationship directly a variety of moderation models 
are also used to examine whether the impact of terrorism communications is conditioned 
                                                 
46 Hypothesis 3: The relationship between Presidential speech and subsequent terrorism will vary across 
administrations. 
47 Hypothesis 4:  As public support becomes increasingly favorable or unfavorable (absolute value 






by presidential approval using the same modeling framework expressed above. The 
dissertation began by amending the first model diagramed above (Figure 5.1) with 
approval rating acting as a moderating variable for the relationship(s) between the key 
independent variable(s) and the count of terrorism in the following month. An example of 
this can be seen below in Figure 11 that presents approval rating (t-1) as a moderating 
variable between the count of terrorism communications (t-1) and terrorism (t). 
 





Chapter 6:  Results 
This chapter presents the results for the primary models outlined in Chapter Five 
and a range of sensitivity analyses that were designed to test each of the four hypotheses. 
It first begins with a summary of the descriptive statistics for terrorism, presidential 
communications regarding terrorism, and the mediating and control variables that are 
included in the primary analyses. 
Description of Terrorism 
According to the GTD, there were 5,359 terrorist attacks that targeted the US 
between January 1970 and December 2014. This figure does exclude attacks from 1993, 
as noted previously. Excluding this one-year period, only seven additional months were 
recorded as not having a terrorist incident that targeted the US (1.33%). As Figure 6.1 
shows, the monthly frequency of terrorist attacks had notable peaks in 1970, 1977, and 
1990. Notwithstanding these peaks, Figure 6.1 also indicates a broadly negative trend in 
the incidence of terrorism targeting the US between 1970 and 2014 (?̂?=-0.032, p<0.001). 
Looking at each presidency separately, the Nixon administration experienced the highest 
average monthly frequency of terrorist attacks, at 21.272. The Ford administration 
experienced the second highest monthly frequency of terrorist attacks, with 17.133 
attacks per month, however this reduction was not statistically significant (t=-1.257, 
p=0.213). All other presidencies experienced statistically significantly less terrorism per 
month in comparison to the Nixon administration; Carter (?̅?=12.532, t=-3.276, p=0.001), 
Reagan (?̅?=10.177, t=-5.8695, p<0.001), Bush I (?̅?=14.104, t=-2.593, p=0.01), Clinton 
(?̅?=7.560, t=-6.950, p<0.001), Bush II (?̅?=6.255, t=-7.607, p<0.001), and Obama 





administration saw an increase in the average monthly frequency of terrorism from the 
previous administration, Reagan’s (t=3.366, p=0.01). All other administrations 
experienced significantly less terrorism (p≤0.05) than the preceding administration; 
Carter (t=-2.967, p=0.04), Reagan (t=-2.355, p=0.020), Clinton (t=-5.669, p<0.001), 
Bush II (t=-1.961, p=0.05), Obama (t=-5.486, p<0.001). 
 
Figure 6.1: Monthly frequency of terrorism targeting US (1970-2014) 
 
Of the 5,359 attacks that targeted the US during this period, 2,646 occurred on US 
soil (49.5%). Similarly to the frequency of overall terrorist attacks, the average monthly 
frequency of terrorist attacks occurring on US soil also reduced in nearly every 
subsequent administration. As demonstrated by the white bars in Figure 6.2 below, only 
the Clinton administration experienced numerically more domestic terrorism than the 





A different trend emerges when examining the proportion of domestic terrorist 
attacks targeting the US. The highest proportion of domestic terrorist attacks occurred 
during the Nixon administration, with 66.8% of attacks occurring in the US, followed by 
Ford (60.3%), Carter (57.9%), Clinton (48.4%), Reagan (43.0%), Obama (38.4%), Bush 
II (28.1%), and Bush I (23.8%). These divergent trends suggest that there may have been 
divergent patterns of domestic and international terrorism targeting the US during the 
Bush I and Clinton administrations.  
 
Figure 6.2: Average monthly frequency of domestic terrorism targeting US (1970-2014) 
 The second dependent variable used to test the four hypotheses is the monthly 
number of individuals killed by terrorism. Figure 6.3 below presents two graphs 
displaying the number of people killed in each month between 1970 and 2014, one 
including the September 11th attacks (left) and one excluding the September 11th attacks 
(right). Out of the 6,317 people killed by terrorist attacks targeting the US, 2,983 are 
attributable to the September 11th, 2001 attacks (47.2%). Including these events, across 
the 45-year period between 1970 and 2014, an average of 11.96 people were killed per 





terrorist fatalities (?̅?=43.51), followed by Reagan (?̅?=8.94), Clinton (?̅?=7.04), Ford 
(?̅?=4.67), Obama (?̅?=3.64), Nixon (?̅?=3.27), Bush I (?̅?=2.56), and Carter (?̅?=1.96). In 
contrast to the incidence of terrorism, which exhibited an overall downward trend, no 
overall temporal trend was observable for the monthly number of people killed in 
terrorist attacks targeting the US (?̂?=0.036, p=0.338). Taken together, these conditional 
averages and the absence of an overall temporal trend suggest that trends in the lethality 
exhibit a different pattern than the incidence of terrorist attacks that targeted the US. 
However, upon removing the data from September 2001 (graph 2 in Figure 6.3), the 
monthly variation in the number of people killed in terrorist attacks can be more clearly 
seen with the re-scaled y-axis. Excluding the events of September 2001, 3,334 people 
were killed in terrorist attacks targeting the US (?̅?=6.33 per month). The exclusion of this 
month also reduced the average number of monthly fatalities during the Bush II 
administration from 43.51 to 11.90. As such, notwithstanding the September 11th, 2001 
attacks, Bush II still experienced more fatalities than any other administration. This 
difference was not statistically significant, however, compared to the administration with 
the next higher average number of fatalities, Reagan (t=0.688, p=0.492). Finally, it 
should also be noted that there were no fatalities due to terrorism in 154 out of the 528 






Figure 6.3: Monthly frequency of individuals killed in terrorist attacks including the September 
11th attacks (left) and excluding the September 11th attacks (right) (1970-2014) 
Description of Public Communications 
This section presents descriptions of the variables used to measure presidential 
communications relevant to terrorism. Figure 6.4 displays the monthly frequency of total 
terrorism communications, as indicated by the dotted black line (president and press 
secretary combined), and the monthly frequency of communications from the president 
alone (solid black line). Focusing firstly upon the monthly frequency of all terrorism 
communications, Figure 6.4 displays that they increased markedly under the presidencies 
of Clinton, Bush II, and Obama. Contrasted with the incidence of terrorism discussed 
above and in Figure 6.1, Figure 6.4 indicates that that count of terrorism communications 
was relatively low when terrorism was at its highest under Nixon, and it peaked 
following the September 11th attacks in 2001 under Bush II.  
 





It is also evident that under the Clinton administration, the press secretary began 
to be used more frequently in order to convey presidential messages regarding terrorism, 
as indicated by the distance between the solid and dotted lines in Figure 6.4. Particularly 
under Bush II, the press secretary was responsible for delivering a large number of these 
communications. Indeed, of the average 2,942 terrorism communications delivered under 
the Bush II administration, 1,935 were delivered by press secretaries. As shown in Figure 
6.5 below, the proportion of terrorism communications delivered by the press secretary 
peaked under the Obama administration (72.6%). Each president, with the sole exception 
of Ford, had at least one month where a press secretary delivered all terrorism 
communications, further demonstrating the importance of the press secretary for 
delivering these messages. 
 


























































Using the sentiment scores that were generated for each terrorism communication, 
Figure 6.6 shows the monthly frequency of presidential communications with a positive 
sentiment (sentiment score >0, marked by a solid line) and a negative sentiment 
(sentiment score <0, marked by the dotted line). Each president had terrorism 
communications with a positive sentiment, but for all presidents the modal 
communication was negative in sentiment. Interestingly, Figure 6.6 also indicates that 
positive and negative sentiment messages were frequently used within the same month, 
indicating that presidents and their press secretaries may have employed different 
communications strategies within relatively small temporal windows. The Clinton 
administration had the greatest proportion of communications with a negative sentiment 
(0.771), followed by Nixon (0.714), Ford (0.692), Obama (0.662), Bush II (0.638), 
Reagan (0.633), Carter (0.628), and Bush I (0.545). As such, the majority of terrorism 
messages across all presidential administrations conveyed a negative sentiment.  
 





  When the monthly frequency of negative presidential communications was 
subtracted from the frequency of positive communications to calculate the net sentiment 
frequency, the average net sentiment was also negative (?̅?=-3.581, see Figure 6.7 below). 
Across all months, the average number of positive communications was 3.765 and the 
average number of negative communications was 7.346. Again demonstrating important 
variation in the monthly messages, this net sentiment frequency demonstrated that each 
president had multiple months where the net value was positive. Across the entire study 
period, 68 months had a positive net frequency, representing 12.6% of all months. The 
Bush II administration had both the highest net frequency value of terrorism 
communications, at eight in April 2002 (30 out of 52 communications were positive in 
sentiment), as well as the lowest net frequency value, at 32 in October 2004 (41 out of 50 
communications were negative in sentiment). The Bush I administration had the greatest 
proportion of months with a positive net sentiment frequency value (0.354), followed by 
Carter (0.213), Reagan (0.177), Obama (0.069), Ford (0.067), Nixon (0.545), Bush II 






Figure 6.7: Frequency of positive sentiment terrorism communication minus the frequency of 
negative sentiment terrorism communications (net frequency) (1970-2014) 
When calcluating the average monthly sentiment score, a different perspective on 
presidential communications emerged. Figure 6.8 below suggests that with the excpetion 
of the Obama administration, the sentiment scores of terrorism communications varied 
more in earlier presidencies. In addition, both Clinton and Bush II rarely averaged 
positive sentiment scores across their administrations. Although the reduced variations 
may be a function of the underlying higher number of terrorism communications used by 
Clinton and Bush II, Obama had also a relatively high number of terrorism 
communications, yet had more variation then his two predecessors. Both Reagan (0.356) 
and Carter (0.383) each had months with an average sentiment score greater than 0.3, 
however in both cases these values were driven by a single communication concerning 





having the lowest average sentiment score at -0.15,  followed by Clinton (-0.09), Reagan 
(-0.07), Ford (-0.07), Bush II (-0.04), Obama (-0.03), Bush I (-0.03), and Carter (-0.02). 
 
Figure 6.8: Average monthly sentiment score of terrorism communications (1970-2014) 
 Incorporating the number of communications in each month, the net sentiment 
value (sum of the sentiment scores for each month) revealed yet another perspective on 
these communications (Figure 6.9). The magnitude of the net sentiment value was 
greatest under Bush II, reflecting the social and political importance placed on terrorism 
in more recent presidencies. Further, Figure 6.9 also indicates that the communication 
strategies employed toward the end of the Carter administration may have been different 
than those employed early on. The variability in the net sentiment value in Figure 6.9 also 
reveals that if taken on their own, the average monthly scores may obscure important 
trends in terrorism communications. While Clinton and Bush II had relatively stable 





calculating the net sentiment reveal that the cumulative impact of terrorism 
communications may have varied quite dramatically across months. 
 
Figure 6.9: Sum of sentiment scores of terrorism communications (net sentiment value) (1970-
2014) 
 This dissertation also documents communications that introduced or updated 
policy concerning terrorism (“policy communications”). As it can be seen in Figure 6.10 
below, the average number of monthly policy communications grew steadily across each 
presidential administration until peaking under Bush II (2.604 per month). Figure 6.10 
also displays that the average number of policy communications doubled for both the 
Clinton and Bush II in comparison to the administrations that preceded them. These 
increases are in line with the observations from Chapter that high profile terrorist 
incidents such as the 1993 World Trade Center under Clinton produced the greater 
introduction of counterterrorism policy (Badey, 1998). The average frequency of policy 





(1.361 per month), further echoing the literature suggesting that the September 11th 
attacks drove the introduction of terrorism policy. The overall trend displayed in Figure 
6.10 however suggests the policy relevance of terrorism had been steadily increasing at 
least since the Nixon administration.  
 
Figure 6.10: Average monthly frequency of policy communications for each presidency 
The relevant communications measures for each administration are summarized 
below in table 6.1 for ease of comparison. In addition to the previously noted trends, it 
should be noted that the Ford administration had the fewest public communications 
concerning terrorism (f=18), however this number was greater per month for Ford (0.6 
per month) than for Nixon (0.338 per month). In his limited tenure, Ford also employed 
more public communications per month than Nixon (83.967 vs. 38.279), however this is 
relatively little compared to Bush II who averaged 166.485 communications per month. 












23 18 131 333 149 1210 2945 1192 
Total 
Communications 
2,603 2,519 5,694 10,945 5,839 14,475 16,149 11,686 








0.338 0.60 2.69 3.42 3.06 12.42 30.24 12.24 
Average Sentiment -0.15 -0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.03 
Standard Deviation 
of Sentiment 
0.26 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.22 0.27 












0.545 0.067 0.213 0.177 0.354 0.042 0.052 0.069 
Average Policy 
Communications 
Per Month 0.073 0.100 0.170 0.292 0.417 1.042 2.604 1.361 
 
Moderating Variable Descriptive Statistics 
As outlined in Chapter 5, this dissertation examines presidential approval rating, 
as a moderating variable. In viewing presidential approval ratings it is first important to 
note that the length of tenure of each president included in this study varied across each 
presidency. Figure 6.11 displays below that Ford spent less than a third of the time in 








Figure 6.11: Tenure of each president in months 
The original data measuring the moderating variable, presidential approval rating, 
can be seen in Figure 6.12. As it can be seen below, Bush II had both the highest 
approval and disapproval scores during this time. All presidents also experienced periods 
during which their approval rating was both higher and lower than their disapproval 
rating. A close inspection of Figure 6.12 also reveals that presidential disapproval is 
linked to not directly inverse of presidential approval, with Nixon’s approval rating 






Figure 6.12: Monthly average approval and disapproval ratings (1970-2014) 
As noted in Chapter 5, linear interpolations were used to estimate presidential 
approval ratings for the 28 months when Gallup did not conduct any polls. In order to 
assess whether these interpolations might influence the results, a series of t-tests are 
conducted for each presidency. Figure 6.13 below shows that the average monthly 
approval ratings are nearly identical regardless of whether the 28 interpolated months are 
included. There were no missing approval data for the Clinton, Bush II, and Obama 
administrations, and for the five presidencies for which presidential approval data were 
interpolated, no statistically significant differences were detectable between the original 
data and the interpolated data used to test the four hypotheses: Nixon (t=0.520, p=0.604), 







Figure 6.13: Average original and interpolated approval ratings (1970-2014) 
Results of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis 1 – The Impact of the Count of Terrorism Communications 
 The first set of models used to test the hypotheses examine whether the frequency 
of presidential communications concerning terrorism had any impact on the incidence of 
terrorism targeting the US in the following month. Due to conflicting theories regarding 
the effect of presidential terrorism communications, the first set of hypotheses stated that 
these communications may be positively related to terrorism (attention) or negatively 
related to terrorism (acknowledgement). Thus, the first model uses the monthly frequency 
of all presidential communications as the primary independent variable. The findings 
from this model are summarized below in Figure 6.14. In this Figure and all subsequent 
Figures, the relationship(s) of theoretical interest are denoted by a thickened black arrow. 
All statistically significant estimates have bolded coefficients listed and have been 






 As it can be seen below in Figure 6.14, this initial test yields a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the frequency of presidential 
communications and the incidence of terrorism in the following month. This negative 
finding supports the acknowledgement hypothesis (1b). This model also reveals a number 
of other theoretically important insights. Firstly, approval rating is found to be unrelated 
to terrorism in the following month, after accounting for the other variables in the model. 
This finding is robust to sensitivity tests that examined disapproval ratings (?̂?=0.004, 
p=0.103), and to those including the pre-interpolated approval ratings instead (?̂?=-0.005, 
p=0.097). This model also suggests that the length of a president’s time in office is 
negatively related to terrorism. Both previous terrorism and the proportion of previous 
presidential communications regarding terrorism are statistically significant predictors of 
presidential communications. 
 
Figure 6.14: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly frequency of 
presidential communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 *, p<0.01 





 When this initial model is amended to examine potential differences between 
domestic and international terrorism similar substantive findings also emerge. As a 
negative relationship is also observed for domestic terrorism (?̂?=-0.023, p<0.001) and 
international terrorism (?̂?=-0.006, p=0.026), this support for the acknowledgement 
hypothesis (1b) does not appear to be an artifact of looking at all terrorism targeting the 
US. When the number of people killed by terrorist attacks is used as the dependent 
variable, the opposite relationship is observed. Regardless of whether the measurement 
for terrorism casualties does (?̂?=0.014, p=0.044) or does not include the September 11th 
attacks (?̂?=0.022, p=0.001), or are log-transformed (excluding September 11th ?̂?=0.012, 
p=0.001; including September 11th ?̂?=0.015, p<0.001), this positive relationship persists. 
This can be seen as conditional support for hypothesis 1a (attention). 
The next set of models examines whether any of the above are driven by either 
written or spoken communications alone. Both written and spoken communications are 
modeled together (denoted by the thickened black arrows), and the primary structural 
equation model that is used to examine this sensitivity test is displayed below in Figure 
6.15. Further supporting the acknowledgement hypothesis (1b), spoken presidential 
communications yield a negative and statistically significant impact on the frequency of 
terrorism in the following month. This impact is not seen to extend to written 
communications however (marked with a dotted line in Figure 6.15).48 In this model and 
in the other sensitivity analyses, the estimate for tenure is statistically null in contrast to 
                                                 
48 The frequency of written and spoken presidential communications are highly correlated with one 
another however (r=0.7406), and when spoken communications are removed from the model, written 





the previous model, which combined all presidential communications into a single 
variable. The frequency of previous terrorism is also found to be positively related to 
spoken communications but not to written communications, further suggesting that 
spoken communications perform differently than written communications. These findings 
persist when the dependent variable includes only domestic terrorist attacks 
(?̂?spoken=0.015, p=0.007; ?̂?written=0.034, p=0.194) or international attacks (?̂?spoken=0.011, 
p=0.021; ?̂?written=0.009, p=0.701). 
 
Figure 6.15: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly frequency of 
spoken and written presidential communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of 
terrorism (p<0.05 *, p<0.01 **, p<0.001 ***) 
 Echoing both sets of previous findings, a positive relationship emerges when the 
number of terrorism casualties is used as the dependent variable, and this relationship is 





attacks are included (?̂?spoken=0.026, p<0.001; ?̂?written=-0.015, p=0.608) or excluded 
(?̂?spoken=0.013, p<0.001; ?̂?written=-0.014, p=0.262) supporting hypothesis 1a (attention).  
 The next set of models examines whether there are any differences between 
communications delivered by presidents and press secretaries (Figure 6.16). Presidential 
communications are negatively associated with to the frequency of terrorism, those by the 
press secretary are null. However, when modeled on its own (r=0.6972) the count of 
terrorism communications from the press secretary is negative and statistically significant 
(?̂?=-0.019, p<0.001). Taken together, these findings are once again in line with the 
acknowledgement hypothesis (1b). These findings are also robust to the location of the 
terrorist attacks, with both domestic (?̂?president=-0.033, p<0.001; ?̂?press secretary=0.006, 
p=0.600) and international attacks (?̂?president=-0.013, p<0.018; ?̂?press secretary=0.001, 






Figure 6.16: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly frequency of 
communications from presidents and press secretaries regarding terrorism on the frequency of 
terrorism (p<0.05 *, p<0.01 **, p<0.001 ***) 
 Separating the count of terrorism communication based on its source also yields 
findings for terrorism casualties that are consistent with the previous models and in 
support of hypothesis 1b (attention). Presidential terrorism communications are positively 
related to terrorist fatalities when the September 11th attacks are included (?̂?=0.029, 
p<0.001) and excluded from the model (?̂?=0.013, p<0.001). Logged communications 
from press secretaries are null when the September 11th attacks are included (?̂?=0.002, 
p=0.870) and excluded from the model (?̂?=0.001, p=0.980). 
 The final set of sensitivity analyses for hypothesis 1 partitions the independent 
variable according to whether or not the communication presented a policy initiative 
(“policy communications”). Figure 6.17 displays the finding from the primary model that 
is used to examine the impact of policy communications on terrorism in the following 
month. Regardless of whether non-policy communications are included in the model or 
not (?̂?=0.021, p=0.251), policy communications are found to be unrelated to the 
frequency of terrorism in the following month. The remaining presidential 
communication however is negatively associated with the frequency of terrorism, in line 
with hypothesis 1b (acknowledgement). These findings are robust to domestic terrorism 
(?̂?policy=0.019, p=0.453; ?̂?not policy=-0.012, p<0.001) and international terrorism (?̂?policy=-






Figure 6.17: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly frequency of 
policy and non-policy communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 
*, p<0.01 **, p<0.001 ***) 
 When logged terrorist fatalities are examined, findings similar to the previous 
models emerge. Policy communications are statistically unrelated to terrorist casualties 
regardless of whether the September 11th attacks are included (?̂?=0.024, p=0.478) or 
excluded from the model (?̂?=-0.005, p=0.694) or whether non-policy communications 
are in the model (?̂?including 9/11=0.023, p=0.478; ?̂?excluding 9/11=-0.006, p=0.694). In all 
models, non-policy communications are positively related to logged terrorist fatalities in 
support of hypothesis 1a (attention) (?̂?including 9/11=0.032, p<0.001; ?̂?excluding 9/11=0.012, 
p<0.001).  
Hypothesis 2 – The Impact of the Sentiment of Terrorism Communications 
  The second hypothesis concerns the sentiment of presidential 





posited that the presidential communications with both positive and negative sentiment 
may either lead to increases or decreases or decreases in subsequent terrorism.49 The first 
set of analyses designed to test hypothesis 2 estimates the impacts of the frequency of 
positive presidential communications and negative communications as separate measures. 
The findings for the primary structural equation model can be seen below in Figure 6.18. 
In support of the sub-hypothesis stemming from restrictive deterrence (2a), this primary 
model detects a negative impact of the frequency of negative presidential terrorism 
communications on the frequency of terrorism in the following month. Unlike the 
previous hypothesis however, within this particular model support for restrictive 
deterrence (2a) does not preclude support for the placation (2c) or display of weakness 
(2d) hypotheses. Despite this flexibility, this initial model does not find support for either 
hypothesis, with a null finding for the impact of the frequency of positive 
communications being observed. 
 Unlike the findings from hypothesis 1, this finding depends on where the terrorist 
attacks occurred. Null findings were observed for domestic US terrorist attacks for both 
the frequency of positive (?̂?=-0.025, p=0.690) and negative (?̂?=-0.014, p=0.743) 
presidential communications. Instead, the above relationship looks to be driven by 
terrorist attacks that were directed at US targets internationally. Again providing support 
solely for restrictive deterrence, the frequency of negative sentiment communications is 
                                                 
49 Hypothesis 2a: Negative speech will be related to decreases in subsequent terrorism (deterrence) 
Hypothesis 2b: Negative speech will be related to increases in subsequent terrorism (backlash) 
Hypothesis 2c: Positive speech will be related to decreases in subsequent terrorism (placation) 





related to decreases in the frequency of terrorism (?̂?=-0.101, p=0.014), while the 
frequency of positive communications yields null impacts (?̂?=0.042, p=0.485). 
 
Figure 6.18: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly frequency of 
positive and negative communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 
*, p<0.01 **, p<0.001 ***) 
 Across all model specifications and measurement strategies, neither the frequency 
of positive communications nor the frequency of negative communications are observed 
to be related to terrorism fatalities. It should be noted however that a positive relationship 
would have been observed for the impact of the frequency of positive communications on 
logged terrorism casualties including (?̂?=0.027, p=0.060) and excluding (?̂?=0.012, 
p=0.064) the events of the September 11th attacks, had a threshold of 0.10 been used. 
Consequently, while this dissertation does not find support for the display of weakness 





 The second measurement strategy that is used to test hypothesis 2 uses the net 
frequency of positive and negative communications, by subtracting the frequency of 
negative presidential communication from the frequency of positive communications in 
each given month. As it can be seen below in Figure 6.19, the net frequency of 
communications is observed to have a positive relationship with the frequency of 
terrorism in the following month. Noting the limitations of this measurement strategy, 
this finding is in line with both the restrictive deterrence (2a) and display of weakness 
(2d) hypotheses, depending on whether the net frequency is low (restrictive deterrence) 
or high (display of weakness). In contrast to the findings that are produced when the 
individual frequencies of positive and negative sentiment communications are observed, 
this relationship is observed only for attacks occurring domestically in the US (?̂?=0.027, 
p=0.002). Although a numerically positive coefficient is observed for non-US attacks 






Figure 6.19: Structural equation model for the relationship between the net sentiment frequency 
of communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 *, p<0.01 **, 
p<0.001 ***) 
 Consistent and robust negative estimates are obtained for the net frequency on 
terrorist casualties in the following month, again suggesting the opposite impacts of 
presidential speech on the incidence terrorism and the deaths resulting from these attacks. 
The impact of the net frequency on terrorist casualties in the following month is negative 
for both logged models (?̂?including 9/11=-0.037, p<0.001; ?̂?excluding 9/11=-0.011, p=0.012) and 
non-logged models (?̂?including 9/11=-3.231, p=0.005; ?̂?excluding 9/11=-0.537, p=0.007). 
Consequently, these collective findings suggest support for the backlash (2b) and 
placation (2c) hypotheses. 
 The next set of models uses the average monthly sentiment score as the measure 
of sentiment. Similarly to the previous set of models, as this uses a single measurement to 
encapsulate both positive and negative sentiment communications the interpretation of 
the findings depends on whether the average sentiment is increasing or decreasing.  
However, it accounts for the actual values of the scores rather than the frequency of 
positive and negative, thus taking all components into account and not just the marginal 
difference. Examining the impact on the frequency of all terrorism targeting the US, a 
null relationship is found for the average monthly sentiment score on terrorism in the 
following month. When this relationship is also examined for US domestic and 
international terrorist attacks targeting the US, null relationships are also observed for all 






Figure 6.20: Structural equation model for the relationship between the monthly average 
sentiment score of communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 *, 
p<0.01 **, p<0.001 ***) 
 Average sentiment score also fails to yield an observable impact on the number of 
people killed by terrorist attacks in the following month for the aggregated measure. This 
is the case for logged terrorism casualties (?̂?including 9/11=0.379, p=0.442; ?̂?excluding 
9/11=0.140, p=0.516), and terrorism casualties (?̂?including 9/11=20.038, p=0.727; ?̂?excluding 
9/11=6.082, p=0.540). When measuring the president and press secretary separately 
however, the average sentiment score from the president yields a positive and statistically 
significant impact on terrorism fatalities in the following month (?̂?including 9/11=1.653, 
p=0.030; ?̂?excluding 9/11=0.752, p=0.025). Null impacts were observed for the press 
secretary (?̂?including 9/11=-0.588, p=0.374; ?̂?excluding 9/11=-0.324, p=0.264). Drawing on all of 
these finding, it thus appears that the average sentiment score provides support only for 





 The final set of models that are used to test hypothesis 2 uses the net sentiment 
values the primary independent variable. As with the previous two measurement 
strategies, it should be noted that this approach is unable to distinguish support for the 
zero-sum hypotheses (restrictive deterrence and display of weakness) from the non-zero-
sum hypotheses (backlash and placation). The primary model used to test the impact of 
this independent variable on the frequency of terrorist attacks in the following month can 
be seen below in Figure 6.21. For all models using the frequency of terrorism, null 
findings are obtained regardless of specification. When the net sentiment value of 
presidential sentiment and press secretary are included in the model, both yield 
numerically positive point estimates that are indistinguishable from zero (?̂?president=0.022, 
p=0.708; ?̂?press secretary=0.051, p=0.185). This pattern is consistent for domestic terrorist 
attacks (?̂?president=0.002, p=0.979; ?̂?press secretary=0.075, p=0.194) and international terrorist 








Figure 6.21: Structural equation model for the relationship between the net sentiment value of 
communications regarding terrorism on the frequency of terrorism (p<0.05 *, p<0.01 **, p<0.001 
***) 
 The net sentiment value is however related to the number of people killed in 
terrorism attacks in the following month when the president and press secretary are 
measured separately, conditionally supporting the non-zero-sum hypotheses (backlash 
and placation). Across models that include (?̂?president=0.346, p=0.001; ?̂?press secretary=-0.272, 
p<0.001) and exclude the September 11th attacks (?̂?president=0.159, p=0.001; ?̂?press secretary=-
0.122, p<0.001), positive estimates are observed for the monthly net presidential 
sentiment while a negative relationship is seen for the monthly sum of press secretary 
sentiment. These divergent findings provide further evidence that the origin of terrorism 
communications if of consequence, with presidents and their press secretaries eliciting 
opposite impacts in this case. As a single measure of presidential communications 
however, the net sentiment value produces null findings for terrorism deaths in the 
following month (?̂?including 9/11=-0.087, p=0.091; ?̂?excluding 9/11=-0.037, p=0.091). 
Concordantly, this measurement strategy suggests that the net sentiment value has a zero-
sum relationship with terrorist fatalities for presidential communications but a non-zero-
sum relationship for press secretaries. 
Hypothesis 3 – Contextual Variation 
 The third hypothesis examines whether the impacts of presidential 
communications on terrorism differ across presidencies.50 To test this hypothesis, each of 
the models presented above are repeated for each president separately to examine the 
                                                 






frequency and sentiment of each presidential administration’s communications on 
terrorism. Due to the volume of primary and sensitivity models required to test this 
hypothesis, only the statistically significant coefficient estimates for the primary 
independent variable(s) are discussed below. As discussed in Chapter 5, the threshold for 
significance for this hypothesis is 0.10 to account for the smaller sample sizes in the 
analyses for this chapter. A table containing the coefficient, standard error, and p-value 
for each structural equation model used to test hypothesis 3 can be found in tables B.1 to 
B.8 in Appendix B. Tables containing the coefficient, standard error, and p-value for 
models that have statistically significant primary independent variables are included in 
this chapter. 
 Beginning with the Nixon administration, the frequency of terrorism 
communications appear to be unrelated to terrorism casualties, domestic, international, or 
all terrorism targeting the US. These null findings are consistent across models that test 
spoken and written communications, communications by the president and press 
secretary, and whether communications introduce policy. When a threshold of 0.10 is 
used however, some statistically significant findings emerge (see Table 6.2 below). 
Communications delivered by Nixon are found to be positively related to domestic 
terrorism in the following month (?̂?=0.658, p=0.082). As 28 structural equation models 
are used to measure the potential relationship between Nixon’s communication and 
terrorism, this finding however is uncompelling. These findings suggest that during the 
Nixon administration terrorism communication are unrelated to terrorism. 
Table 6.2: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 







Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
President Comm Domestic 0.658 0.378 0.082 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.222 0.117 0.057 
Average Sentiment Count -0.939 0.496 0.058 
 Similar null findings are also observed for the four different sentiment measures 
on terrorism under Nixon. Out of the 20 models testing this potential relationship, once 
again, zero produce statistically significant findings (𝛼=0.05). At an alpha of 0.10, the net 
sentiment value has a negative relationship with international terrorism in the following 
month (?̂?=-0.222, p=0.057), and the average monthly sentiment also yields a negative 
impact on the frequency of all terrorism targeting the US (?̂?=-0.939, p=0.058). Taken 
together, these findings suggest an overall null impact of both the frequency and 
sentiment of terrorism communications on terrorism in the following month during 
Nixon’s presidency. 
 Despite Ford’s shorter presidential tenure, a variety of terrorism communications 
are detected to impact terrorism in the following month (Table 6.3). Spoken 
communications by Ford and his press secretary were related to decreases in domestic 
terrorism (?̂?=-0.468, p=0.011) and increases in international terrorism targeting the US in 
the following month (?̂?=0.303, p=0.097). When the source of these communications is 
viewed, Ford’s press secretaries appear to be driving this impact. Ford’s press secretaries 
impact on domestic (?̂?=-0.914, p=0.035) and international terrorism (?̂?=0.691, p=0.007) 
follow this same diverging influence, while Ford’s impact on domestic terrorism runs in 
the opposite direction than that observed for all communications (?̂?=0.202, p=0.092). 





to maintain perception of authority as president domestically (Brinkley, 2007) and that he 
left much of the meaningful counterterrorism actions to other members of the federal 
government (Naftali, 2005). 
Table 6.3: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Ford Administration 
Ford 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Spoken Comm Domestic -0.468 0.183 0.011 
Spoken Comm International  0.303 0.182 0.097 
President Comm Domestic 0.202 0.120 0.092 
PS Comm Domestic -0.914 0.438 0.035 
PS Comm International  0.691 0.255 0.007 
Positive Comm Count International  -0.111 0.061 0.072 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.381 0.190 0.045 
 Similarly to Nixon, the majority of models investigating the impact of the 
sentiment of terrorism communications yield null estimates for Ford. Despite this overall 
trend, both the monthly count of positive communications (?̂?=-0.111, p=0.072) and the 
net sentiment frequency (?̂?=-0.381, p=0.045) elicit a negative influence on international 
terrorism during this period. Although this dissertation once again urges caution in 
interpreting these findings, this pattern of findings suggests that the sentiment of Ford’s 
communications may have had a placating impact on international terrorism targeting the 
US. As this impact was not observed for any models testing the average or net monthly 
sentiment, the quantity and distinction between the sentiment being positive and negative 
appears to have been of greater consequence for international terrorism. 
 Communications regarding terrorism have a more consistent and widely evident 
impact on terrorism in the following month for the Carter administration (see Table 6.4 





terrorism targeting the US generally (?̂?=-0.057, p=0.029) and internationally (?̂?=-0.090, 
p=0.031). Sensitivity analyses to investigate whether the medium of the communication 
matters also yield identical substantive findings for spoken communications on terrorism 
generally (?̂?=-0.040, p=0.053) and international terrorism (?̂?=-0.082, p=0.012). Like 
Ford, Carter’s press secretaries’ communications also impact international terrorism, 
however this relationship was negative (?̂?=-0.224, p=0.006) and in line with the 
acknowledgement hypothesis (1b). The frequency of President Carter’s terrorism 
communications is also connected to reductions in all terrorism (?̂?=-0.050, p=0.054) and 
international terrorism (?̂?=-0.076, p=0.048) in further evidence of the acknowledgement 
hypothesis (1b). Although policy communications did not produce a measurable impact, 
similarly to all models measuring terrorist casualties, all models with statistically 
significant findings suggest that the frequency of terrorism communications under the 
Carter administration were linked with reductions in terrorism. 
Table 6.4: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Carter Administration 
Carter 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.057 0.026 0.029 
Comm Count International  -0.090 0.037 0.031 
Spoken Comm Count -0.040 0.021 0.053 
Spoken Comm International  -0.082 0.032 0.012 
President Comm Count -0.050 0.026 0.054 
President Comm International  -0.076 0.038 0.048 
PS Comm International  -0.224 0.082 0.006 
Positive Comm Count International  0.054 0.025 0.031 
Average Sentiment Count 1.088 0.498 0.029 
Average Sentiment Domestic 1.957 0.563 0.001 
Net Sentiment Value Count 0.292 0.170 0.088 





 Conversely and in line with the overall findings from hypothesis 2, the sentiment 
of Carter’s public communication concerning terrorism produce positive impacts on 
terrorism supporting the restrictive deterrence and display of weakness hypotheses. Both 
the monthly average sentiment (?̂?=1.088, p=0.029 for all terrorism; ?̂?=1.957, p=0.001 for 
domestic terrorism) and the net sentiment value (?̂?=0.292, p=0.088 for all terrorism; 
?̂?=0.545, p=0.004 for domestic terrorism) suggest positive impacts on terrorism overall 
and domestic terrorism. These findings suggest that the relative sentiment level rather 
than the positive/negative distinction is more meaningful for Carter than for Ford, 
displaying key patterned differences between presidencies. 
 The frequency of terrorism communications for Reagan produces findings 
conditionally supporting both acknowledgement and attention hypotheses (Table 6.5). 
Supporting the acknowledgement hypothesis, the monthly frequency of terrorism 
communications produces a negative impact on terrorism in the following month (?̂?=-
0.048, p=0.035). Sensitivity analyses suggest that this influence is limited to spoken 
communications on domestic terrorism (?̂?=-0.073, p=0.014) and communications 
delivered by Reagan’s press secretaries (?̂?=-0.109, p=0.029). For Reagan, who waged the 
first “war on terrorism,” non-policy communications increase the frequency of terrorism 
in the following month (?̂?=0.028, p=0.065), international terrorism (?̂?=0.058, p=0.003), 
and for the first time the number of terrorism casualties (?̂?=0.087, p=0.048). Policy 
communications also increase terrorism casualties in the following month under Reagan 
(?̂?=0.291, p=0.031) in accordance with the attention hypothesis that was politically 





Table 6.5: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Reagan Administration 
Reagan 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Domestic -0.048 0.023 0.035 
Spoken Comm Domestic -0.073 0.030 0.014 
PS Comm Domestic -0.109 0.050 0.029 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.028 0.015 0.065 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.058 0.020 0.003 
Policy Comm Casualties 0.291 0.132 0.031 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.087 0.043 0.048 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.029 0.016 0.059 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.048 0.021 0.021 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic 0.022 0.129 0.088 
 The influence of sentiment exhibits similar impacts for the Reagan administration 
to the previously discussed findings for the Ford administration. The monthly frequency 
of both positive and negative communications are unrelated to any type of terrorism or 
terrorism casualties under the Reagan presidency. The net sentiment frequency does 
however produce negative estimates for the monthly count of terrorism (?̂?=-0.029, 
p=0.059) and international terrorism (?̂?=-0.048, p=0.021), supporting the backlash and 
placation hypotheses. Some support for the restrictive deterrence and display of 
weakness hypotheses is also observed under Reagan, however this is limited to the net 
sentiment value on domestic terrorism. 
 As suggested by the discussion in Chapter 4, the impact of terrorism 
communications shares numerous similarities for Bush I compared to the Reagan 
administration. The frequency of spoken communications has a negative impact on both 
overall terrorism (?̂?=-0.093, p=0.035) and international terrorism (?̂?=-0.116, p=0.032) in 
the following month under during the Bush I’s tenure (see Table 6.6 below). This 





impact was in line the acknowledgement hypothesis. Communications from the press 
secretary are also yield observable influences on the count of terrorism (?̂?=-0.131, 
p=0.057), international terrorism (?̂?=-0.159, p=0.060), and terrorism casualties under 
Bush I (?̂?=-0.274, p=0.006), with Bush I’s communications only linking to reductions in 
the overall count of terrorism (?̂?=-0.094, p=0.087). As with Reagan however the 
frequency of non-policy communications have positive impacts on the count of terrorism 
(?̂?=0.071, p=0.066) and international terrorism (?̂?=0.088, p=0.061) in the following 
month in partial support of the attention hypothesis. 
Table 6.6: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Bush I Administration 
Bush I 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Spoken Comm Count -0.093 0.044 0.035 
Spoken Comm International  -0.116 0.054 0.032 
Spoken Comm Casualties -0.147 0.066 0.033 
President Comm Count -0.094 0.055 0.087 
PS Comm Count -0.131 0.069 0.057 
President Comm International  -0.120 0.068 0.080 
PS Comm International  -0.159 0.085 0.060 
PS Comm Casualties -0.274 0.094 0.006 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.071 0.039 0.066 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.088 0.047 0.061 
 Regardless of the measure of independent or dependent variable, sentiment is 
unrelated to terrorism and terrorism casualties for the Bush I administration (see Table 
B.5 in Appendix B). This marks the only presidency where this is the case, and these null 
findings are evident using any traditional statistical threshold. 
 In stark contrast, the frequency of communications yields virtually no observable 
impacts on terrorism for the Clinton administration (see Table B.6 in Appendix B). The 





reductions in terrorism casualties providing limit and specific support for the 
acknowledgement hypothesis (?̂?=-0.176, p=0.034) (Table 6.7). Similarly, the vast 
majority of sentiment measures also produce null findings for terrorism during Clinton’s 
tenure. However, robust and large magnitude impacts are observed for the average 
monthly sentiment. Average monthly sentiment is linked to reductions in total terrorism 
(?̂?=-2.807, p=0.003), domestic terrorism (?̂?=-3.248, p=0.029), and international during 
this period (?̂?=-2.232, p=0.090). 
Table 6.7: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Clinton Administration 
Clinton 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Written Comm Casualties -0.176 0.082 0.034 
Average Sentiment Count -2.807 0.947 0.003 
Average Sentiment Domestic -3.248 1.488 0.029 
Average Sentiment International  -2.232 1.315 0.090 
 For the Bush II presidency, the frequency of terrorism communications produces 
a number of findings consistent with the attention hypothesis. Spoken communications 
(?̂?=0.009, p=0.078) and communications from the President (?̂?=0.015, p=0.088) both 
increase terrorism in the following month during the Bush II administration. Given the 
important terrorism legislation that was introduced under Bush II, policy communications 
are also observed to have meaningful and consistent impacts on terrorism in the 
following month. These models suggest that policy communications are associated with 
increases in the overall frequency of terrorism (?̂?=0.114, p=0.017), domestic terrorism 
(?̂?=0.186, p=0.030), and international terrorism (?̂?=0.096, p=0.076). When the impacts 
of the sentiment of terrorism communications are observed for the Bush II presidency, 





however was positive for the negative communication count (?̂?=0.041, p=0.012), but 
positive for the net sentiment frequency (?̂?=-0.017, p=0.084) and the net sentiment value 
(?̂?=-0.092, p=0.064) producing inconsistent findings for both sets of hypotheses. 
Table 6.8: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Bush II Administration 
Bush II 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Spoken Comm Count 0.009 0.005 0.078 
President Comm Count 0.015 0.009 0.088 
Policy Comm Count 0.114 0.047 0.017 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.012 0.004 0.004 
Policy Comm Domestic 0.186 0.086 0.030 
Policy Comm International  0.096 0.054 0.076 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic 0.015 0.007 0.032 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.009 0.005 0.064 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.024 0.009 0.010 
Negative Comm Count International  0.041 0.016 0.012 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.017 0.010 0.084 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.092 0.050 0.064 
 Similar to Bush II, the Obama presidency also yields findings from the frequency 
variables in line with the attention hypothesis and mixed findings from the sentiment 
models. For the first time, written communications are seen to increase overall terrorism 
(?̂?=0.075, p=0.056) and domestic terrorism (?̂?=0.107, p=0.099), and non-policy 
communication increase terrorism in the following month as well (?̂?=0.015, p=0.085). 
Both the average sentiment and net sentiment value are observed to decrease domestic 
terrorism (backlash and placation) but to increase international terrorism (restrictive 
deterrence and display of weakness). These divergent but consistent findings further 
suggest that for some presidents, terrorism communications may yield impacts that 





Table 6.9: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the statistically significant 
primary relationships for the Obama Administration 
Obama 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Written Comm Count 0.075 0.039 0.056 
Written Comm Domestic 0.107 0.065 0.099 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.015 0.009 0.085 
Average Sentiment Domestic -3.952 1.839 0.032 
Average Sentiment International  2.639 1.195 0.027 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic -0.281 0.116 0.016 
Net Sentiment Value International  0.161 0.077 0.037 
Hypothesis 4 – Public Approval Moderating the Impact of Presidential Communications 
The final hypothesis that this dissertation examines is whether a president’s public 
approval rating moderates the impact of the frequency of terrorism communications on 
terrorism in the following month. Beginning with examining whether having above 
average approval rating (approval rating greater than 50.666) changes the impact a 
president’s communications, Table 6.10 lists for each dependent variable the coefficient 
estimates for each main effect and the interaction, their standard errors and p-values.  
Significant estimates (p<0.05) are bolded for ease of interpretation. Consistent with the 
tests performed in hypothesis 1, the communication has a negative relationship with the 
frequency of all terrorism targeting the US in the following month after including above 
average approval rating in the model (?̂?=-0.018, p<0.001). The estimate for the 
interaction between the frequency of communications and above average approval rating 
is positive and statistically significant (?̂?=0.012, p=0.003). This suggests that the 
decrease in terrorism following months with more communication is offset when the 
president’s favorability rating is higher than average. This finding appears to be driven by 
domestic terrorism, as the impacts of this interaction on domestic terrorism is also 





findings, terrorist casualties are observed to have the opposite relationship with 
presidential communications, with a negative and statistically significant impact. 
Consequently, an above average approval rating appears to reduce the magnitude of the 
impact of public communications on terrorist fatalities. 
Table 6.10: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for the impact of higher than average 
approval rating, communication count and the interaction between higher than average approval 
and communication count 
 Coefficient Standard Error P-Value 
All Terrorism    
Above Approval -0.050 0.068 0.459 
Communication Count -0.018 0.003 <0.001 
Interaction 0.012 0.004 0.003 
Domestic Terrorism    
Above Approval -0.081 0.095 0.393 
Communication Count -0.041 0.006 <0.001 
Interaction 0.035 0.007 <0.001 
International Terrorism   
Above Approval -0.110 0.092 0.230 
Communication Count -0.010 0.004 0.017 
Interaction 0.003 0.005 0.626 
Terrorism Casualties    
Above Approval -0.055 0.127 0.667 
Communication Count 0.031 0.006 <0.001 
Interaction -0.018 0.007 0.013 
In order to examine whether particularly unpopular and popular presidents’ 
communications yield different impacts, interactions that measure presidents with 
approval ratings in the lowest (approval <36) and highest quartile (approval >58.633) are 
also used. As above, international terrorism targeting US interests is not impacted 
differentially by terrorism communications by presidents with lower or higher approval 
ratings. Indeed, this null relationship persists when the lowest and highest deciles were 
examined. Presidential communications from presidents with approval rating in the 





negative main effect and interaction estimates. Communications from these less popular 
presidents also yielded greater increases in terrorist casualties however, with positive 
main effect and interaction estimates emerging. The presidents with the highest approval 
ratings yield very little impact on domestic terrorism in the following month however as 
the findings show the positive interaction offsets the negative main effect. In addition, 
communications from presidents with approval ratings in the highest quartile are not 
observed to have any differential impact on terrorist fatalities. 
Table 6.11: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for the impact of low and high 
approval rating, communication count and the interaction between low and high approval and 
communication count 
  Lowest 25% Approval Highest 25% Approval 
  Coefficient Std. Error P-Value Coefficient Std. Error P-Value 
All Terrorism       
Low/High Approval 0.019 0.079     0.813 -0.058 0.076 0.447 
Communication Count -0.009 0.002   <0.001 -0.015 0.003 0.000 
Interaction -0.006 0.005 0.220 0.010 0.004 0.023 
Domestic Terrorism       
Low/High Approval 0.093 0.113 0.415 -0.165 0.108 0.127 
Communication Count -0.010 0.004 0.005 -0.029 0.004 <0.001 
Interaction -0.041 0.009 <0.001 0.028 0.006 <0.001 
International Terrorism      
Low/High Approval 0.024 0.105 0.820 -0.027 0.103 0.790 
Communication Count -0.011 0.003 0.001 -0.008 0.003 0.016 
Interaction 0.008 0.006 0.182 0.000 0.006 0.964 
Terrorism Casualties       
Low/High Approval 0.073 0.147 0.618 -0.117 0.142 0.409 
Communication Count           0.015 0.004 0.001 0.024 0.005 <0.001 
Interaction 0.023 0.008 0.006 -0.009 0.008 0.258 
 
Summary of Findings 
This dissertation sought to examine whether presidential terrorism 
communications between 1970 and 2014 influenced the incidence of terrorism targeting 





hypothesized that these communications and the sentiments expressed therein had the 
potential to influence subsequent terrorism. Beginning with the first hypothesis 
concerning the frequency of terrorism communications, consistent support was found for 
both the attention hypothesis (1a) and the acknowledgement hypothesis (1b) across all 
four ways of partitioning the primary independent variable (total frequency, delivery 
method, source, and content). Across all four sets of analyses and their sensitivity 
models, spoken communications, communications from the president himself, and non-
policy communications were negatively related to the incidence of terrorism 
(acknowledgement), but positively related to terrorist fatalities (attention). These findings 
are robust across whether examining domestic or international terrorism targeting the US 
and whether the casualty count of the September 11th attacks is included. Taken together, 
these findings suggest that while there are counterterrorism benefits for publicly 
discussing terrorism, presidents should exercise caution, as the attacks committed in the 
following month tend to be more lethal. 
The sentiment of presidential terrorism communications also emerged as an 
empirically important dimension. The frequency of communications that were negative in 
tone was related to decreases in terrorism in the following month, but was unrelated to 
terrorist casualties. The frequency of positive communications, on the other hand, was 
found to be marginally related increases in terrorism, highlighting that the sentiment of 
terrorism communications is an important characteristic that may yield different terrorist 
responses. Models that measured the net frequency sentiment also produced findings 
consistent with restrictive deterrence. Although this approach was unable to strictly 





the majority of months had a negative net frequency sentiment, this dissertation interprets 
this finding as support for restrictive deterrence. In light of null findings emerging for the 
average monthly sentiment and the net sentiment score however, this dissertation 
cautions that communication strategies that focus on conveying more extreme negative 
sentiment are unlikely to influence terrorism. Instead, as the distinction between positive 
and negative sentiment appears to be the more meaningful threshold, communications 
that are negative but more neutral in sentiment appear to be the most empirically 
supported counterterrorism strategy for the 45-year period examined. 
Echoing much of the qualitative literature discussed in Chapter 4, this dissertation 
also found meaningful differences for the impact of presidential terrorism 
communications on terrorism across presidential administrations. In line with the low 
prominence that the Nixon administration placed on terrorism, the previous analyses 
consistently produced null findings for nearly all measurement strategies to test 
hypotheses 1 and 2. Indeed, it wasn’t until the Carter administration that consistent 
impacts for communications on terrorism emerged. In addition, different communication 
aspects were more influential within some presidencies. For George H. W. Bush, who 
continued much of Reagan’s communication strategies and techniques, the sentiment of 
his communications was unrelated to terrorism and terrorist casualties in all models. 
Conversely for Clinton, who greatly increased the frequency of counterterrorism 
communications from his predecessors, only his average sentiment score was observed to 
influence terrorism. Consequently, despite the overall findings produced in testing 





heterogeneity in the impact of terrorism communications across presidential 
administrations. 
The last hypothesis examined by this dissertation examined whether the impact of 
terrorism communication was moderated by presidential approval ratings. As predicted, 
public communications were observed to have statistically distinguishable impacts on 
terrorism for presidents who had approval ratings in the lowest quartile for the period 
examined. However, these findings suggest that less popular presidents diminished the 
incidence of terrorism in the following month more than more popular presidents. While 
presidents with public approval ratings that are significantly higher or lower than average 
are also more likely to adopt unpopular policy positions (Canes-Wrone and Shotts, 2004), 







Chapter 7:  Discussion and Conclusions 
This final chapter discusses the findings and conclusions regarding the 
relationship between presidential communication and subsequent terrorism targeting the 
US. The chapter begins by discussing the results for each of the hypotheses. This is 
followed by a discussion of the limitations inherent in the analyses and a discussion of 
future research prompted by the work undertaken here. This chapter concludes with a 
summary of potential policy and theoretical implications stemming from these findings. 
Discussion of Findings 
 As predicted, presidential communications concerning terrorism were observed to 
impact terrorism targeting the US in the following month. This suggests that when US 
presidents console the public, express resolve in terrorist conflicts, and project deterrent 
messages that terrorist groups are also influenced by these statements. This influence is 
complicated however, and the results of this dissertation suggest that great care should be 
taken in crafting communications concerning terrorism. While generally presidential 
communications were found to be related to reductions in the incidence of terrorism, they 
were also observed to increase fatalities from these attacks. This may indicate that in light 
of the political prominence provided by presidents that terrorist groups may focus their 
resources on fewer but more lethal attacks to maximize their impact. Why this is the case 
can only be speculated.  Perhaps terror groups are emboldened, or perhaps they are 
desperate. These larger scale more lethal attacks could actually harm the political support 
for terrorist organizations, rather than drawing a larger constituency, and potentially 





Regardless of the longer-term outcomes for terrorist organizations, this connection to 
increases in terrorist casualties necessitates that US presidents should carefully consider 
whether they should use public communications to discuss terrorism to avoid potentially 
inciting lethal violence. Stemming from these findings, presidential communications are 
meaningful to terrorist organizations and there is empirical reason to believe that even 
flippant presidential comments in a public forum may lead to more US deaths from 
terrorism. 
 The sentiment of terrorism communications was also observed to be meaningful 
for terrorist behavior. Indeed, the numerous tests conducted for this dissertation suggest 
that when presidents communicate more harshly are related to reductions in terrorism. 
These findings do not indicate that presidents should campaign heavily against terrorist 
organizations. The findings instead suggest that such strategies would likely produce null 
impacts on the incidence of terrorism but increase terrorist casualties, particularly if the 
press secretary employs this strategy. These findings exhibit that presidents and their 
press secretaries should carefully consider the tone of their terrorism communications 
before responding or not responding to terrorist events. While there may be political 
capital to be gained by responding with vitriol, this could do little more than spur terrorist 
organizations to increase levels of destructive violence. 
 After observing that the impact of presidential communications varied 
meaningfully across administrations, this dissertation also suggests that future presidents 
be mindful of their communications and not employ a “one-size-fits-all” approach to 





frequency of spoken terrorism communications by George H. W. Bush appeared to 
decreased terrorism, while the data show that more attacks were perpetrated against the 
US after George W. Bush spoke about terrorism. As such, even though some strategies 
showed promise in reducing terrorism less than a decade earlier, this is no guarantee that 
any effects will persist. Further, consecutive presidents were observed to have different 
elements of their communications impact terrorism. In the late 1980s early 1990s, the 
sentiment of President Bush’s language seemed ineffectual, yet later in the 1990s, 
Clinton’s average sentiment appeared to strongly affect terrorism. While this may be a 
function of his highly loquacious nature that diminished the impact of any single 
message, these findings demonstrate that presidents need to be aware that what they say 
could elicit qualitatively different terrorist responses to their predecessor. As such, this 
dissertation strongly recommends that presidents and their press secretaries monitor the 
impacts of the communications that are delivered, in order to identify the need to change 
strategies if the terrorist response alters over time. 
This administration dependent impact was particularly evident for policy 
communications. While policy communications yielded null findings for the full time 
period examined and for every other president,51 they were consistently positively related 
to the incidence of both domestic and international terrorism in the following month for 
George W. Bush. This suggests that the political exposure given to written 
communications including the PATRIOT Act following the September 11th attacks on 
average were related to increases in terrorism in the following month. One of the 
                                                 
51 The sole exception to this was for the Reagan administration where policy communications were related 





strengths of this dissertation was that the data used were able to detect the political 
attention given to these policies. As non-controversial policies need little discussion, 
months with a higher volume of policy communications demonstrate increased attention 
that could mobilize backlash responses. As these political messages may elicit reactions 
before or after policy introduction, this measurement strategy is thus qualitatively 
different from the implementation of the policies being discussed. These findings do not 
however suggest that presidents should avoid publicly announcing counterterrorism 
policies. Firstly, as noted in Chapter 2, the communication of policies is essential for 
policies that aim to deter terrorism. In addition, these increases in terrorism in the 
following month do not preclude longer-term terrorism reductions. Although a lag of 
month was selected for the present analyses, clearly future research should assess the 
longer term impacts of these prominent policy communications is an important avenue 
for future research. 
 Even within a presidency, the effects of communications can change. When 
presidents were especially popular their ability to reduce terrorism through speech was 
less effective than it was for less popular presidents.  When presidents were especially 
popular their ability to reduce terrorism through speech was less effective than it was for 
less popular presidents. In fact, this ‘unpopular president effect’ was opposite 
expectation. One reason for this may be that legitimate political channels appear more 
viable at these times for terrorist organizations, providing alternative political avenues for 
resolving conflicts. This does not mean however that less favored presidents can discuss 
terrorism with impunity, as terrorist casualties were also observed to increased for those 





unpopular presidents may inadvertently increase the justifications for lethal violence, 
particularly within the US. 
Limitations 
While this research has direct policy implications for governments, along with the 
potential to generate insights relevant to the fields of criminology and communications, it 
also has a number of notable limitations. The US context was determined to be 
advantageous due to the availability of data and questions as to whether presidential 
speech is able to elicit changes in the attitudes or actions of individuals. However the US 
has a unique global influence (Erjavec and Volčič, 2006; Kellner, 2005; Osuri and 
Banerjee, 2004), making the aforementioned findings ungeneralizable to other nations. 
Further, the dissimilarities across presidential administrations limits the generalizability 
to presidents beyond 2014. As such, continuing these investigations for future 
presidencies is vital. 
The dataset that was compiled for this dissertation also excludes a number of key 
variables that would need to be accounted for in an ideal model. Such variables include 
overt and covert counterterrorism actions, developments in technology assisting or 
impeding counterterrorism efforts, attrition of terrorist group membership, and host of 
other strategic variables. Consequently, it should be noted that this dissertation is unable 
to rule out rival hypotheses related to other counterterrorism strategies, or to exclude the 
possibility that the previously highlighted findings are likely biased due to the omission 





A related limitation is that this dissertation excludes public communications 
delivered by other US federal government actors who play a key role in counterterrorism, 
such as the Secretary of State. In light of robust impacts being observed from Ford’s 
press secretaries, there is now an empirical justification to investigate whether other key 
counterterrorism officials beyond the president are also able to impact terrorism 
especially when the president appears ineffectual. Further, this dissertation also did not 
investigate the impact of public media accounts or influence which is also a topic worthy 
of greater empirical investigation.  
It should also be noted that the data for the primary independent variable 
measures the transmission of presidential communications but does not capture their 
reception by potential terrorists and other key stakeholders. Particularly in cases where 
null findings were observed, the previous analyses are unable to distinguish whether 
these findings are product of these messages not impacting terrorist behavior or whether 
they were systematically not received. The potential for non-exposure may be especially 
problematic in these models, and may be responsible for the null impacts observed for 
written communications on international terrorism. Especially for terrorist organizations 
that do not use English as their primary language, these translation issues are not trivial, 
and present an important avenue for future research. 
It should finally be noted that the data used for this dissertation were also unable 
to test or to identify the mechanisms that connect presidential communications to terrorist 
decision-making and terrorist attacks. Consequently, while many of the findings were 
taken to be evidence of restrictive deterrence, this dissertation cannot make any 





analyzing individual-level data to better understand the motivations for terrorism remain 
an important priority for criminology and other related disciplines. Particularly in cases 
the identity of the perpetrator is unknown, this renders the previous analyses unable to 
distinguish between different types of deterrence. Thus, while it was argued previously 
that the most restrictive deterrence was the most likely process driving the findings that 
were observed, under certain circumstances it is possible that these findings may also be 
the product of absolute deterrence (see Dugan, Huang, LaFree, and McCauley, 2008). 
Concordantly, while the overall findings do generally support the restrictive deterrence 
hypothesis, more tailored research designs are required to better isolate this perspective 
from other deterrence perspectives. 
Policy and Theoretical Implications 
Despite these limitations, the findings from this dissertation have merit for 
governments and scholars concerned with counterterrorism. Its major contributions are 
threefold. Firstly, terrorist organizations do, indeed, appear to be cognizant of public 
communications delivered by US presidents. This suggests that what presidents say have 
consequences beyond shifting their popularity and political capital and can influence the 
decisions made by terrorists. 
Secondly, the specific findings generated from this study can be used to refine and 
target the messaging strategies used by the US president and other political entities, in 
order to reduce the impetus for terrorism. The messaging strategies by presidents and 
other political entities should be deliberate, as the findings suggest that talking about 
terrorism might reduce the number of attacks, but it could also inspire more lethal attacks 





particularly when government policies are inconsistent this may drive increased violence 
will minimizing non-violent actions of dissent (see Lichbach, 1987). In light of the 
finding that high-profile policy communications under the Bush II administration were 
related to increases in terrorist violence, counterterrorism and policing agencies should 
also be on increased alert after presidents discuss terrorism in their rhetoric for possible 
high impact attacks. Taken together these findings suggest that the majority of policy 
announcement communications yield negligible impacts on terrorism, however when 
these statements preset large shifts in policy or are controversial, even traditionally 
inconspicuous communication types can influence the incidence of terrorism. 
These observations also raise the importance of exploring other forms of 
contextual variation. Beyond the topic and contents of the words being delivered, the 
delivery of these communications may also be an important element that may drive 
variation in terrorism. Particularly for verbal communications, whether a speech is 
delivered behind a podium at the White House, in front of the General Assembly at 
United Nations, or from a the site of a previous terrorist attack may have important 
political or symbolic implications. The political significance of these locations may thus 
also add or detract from the gravity of the messages being conveyed, moderating the 
impact on terrorism. 
Finally, the aforementioned findings yield important insights for criminology, 
political science, and communications research. Beyond demonstrating that 
communications is a viable strategy to counter the use of political violence, these findings 
also provide substantial, yet nuanced, support for the restrictive deterrence perspective. 





different elements of communications during different temporal periods. As such, 
although the acknowledgement and restrictive deterrence hypotheses were the most 
consistently supported perspectives in these data, there were periods where both the 
frequency (under Clinton) and the sentiment (under George W. Bush) of terrorist 
communications had no observable impact on terrorism in the following month. 
Conclusions 
Presidential communications were consistently related to reductions in terrorism 
targeting the US in the following month. Their impact however was dependent on the 
person delivering these messages, the medium of delivery, whether they introduced 
policy, and the sentiment being conveyed. Presidential communications are thus more 
than hollow rhetoric, and its elements were observed to elicit both increases and 
decreases in terrorism. Further, the findings repeatedly demonstrated that speech can lead 
to more terrorist fatalities. In light of these important consequences, presidents and their 
press secretaries should carefully construct their responses to terrorism, and potentially 
consider responding with silence in certain instances, to avoid raising the perceived 
benefits for lethal terrorist violence. Although subsequent research is required to better 
situate and understand these findings, this dissertation provides empirical support that 
public communications may be used as a relatively inexpensive, readily available, and 






Table A.1 below displays the 20 most frequently used words from the upper 
and lower sentiment score deciles. 
Table A.1: The 20 most frequently used words conveying sentiment from the 10% least 
positive and the 10% most positive communications (words appearing in the most frequently 
used 100 words in both the upper and lower deciles in italics) 
 Highest 10% Sentiment Lowest 10% Sentiment 
Rank Word Count Word Count 
1 support 926 just 3475 
2 new 815 know 3442 
3 cooperation 772 now 2840 
4 work 749 get 2757 
5 efforts 702 make 2336 
6 including 655 question 2120 
7 peace 653 want 2113 
8 well 650 made 2040 
9 continue 525 take 1882 
10 commitment 485 like 1799 
11 together 481 issues 1792 
12 important 480 work 1698 
13 health 474 back 1606 
14 time 435 let 1589 
15 information 434 see 1558 
16 thank 433 need 1522 
17 energy 421 important 1517 
18 global 420 new 1508 
19 help 408 issue 1473 
20 great 407 look 1470 
21 years 398 information 1434 
22 forward 386 process 1430 
23 partnership 386 support 1426 




25 act 383 something 1325 
26 make 377 believe 1306 
27 human 376 forward 1295 
28 must 371 point 1292 
29 free 363 many 1220 
30 region 362 clear 1216 
31 good 359 come 1191 
32 need 356 done 1171 
33 house 354 fact 1167 
34 think 351 part 1157 
35 agreed 349 may 1141 
36 program 346 peace 1127 
37 freedom 345 put 1119 
38 strengthen 343 mean 1112 
39 community 342 good 1100 
40 made 335 lot 1068 
41 meeting 331 talk 1064 
42 critical 327 much 1054 
43 strong 326 sure 1046 
44 now 318 working 1029 
45 progress 318 whether 1021 
46 going 316 act 1019 
47 growth 315 help 949 
48 public 314 still 906 
49 welcome 314 even 888 
50 just 313 action 883 
51 common 311 every 875 
52 general 309 prime 868 
53 agreement 308 give 861 
54 opportunity 300 case 850 
55 foreign 298 anything 843 
56 executive 295 kind 840 
57 provide 292 long 827 
58 regional 289 thank 797 




60 future 288 obviously 791 
61 want 284 making 785 
62 ensure 282 together 784 
63 know 279 problem 782 
64 many 279 position 753 
65 rights 279 around 743 
66 bilateral 274 talked 740 
67 political 274 next 738 
68 assistance 273 tell 728 
69 programs 272 terms 726 
70 economy 271 ask 725 
71 last 269 seen 724 
72 way 268 including 716 
73 promote 267 might 715 
74 may 263 efforts 698 
75 importance 261 taken 698 
76 process 261 try 698 
77 investment 260 really 693 
78 million 260 matter 680 
79 much 259 use 676 
80 policy 259 asked 673 
81 shared 254 deal 673 
82 threat 251 since 673 
83 democratic 249 end 670 
84 forces 248 political 666 
85 within 248 must 665 
86 prosperity 247 program 663 
87 relationship 244 justice 660 
88 visit 244 able 653 
89 service 242 understand 650 
90 like 240 different 646 
91 committed 239 move 634 
92 long 228 answer 628 
93 based 226 getting 628 




95 improve 226 certainly 615 
96 issues 224 course 612 
97 private 224 future 611 
98 relations 224 specific 611 
99 plan 222 order 610 







 This appendix provides the coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each 
of the primary relationships examined to test hypothesis 3. All models where the 
primary independent variable of interest was statistically significant are indicated 
with bolded font (𝛼=0.05) or bolded and italicized font (𝛼=0.10). The full output for 
all models is available upon request. Estimates pertaining to the models with 
measures of sentiment are presented below the horizontal line located in each of the 
eight tables below (B.1-B.8). 
Table B.1: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Nixon Administration 
Nixon 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.031 0.072 0.668 
Comm Count Domestic -0.030 0.087 0.734 
Comm Count International  -0.028 0.100 0.777 
Comm Count Casualties 0.002 0.130 0.988 
Written Comm Count 0.119 0.146 0.415 
Spoken Comm Count 0.122 0.118 0.301 
Written Comm Domestic 0.091 0.176 0.606 
Written Comm International  0.178 0.200 0.372 
Spoken Comm Domestic 0.119 0.140 0.394 
Spoken Comm International  0.182 0.150 0.224 
Written Comm Casualties -0.129 0.265 0.627 
Spoken Comm Casualties -0.134 0.220 0.543 
President Comm Count 0.068 0.083 0.414 
PS Comm Count 0.478 0.320 0.136 
President Comm Domestic 0.658 0.378 0.082 
President Comm International  0.183 0.444 0.680 
PS Comm Domestic 0.045 0.098 0.648 
PS Comm International  0.137 0.107 0.203 
President Comm Casualties -0.104 0.154 0.500 
PS Comm Casualties -0.078 0.599 0.896 
Policy Comm Count 0.174 0.147 0.235 
Non-Policy Comm Count -0.022 0.081 0.786 
Policy Comm Domestic 0.128 0.174 0.462 
Policy Comm International  0.208 0.203 0.305 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic 0.046 0.095 0.627 




Policy Comm Casualties -0.144 0.099 0.158 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties -0.135 0.141 0.343 
Positive Comm Count Count -0.193 0.224 0.388 
Negative Comm Count Count 0.152 0.094 0.106 
Positive Comm Count Domestic -0.414 0.287 0.150 
Negative Comm Count Domestic 0.181 0.116 0.120 
Positive Comm Count International  -0.034 0.293 0.907 
Negative Comm Count International  0.171 0.116 0.140 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.134 0.353 0.706 
Negative Comm Count Casualties -0.195 0.155 0.215 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.081 0.091 0.373 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic -0.016 0.105 0.883 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.222 0.117 0.057 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties 0.173 0.159 0.284 
Average Sentiment Count -0.939 0.496 0.058 
Average Sentiment Domestic -0.865 0.620 0.163 
Average Sentiment International  -0.816 0.628 0.194 
Average Sentiment Casualties 0.424 0.916 0.646 
Net Sentiment Value Count -0.616 0.478 0.198 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic -0.353 0.608 0.562 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.758 0.599 0.206 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties 0.845 0.872 0.338 
Table B.2: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Ford Administration 
Ford 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.035 0.080 0.665 
Comm Count Domestic -0.035 0.124 0.778 
Comm Count International  0.011 0.139 0.935 
Comm Count Casualties 0.002 0.210 0.994 
Written Comm Count -0.101 0.142 0.475 
Spoken Comm Count -0.100 0.003 0.396 
Written Comm Domestic -0.319 0.220 0.146 
Written Comm International  0.210 0.238 0.378 
Spoken Comm Domestic -0.468 0.183 0.011 
Spoken Comm International  0.303 0.182 0.097 
Written Comm Casualties -0.412 0.339 0.241 
Spoken Comm Casualties -0.305 0.296 0.317 
President Comm Count -0.111 0.079 0.163 
PS Comm Count 0.169 0.192 0.378 
President Comm Domestic 0.202 0.120 0.092 
President Comm International  0.050 0.139 0.717 
PS Comm Domestic -0.914 0.438 0.035 
PS Comm International  0.691 0.255 0.007 




PS Comm Casualties 0.410 0.542 0.459 
Policy Comm Count -0.139 0.184 0.451 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.044 0.101 0.661 
Policy Comm Domestic -0.114 0.296 0.701 
Policy Comm International  -0.163 0.310 0.599 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic -0.102 0.153 0.507 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.281 0.174 0.108 
Policy Comm Casualties -0.448 0.456 0.339 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties -0.276 0.245 0.274 
Positive Comm Count Count -0.017 0.036 0.632 
Negative Comm Count Count 0.009 0.012 0.454 
Positive Comm Count Domestic 0.040 0.056 0.470 
Negative Comm Count Domestic 0.015 0.019 0.441 
Positive Comm Count International  -0.111 0.061 0.072 
Negative Comm Count International  0.003 0.020 0.874 
Positive Comm Count Casualties -0.118 0.088 0.201 
Negative Comm Count Casualties 0.029 0.030 0.337 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.092 0.115 0.426 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic 0.093 0.180 0.605 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.381 0.190 0.045 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.030 0.306 0.923 
Average Sentiment Count -0.249 0.768 0.746 
Average Sentiment Domestic -1.224 1.139 0.283 
Average Sentiment International  1.513 1.432 0.291 
Average Sentiment Casualties -0.017 2.108 0.994 
Net Sentiment Value Count 0.221 0.682 0.746 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic -0.724 1.047 0.489 
Net Sentiment Value International  1.635 1.183 0.167 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties 1.164 1.829 0.533 
Table B.3: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Carter Administration 
Carter 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.057 0.026 0.029 
Comm Count Domestic -0.046 0.031 0.150 
Comm Count International  -0.090 0.037 0.031 
Comm Count Casualties -0.044 0.034 0.202 
Written Comm Count -0.160 0.118 0.177 
Spoken Comm Count -0.040 0.021 0.053 
Written Comm Domestic -0.183 0.140 0.193 
Written Comm International  -0.137 0.160 0.391 
Spoken Comm Domestic 0.023 0.025 0.354 
Spoken Comm International  -0.082 0.032 0.012 
Written Comm Casualties 0.123 0.148 0.411 




President Comm Count -0.050 0.026 0.054 
PS Comm Count -0.086 0.053 0.108 
President Comm Domestic -0.038 0.031 0.218 
President Comm International  -0.076 0.038 0.048 
PS Comm Domestic -0.028 0.062 0.646 
PS Comm International  -0.224 0.082 0.006 
President Comm Casualties 0.046 0.031 0.153 
PS Comm Casualties 0.098 0.066 0.142 
Policy Comm Count -0.044 0.101 0.662 
Non-Policy Comm Count -0.017 0.025 0.494 
Policy Comm Domestic -0.039 0.120 0.748 
Policy Comm International  -0.064 0.131 0.624 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic -0.005 0.030 0.861 
Non-Policy Comm International  -0.036 0.036 0.312 
Policy Comm Casualties 0.202 0.123 0.109 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.022 0.032 0.494 
Positive Comm Count Count 0.016 0.018 0.384 
Negative Comm Count Count -0.004 0.016 0.780 
Positive Comm Count Domestic -0.004 0.022 0.838 
Negative Comm Count Domestic -0.006 0.019 0.767 
Positive Comm Count International  0.054 0.025 0.031 
Negative Comm Count International  -0.003 0.020 0.881 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.027 0.023 0.232 
Negative Comm Count Casualties -0.001 0.019 0.947 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.056 0.063 0.371 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic -0.096 0.071 0.178 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  0.009 0.086 0.913 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties 0.035 0.079 0.658 
Average Sentiment Count 1.088 0.498 0.029 
Average Sentiment Domestic 1.957 0.563 0.001 
Average Sentiment International  -0.189 0.710 0.790 
Average Sentiment Casualties -0.790 0.659 0.239 
Net Sentiment Value Count 0.292 0.170 0.088 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic 0.545 0.190 0.004 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.184 0.254 0.468 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties -0.111 0.210 0.600 
Table B.4: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Reagan Administration 
Reagan 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.009 0.014 0.552 
Comm Count Domestic -0.048 0.023 0.035 
Comm Count International  0.014 0.020 0.471 
Comm Count Casualties 0.026 0.037 0.487 




Spoken Comm Count -0.006 0.019 0.745 
Written Comm Domestic -0.010 0.073 0.891 
Written Comm International  -0.093 0.071 0.184 
Spoken Comm Domestic -0.073 0.030 0.014 
Spoken Comm International  0.034 0.027 0.204 
Written Comm Casualties -0.068 0.124 0.588 
Spoken Comm Casualties 0.036 0.050 0.470 
President Comm Count -0.011 0.023 0.650 
PS Comm Count -0.021 0.032 0.511 
President Comm Domestic -0.051 0.036 0.156 
President Comm International  0.015 0.033 0.658 
PS Comm Domestic -0.109 0.050 0.029 
PS Comm International  0.029 0.044 0.508 
President Comm Casualties -0.056 0.060 0.359 
PS Comm Casualties -0.026 0.084 0.759 
Policy Comm Count -0.083 0.055 0.134 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.028 0.015 0.065 
Policy Comm Domestic -0.018 0.082 0.825 
Policy Comm International  -0.128 0.079 0.105 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic -0.037 0.026 0.156 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.058 0.020 0.003 
Policy Comm Casualties 0.291 0.132 0.031 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.087 0.043 0.048 
Positive Comm Count Count 0.018 0.016 0.254 
Negative Comm Count Count -0.017 0.013 0.206 
Positive Comm Count Domestic 0.011 0.023 0.636 
Negative Comm Count Domestic -0.011 0.020 0.594 
Positive Comm Count International  0.021 0.022 0.336 
Negative Comm Count International  -0.020 0.019 0.283 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.011 0.041 0.789 
Negative Comm Count Casualties -0.022 0.034 0.524 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.029 0.016 0.059 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic 0.010 0.027 0.703 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.048 0.021 0.021 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.096 0.046 0.670 
Average Sentiment Count 0.055 0.422 0.896 
Average Sentiment Domestic 0.854 0.622 0.169 
Average Sentiment International  -0.497 0.609 0.414 
Average Sentiment Casualties 0.616 1.143 0.591 
Net Sentiment Value Count 0.087 0.084 0.300 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic 0.022 0.129 0.088 
Net Sentiment Value International  0.007 0.120 0.956 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties 0.186 0.225 0.412 
Table B.5: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 





Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count 0.012 0.042 0.775 
Comm Count Domestic 0.037 0.053 0.485 
Comm Count International  0.004 0.053 0.940 
Comm Count Casualties 0.045 0.061 0.463 
Written Comm Count -0.094 0.090 0.297 
Spoken Comm Count -0.093 0.044 0.035 
Written Comm Domestic -0.038 0.113 0.734 
Written Comm International  -0.111 0.116 0.338 
Spoken Comm Domestic 0.011 0.062 0.866 
Spoken Comm International  -0.116 0.054 0.032 
Written Comm Casualties -0.051 0.128 0.691 
Spoken Comm Casualties -0.147 0.066 0.033 
President Comm Count -0.094 0.055 0.087 
PS Comm Count -0.131 0.069 0.057 
President Comm Domestic 0.010 0.075 0.891 
President Comm International  -0.120 0.068 0.080 
PS Comm Domestic -0.019 0.092 0.841 
PS Comm International  -0.159 0.085 0.060 
President Comm Casualties -0.054 0.086 0.535 
PS Comm Casualties -0.274 0.094 0.006 
Policy Comm Count -0.017 0.063 0.788 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.071 0.039 0.066 
Policy Comm Domestic -0.058 0.084 0.487 
Policy Comm International  -0.007 0.078 0.925 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic -0.012 0.056 0.825 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.088 0.047 0.061 
Policy Comm Casualties 0.058 0.095 0.540 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.043 0.063 0.502 
Positive Comm Count Count 0.015 0.031 0.623 
Negative Comm Count Count 0.009 0.017 0.580 
Positive Comm Count Domestic -0.020 0.041 0.628 
Negative Comm Count Domestic 0.016 0.021 0.435 
Positive Comm Count International  0.025 0.040 0.531 
Negative Comm Count International  0.006 0.021 0.777 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.058 0.047 0.224 
Negative Comm Count Casualties -0.017 0.024 0.480 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.051 0.037 0.171 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic -0.070 0.049 0.155 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.045 0.046 0.329 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.037 0.058 0.525 
Average Sentiment Count 0.240 0.724 0.740 
Average Sentiment Domestic 1.296 0.879 0.140 
Average Sentiment International  -0.048 0.903 0.958 




Net Sentiment Value Count 0.055 0.248 0.826 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic 0.411 0.269 0.127 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.067 0.315 0.832 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties 0.071 0.341 0.836 
Table B.6: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Clinton Administration 
Clinton 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.005 0.009 0.552 
Comm Count Domestic -0.004 0.014 0.756 
Comm Count International  -0.006 0.012 0.615 
Comm Count Casualties -0.022 0.019 0.233 
Written Comm Count -0.022 0.040 0.572 
Spoken Comm Count -0.005 0.009 0.570 
Written Comm Domestic -0.010 0.062 0.871 
Written Comm International  -0.037 0.053 0.489 
Spoken Comm Domestic -0.002 0.014 0.858 
Spoken Comm International  -0.008 0.012 0.500 
Written Comm Casualties -0.176 0.082 0.034 
Spoken Comm Casualties -0.001 0.019 0.953 
President Comm Count -0.010 0.014 0.460 
PS Comm Count -0.007 0.016 0.676 
President Comm Domestic -0.016 0.022 0.479 
President Comm International  -0.004 0.019 0.813 
PS Comm Domestic 0.009 0.024 0.702 
PS Comm International  -0.027 0.022 0.217 
President Comm Casualties -0.020 0.030 0.515 
PS Comm Casualties -0.007 0.034 0.830 
Policy Comm Count -0.002 0.030 0.948 
Non-Policy Comm Count -0.003 0.009 0.704 
Policy Comm Domestic -0.016 0.047 0.734 
Policy Comm International  0.017 0.039 0.660 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic -0.010 0.014 0.495 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.002 0.011 0.883 
Policy Comm Casualties -0.010 0.062 0.868 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.025 0.019 0.196 
Positive Comm Count Count -0.012 0.015 0.437 
Negative Comm Count Count 0.016 0.015 0.272 
Positive Comm Count Domestic -0.020 0.024 0.394 
Negative Comm Count Domestic 0.024 0.023 0.394 
Positive Comm Count International  -0.016 0.021 0.941 
Negative Comm Count International  0.006 0.021 0.941 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.015 0.035 0.678 
Negative Comm Count Casualties -0.036 0.033 0.281 




Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic 0.010 0.019 0.592 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.006 0.016 0.705 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.015 0.025 0.543 
Average Sentiment Count -2.807 0.947 0.003 
Average Sentiment Domestic -3.248 1.488 0.029 
Average Sentiment International  -2.232 1.315 0.090 
Average Sentiment Casualties -0.195 2.164 0.929 
Net Sentiment Value Count -0.074 0.068 0.273 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic -0.132 0.104 0.206 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.004 0.092 0.967 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties 0.056 0.144 0.699 
Table B.7: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Bush II Administration 
Bush II 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count 0.007 0.005 0.132 
Comm Count Domestic 0.003 0.008 0.718 
Comm Count International  0.008 0.005 0.111 
Comm Count Casualties 0.010 0.008 0.229 
Written Comm Count 0.017 0.022 0.421 
Spoken Comm Count 0.009 0.005 0.078 
Written Comm Domestic 0.009 0.040 0.825 
Written Comm International  0.020 0.023 0.387 
Spoken Comm Domestic 0.010 0.009 0.288 
Spoken Comm International  0.007 0.006 0.202 
Written Comm Casualties -0.033 0.040 0.408 
Spoken Comm Casualties 0.009 0.010 0.365 
President Comm Count 0.015 0.009 0.088 
PS Comm Count 0.010 0.008 0.170 
President Comm Domestic 0.025 0.016 0.115 
President Comm International  0.008 0.010 0.402 
PS Comm Domestic 0.004 0.013 0.761 
PS Comm International  0.012 0.008 0.150 
President Comm Casualties 0.001 0.018 0.954 
PS Comm Casualties 0.138 0.015 0.346 
Policy Comm Count 0.114 0.047 0.017 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.012 0.004 0.004 
Policy Comm Domestic 0.186 0.086 0.030 
Policy Comm International  0.096 0.054 0.076 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic 0.015 0.007 0.032 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.009 0.005 0.064 
Policy Comm Casualties -0.167 0.102 0.107 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties 0.024 0.009 0.010 
Positive Comm Count Count -0.018 0.023 0.432 




Positive Comm Count Domestic 0.382 0.047 0.420 
Negative Comm Count Domestic -0.037 0.031 0.236 
Positive Comm Count International  -0.037 0.024 0.115 
Negative Comm Count International  0.041 0.016 0.012 
Positive Comm Count Casualties -0.049 0.046 0.291 
Negative Comm Count Casualties 0.040 0.031 0.198 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count -0.010 0.010 0.318 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic 0.009 0.020 0.648 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.017 0.010 0.084 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.024 0.019 0.216 
Average Sentiment Count -0.266 1.437 0.853 
Average Sentiment Domestic 1.405 2.603 0.589 
Average Sentiment International  -0.944 1.544 0.541 
Average Sentiment Casualties 1.043 2.750 0.706 
Net Sentiment Value Count -0.064 0.047 0.173 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic 0.018 0.091 0.847 
Net Sentiment Value International  -0.092 0.050 0.064 
Net Sentiment Value Casualties -0.089 0.095 0.350 
Table B.8: The coefficients, standard errors, and p-values for each of the primary 
relationships examined to test hypothesis 3 for the Obama Administration 
Obama 
Independent Variable Dependent Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Value 
Comm Count Count -0.010 0.012 0.395 
Comm Count Domestic -0.022 0.019 0.243 
Comm Count International  -0.007 0.014 0.608 
Comm Count Casualties -0.007 0.079 0.669 
Written Comm Count 0.075 0.039 0.056 
Spoken Comm Count 0.003 0.011 0.756 
Written Comm Domestic 0.107 0.065 0.099 
Written Comm International  0.048 0.043 0.264 
Spoken Comm Domestic 0.156 0.018 0.387 
Spoken Comm International  -0.003 0.013 0.820 
Written Comm Casualties -0.028 0.067 0.674 
Spoken Comm Casualties 0.000 0.017 0.997 
President Comm Count 0.169 0.026 0.514 
PS Comm Count 0.008 0.012 0.534 
President Comm Domestic 0.034 0.043 0.436 
President Comm International  0.006 0.029 0.851 
PS Comm Domestic 0.021 0.020 0.281 
PS Comm International  0.000 0.015 0.990 
President Comm Casualties -0.008 0.042 0.847 
PS Comm Casualties -0.001 0.020 0.976 
Policy Comm Count -0.001 0.123 0.995 
Non-Policy Comm Count 0.015 0.009 0.085 




Policy Comm International  0.111 0.137 0.416 
Non-Policy Comm Domestic 0.160 0.014 0.246 
Non-Policy Comm International  0.011 0.010 0.307 
Policy Comm Casualties -0.137 0.189 0.472 
Non-Policy Comm Casualties -0.007 0.015 0.627 
Positive Comm Count Count 0.052 0.045 0.241 
Negative Comm Count Count 0.000 0.018 0.998 
Positive Comm Count Domestic -0.004 0.077 0.961 
Negative Comm Count Domestic 0.011 0.031 0.719 
Positive Comm Count International  0.045 0.050 0.364 
Negative Comm Count International  0.008 0.020 0.703 
Positive Comm Count Casualties 0.046 0.071 0.524 
Negative Comm Count Casualties 0.023 0.030 0.454 
Net Sentiment Frequency Count 0.003 0.018 0.880 
Net Sentiment Frequency Domestic 0.015 0.028 0.588 
Net Sentiment Frequency International  -0.005 0.021 0.810 
Net Sentiment Frequency Casualties -0.003 0.028 0.909 
Average Sentiment Count 0.388 1.088 0.722 
Average Sentiment Domestic -3.952 1.839 0.032 
Average Sentiment International  2.639 1.195 0.027 
Average Sentiment Casualties 0.488 1.687 0.773 
Net Sentiment Value Count -0.012 0.069 0.858 
Net Sentiment Value Domestic -0.281 0.116 0.016 
Net Sentiment Value International  0.161 0.077 0.037 
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